


ENVIRONMENTAL LAW

— A STUDY AND TEACHING GUIDE —



— BY DR ADRIAN ADAMS —

PREFACE

Preface

BY DR ADRIAN ADAMS

This book is written for law students who want more than a collection of rules. It is designed to help students understand *why* environmental law exists, *how* its legislation fits together, *how* courts and decision-makers reason with it, and eventually *how a lawyer uses it to advise real people and organisations*.

Environmental law is an unusually practical legal discipline. It reaches into land development, property transactions, infrastructure, energy and resources, corporate governance, government decision-making, biodiversity, pollution, planning, contaminated land, environmental impact assessment, licensing, enforcement and litigation. A single project may require a lawyer to move between Commonwealth legislation, Queensland legislation, local planning controls, scientific reports, expert evidence and administrative decision-making.¹

For a student, that can initially feel fragmented. The purpose of this book is to make the structure visible. Every chapter begins with the problem the law is trying to solve, then moves through the legal architecture, the exact legislation, defined terms, statutory purpose, cases and authorities, evidence, application and practical consequences.

THE LEARNING JOURNEY

STUDENT -> LAWYER -> ADVISER. First learn what the rule means. Then learn how to find, interpret and apply it. Finally learn how to explain the risk, options and next steps to a client, developer, corporation, consultant, regulator, government department, financier, community organisation or other stakeholder.

¹. [Queensland Legislation](#) (Web Page).

Preface - continued

The book therefore treats environmental law as both an academic subject and a professional method. Students are shown how to identify issues, navigate Acts and subordinate legislation, check definitions, read objects clauses, use the *Acts Interpretation Act 1954* (Qld) and *Acts Interpretation Act 1901* (Cth), work with authority, understand expert evidence and convert legal analysis into advice.^{2, 3}

That progression is deliberate. University problem questions teach the same underlying discipline that legal practice demands: identify the decision-maker, identify the source of power or obligation, find the controlling provision, understand the statutory purpose, test the evidence against the legal elements, recognise uncertainty, and state what should happen next.

Environmental law also requires an understanding of values. Whether the law is protecting nature for human welfare, recognising the intrinsic value of ecosystems, or balancing ecological protection against development and social needs can shape statutory design and legal argument. For that reason, this book begins with anthropocentric, biocentric and ecocentric perspectives before moving into the legal meaning of the word *environment*.

The prescribed text for the subject is Gerry Bates, [Environmental Law in Australia](#)⁴ (LexisNexis Butterworths, 11th ed, 2023). It is an important secondary source and will be used throughout the project alongside the current primary law. This guide does not reproduce the prescribed text; it presents environmental law in its own original structure, informed by tertiary and professional education, experience and legal research, and directs students back to primary sources and authoritative research materials.

HOW TO USE AUTHORITY IN THIS BOOK

Blue links take the reader to legislation, cases or authoritative resources where a direct source is available. A legal proposition should ultimately be tied to the controlling source of law. Tertiary and professional education, practical experience and respected secondary commentary help explain the law; they are not substitutes for the law itself.

2. [Acts Interpretation Act 1954 \(Qld\)](#) ss 14A-14B.

3. [Acts Interpretation Act 1901 \(Cth\)](#) ss 15AA-15AB.

4. Gerry Bates, *Environmental Law in Australia* (LexisNexis Butterworths, 11th ed, 2023).

Preface - conclusion

Environmental law changes frequently. Departmental structures change, statutes are amended, standards are introduced and administrative responsibilities move. Students should develop the habit of checking the current authorised version of legislation and the current regulator before advising anyone. That is not merely an examination skill; it is a professional responsibility.

The central aim of this book is confidence through method. A student should finish a chapter knowing not only the legal rule, but also how to recognise the issue in facts, where to find the law, how to interpret it, what evidence matters, what can go wrong, and what a competent adviser would do next.

That is why the chapters deliberately move from **understanding**, to **application**, to **advice**. The reader first learns the concept in plain English, then the exact legal architecture, then the authorities and evidence, then how the same material appears in tutorials, examinations and professional decision-making.

May this book help you approach environmental law with clarity, discipline, curiosity and a growing sense of professional judgment.

PUBLICATION AND SOURCE NOTE

Publication and Source Note

ENVIRONMENTAL LAW - A STUDY AND TEACHING GUIDE is being developed from the author's tertiary and professional education, environmental law experience and a broader programme of legal research. The book is designed as an original teaching work rather than a reproduction of any seminar, transcript or prescribed textbook.

This book is informed by tertiary and professional education, practical experience, legal research, problem-based learning, tutorial and application exercises, and authoritative primary and secondary sources. Together, these help identify the concepts, statutes, cases, authorities and practical skills that students and future practitioners need to understand.

The prescribed secondary text is Gerry Bates, [*Environmental Law in Australia*](#)⁵ (LexisNexis Butterworths, 11th ed, 2023). It is treated as a major supporting source. Primary law remains controlling.

SOURCE HIERARCHY USED IN THIS BOOK

1. Current legislation and regulations. 2. Binding and persuasive judicial authority. 3. Official regulator/government materials. 4. Tertiary education, professional understanding and environmental law experience. 5. Prescribed and respected secondary commentary. Every chapter is written so students can see where explanation ends and legal authority begins.

5. Gerry Bates, *Environmental Law in Australia* (LexisNexis Butterworths, 11th ed, 2023).

Currency, accuracy and hyperlinks

Environmental law is particularly vulnerable to rapid change. A statute can be amended; a regulator can be renamed or restructured; a National Environment Standard can commence; a court can alter the interpretation of a provision; and administrative responsibility can move between agencies. For that reason, the electronic edition uses blue hyperlinks to authoritative current sources wherever technically possible.

Where legislation is cited, the book identifies the relevant Act and provision at section, subsection and paragraph level where that precision matters. Where a case is relied upon, the case name and citation are connected to a verified judgment source where available. Links are a research aid only: the legal proposition in the text remains tied to the cited authority.

The book also distinguishes historical teaching examples from current law. Older legislation and historical decisions remain important where they explain legal development, but a current problem must be answered using the current legal framework unless the question specifically asks for a historical position.

PUBLICATION PRINCIPLE

Course teaching coverage: the FULL LIVE TRANSCRIPTS are the controlling record of what was taught and override JUNI summaries. Official slides and speaker notes, weekly/application questions and supplied course resources are integrated around the live teaching. **Legal accuracy:** current legislation, regulations and authoritative case law control the statement of the law, so obvious speech-to-text errors in a transcript are corrected against the primary source without changing the lecturer's substantive emphasis.

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HOW TO USE THIS BOOK

How to Use This Book

Environmental Law becomes manageable when you know what to look for. Use this book as a working study guide: start with the facts, identify the environmental concern, determine which government level and decision-maker matter, find the controlling legislation, check the definitions and purpose, identify the cases and evidence, apply the law, and then state the practical consequence.

The learning method

THE CORE METHOD

**FACTS -> ISSUE -> SUB-ISSUES -> JURISDICTION -> DECISION-MAKER -> EXACT
LAW: ACT / PART / DIVISION / SECTION / SUBSECTION / PARAGRAPH ->
DEFINITIONS -> OBJECTS / PURPOSE -> INTERPRETATION ACT -> CASE /
AUTHORITY -> EXPERT EVIDENCE -> APPLICATION -> CONCLUSION -> ADVICE ->
NEXT STEP / APPROVAL / CONDITION / REVIEW / ENFORCEMENT RESPONSE.**

Start with the facts, but do not stop at the environmental concern. A lawyer must identify the legal pathway. Is the issue Commonwealth, Queensland, local, international or common law? Does the problem involve an approval, a prohibition, a licence, a referral, a condition, an offence, a judicial review ground or a civil dispute?

Read each chapter in three passes

PASS 1 - UNDERSTAND. Read the plain-English explanation and chapter narrative. Ask what problem the law is trying to solve and why the rule exists.

PASS 2 - MASTER THE LAW. Work through the exact statute, definitions, objects, interpretation provisions, cases, authorities and expert-evidence requirements.

PASS 3 - APPLY AND ADVISE. Use the tutorials, FAQs, multiple-choice questions, short-answer questions and IRAC problems. Then convert the legal conclusion into advice: what should the client, developer, organisation, consultant or decision-maker do next?

Prescribed and recommended text

The prescribed textbook is Gerry Bates, [*Environmental Law in Australia*](#)⁶ (LexisNexis Butterworths, 11th ed, 2023). Use it for deeper commentary, context, cases and statutory discussion. This book is designed to sit beside that text and direct the student back to current primary sources.

6. Gerry Bates, *Environmental Law in Australia* (LexisNexis Butterworths, 11th ed, 2023).

How the end-of-chapter learning suite works

Each chapter ends with a deliberate progression from recall to legal reasoning:

FAQs & Answers. Resolve the questions students most often ask and correct common misunderstandings.

Multiple Choice Questions. Test precise recognition of rules, cases, statutory structure and distinctions. Answers and explanations begin on the following page.

Short Answer Questions. Require the student to explain law in their own words. Model answers begin on the following page.

IRAC Problems. Move from doctrine to facts, law, application, conclusion and advice. Model answers begin on the following page.

Student -> Lawyer -> Adviser. The final revision page asks what the issue means for a real client or decision-maker.

FUN REVISION RESOURCE

Interactive Glossary of Terms

This glossary is an alphabetical revision resource. The **term itself is bold**. The blue bracketed subject label is a genuine internal hyperlink that takes the reader to the relevant teaching section in Chapter 1. The definition that follows is regular body text, the same size and weight as the rest of the book.

Study note: these are short-form revision definitions. For an assessment answer or legal advice, use the exact current legislation, full authorities and the detailed chapter explanation.

A

Acts Interpretation Act 1901 (Cth) [\[Statutory Interpretation\]](#) The Commonwealth interpretation statute. Sections 15AA-15AB are central to purposive interpretation and the controlled use of extrinsic materials.⁷

Acts Interpretation Act 1954 (Qld) [\[Statutory Interpretation\]](#) The Queensland interpretation statute. Sections 14A-14B guide purposive interpretation and the use of extrinsic materials.⁸

Anthropocentric [\[Environmental Ethics and Values\]](#) Human-centred. The environment is valued principally because of its instrumental contribution to human welfare, health, property, prosperity, culture or quality of life.

Anthropogenic change [\[Historical Development\]](#) Environmental change caused or accelerated by human activity.

B

Biocentric [\[Environmental Ethics and Values\]](#) A value position recognising inherent moral value in living beings. It is narrower than ecocentrism, which extends to ecological systems and relationships.

C

Controlled action [\[Commonwealth Environmental Regulation\]](#) An EPBC Act concept linking a proposed action to the Commonwealth approval regime where taking the action without approval would be prohibited by a relevant Part 3 provision.⁹

⁷. Acts Interpretation Act 1901 (Cth) ss 15AA-15AB.

⁸. Acts Interpretation Act 1954 (Qld) ss 14A-14B.

⁹. Environment Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act 1999 (Cth) ss 67-69.

E

Ecocentric [\[Environmental Ethics and Values\]](#) Nature- and ecosystem-centred. Ecological systems and the natural world are treated as possessing intrinsic value independent of direct human benefit.

Environment [\[Meaning of Environment\]](#) A legally significant concept whose meaning depends on the governing statute, its definitions, context and purpose. Modern legislation commonly adopts broad ecological and human/social dimensions.

Environmental ethics [\[Environmental Ethics and Values\]](#) The study of values and norms governing relationships between humans and the natural world.

Environmental impact assessment [\[Environmental Assessment\]](#) A structured process for identifying, assessing and informing decisions about the environmental consequences of proposed actions or projects.

Expert evidence [\[Experts and Evidence\]](#) Scientific or technical evidence supplied by appropriately qualified experts. The lawyer identifies the legal test; the expert addresses the technical facts relevant to that test.

Extrinsic material [\[Statutory Interpretation\]](#) Material outside the enacted statutory text that may be considered in the circumstances permitted by interpretation legislation, such as explanatory materials or certain parliamentary materials.

I

Instrumental value [\[Environmental Ethics and Values\]](#) Value derived from usefulness to another end, commonly human welfare.

Intrinsic value [\[Environmental Ethics and Values\]](#) Value possessed independently of usefulness to humans.

L

Land ethic [\[Historical Development\]](#) Aldo Leopold's idea that humans should see themselves as members of a wider ecological community rather than conquerors of it.¹⁰

M

Mon Repos [\[Meaning of Environment\]](#) The Queensland turtle-rookery setting for the litigation culminating in *The Crown v Murphy*, used in this book to teach contextual interpretation of the word environment.¹¹

¹⁰. Aldo Leopold, *A Sand County Almanac, and Sketches Here and There* (Oxford University Press, 1949).

¹¹. *The Crown v Murphy* [1990] HCA 42; (1990) 64 ALJR 593.

N

National Environmental Protection Agency [\[Institutions and Regulators\]](#) Australia's national environmental regulator, operating from 1 July 2026. Its functions and current delegations should always be checked against current official sources.^{12, 13}

NIMBY [\[Stakeholders and Environmental Values\]](#) “Not In My Back Yard”: shorthand for support or opposition shaped strongly by localised personal impacts. It is a descriptive stakeholder concept, not a legal test.

O

Objects clause [\[Statutory Interpretation\]](#) A provision stating or helping identify the purposes of legislation. It can be important when applying purposive interpretation.

P

Planning and Environment Court [\[Institutions and Regulators\]](#) A specialist Queensland court dealing with relevant planning and environmental disputes within its statutory jurisdiction.

Purposive interpretation [\[Statutory Interpretation\]](#) The method of preferring the interpretation that best achieves the purpose or object of an Act, subject to the statutory text and applicable interpretation legislation.

R

Rights of nature [\[Environmental Ethics and Standing\]](#) The idea that natural objects or ecological entities may possess legally recognised rights or interests capable of representation through guardians or other persons.

S

Sierra Club v Morton [\[Environmental Ethics and Standing\]](#) A 1972 United States Supreme Court case important to this chapter for standing, environmental injury and the debate about legal rights for nature.¹⁴

Standing [\[Environmental Litigation\]](#) The legal capacity of a person or organisation to bring a proceeding or seek review. The governing test depends on the jurisdiction and statutory framework.

^{12.} National Environmental Protection Agency, 'What is the National EPA?' (Web Page) <<https://www.nationalepa.gov.au/about/national-epa/what-is>>.

^{13.} [National Environmental Protection Agency Act 2025 \(Cth\)](#) ss 2-3.

^{14.} *Sierra Club v Morton*, 405 US 727 (1972).

Statutory definition [\[Reading Environmental Legislation\]](#) A definition enacted within legislation. Where applicable it controls the legal meaning of the defined term and may differ from scientific or ordinary usage.

Statutory purpose [\[Statutory Interpretation\]](#) The objective purpose or object of the legislation as revealed by its text, structure and legally relevant context.

T ---

The Crown v Murphy [\[Meaning of Environment\]](#) High Court authority used here to illustrate contextual interpretation of an undefined statutory reference to environment in the Mon Repos turtle-rookery setting.¹⁵

¹⁵. *The Crown v Murphy* [1990] HCA 42; (1990) 64 ALJR 593.

LEGAL RESEARCH

Legal Research: Cases, Legislation and Authorities

Environmental Law is not learned from one textbook or one Act. A strong law student learns how to find the controlling legislation, identify the judicial authority behind a proposition, understand the legal effect of regulator materials, distinguish current law from historical material and then apply those sources to facts.

Research platforms students should know

[Federal Register of Legislation](https://www.legislation.gov.au/).¹⁶ Use the official Commonwealth source for current legislation, commencement information, amendments, instruments and historical versions.

[Queensland Legislation](https://www.legislation.qld.gov.au/).¹⁷ Use the official Queensland source for current Acts, regulations, subordinate legislation and legislative history.

[AustLII](https://www.austlii.edu.au/).¹⁸ A major free Australian legal research database. Use it to locate judgments, legislation and related authorities. Where this book provides a verified direct judgment link, use that direct source.

[National Environmental Protection Agency](https://www.nationalepa.gov.au/about/national-epa/what-is/).¹⁹ Use the current federal regulator's official site for national environmental regulatory information and current institutional arrangements.

¹⁶ Federal Register of Legislation (Web Page) <<https://www.legislation.gov.au/>>.

¹⁷ Queensland Legislation (Web Page) <<https://www.legislation.qld.gov.au/>>.

¹⁸ Australasian Legal Information Institute, AustLII (Web Page) <<https://www.austlii.edu.au/>>.

¹⁹ National Environmental Protection Agency, 'What is the National EPA?' (Web Page) <<https://www.nationalepa.gov.au/about/national-epa/what-is/>>.

Primary law before commentary

Secondary commentary is valuable because it explains structure, identifies authorities and helps a student see connections. It should not be mistaken for the controlling legal source. A useful research sequence is:

QUESTION -> CURRENT ACT / REGULATION -> DEFINED TERMS -> OBJECTS / PURPOSE -> CASES INTERPRETING THE PROVISION -> OFFICIAL REGULATOR MATERIAL -> SECONDARY COMMENTARY -> APPLICATION TO FACTS.

Know what source of law you are using

A statute creates legal rules. A regulation or other legislative instrument may add detail. A case interprets and applies law. Official guidance may explain regulatory practice but does not automatically have the same legal status as legislation. A textbook explains the law but does not enact it. Always identify the source and its legal weight.

RESEARCH DISCIPLINE

Before relying on a proposition, ask: What is the source? Is it current? Is it binding? Does it apply in this jurisdiction? Has later legislation or authority altered the position? Which exact provision or paragraph supports the proposition?

CHAPTER 1

ENVIRONMENTAL LAW: CONTEXT, VALUES, EVOLUTION AND MEANING

From understanding why environmental law exists to learning how a lawyer reads, applies and explains it.

THE LEARNING JOURNEY

STUDENT -> LAWYER -> ADVISER. First understand what the idea or rule means. Then learn how to find the controlling law, interpret it and apply it. Finally, learn how to explain the risk, options and next steps to a client, developer, corporation, consultant, regulator, government department, financier, community organisation or other stakeholder.

CURRENT-LAW ALERT - NATIONAL ENVIRONMENT REFORMS IN TRANSITION (8 OCTOBER 2026)

The [Environment Protection Reform Act 2025 \(Cth\)](#) is being implemented in stages. Tranche 1 commenced on 20 February 2026; the National Environmental Protection Agency commenced on 1 July 2026; the first four National Environmental Standards were made on 19 August 2026; a further tranche commenced on 24 August 2026; and the remaining reforms are due to commence on or before 1 December 2026. The Standards do not apply to project assessment and approval decisions until the new approval tests commence. This book therefore distinguishes the law currently in force from enacted reforms that are not yet fully operative. Before relying on an EPBC provision in practice or an exam, check the current authorised compilation and the [official reform implementation status](#).

1.1 Why this chapter comes first

Environmental law is often introduced through statutes, approvals and offences. That is necessary, but it is not enough. A student who begins only with section numbers can quickly become lost because environmental legislation sits on top of deeper choices

about how society values land, water, species, development, health, culture, economic activity and future generations.

This chapter therefore begins one step earlier. It asks why environmental protection is legally important, how environmental ideas changed over time, what lawyers mean by the word *environment*, and how Parliament turns those ideas into legislation. Those foundations matter later when the book moves into federal responsibility, international environmental law, environmental impact assessment, licensing, contaminated land, land clearing, business liability, common law and environmental litigation.

The objective is practical. By the end of the chapter, you should be able to move from an abstract environmental concern to a disciplined legal method: identify the relevant jurisdiction, find the Act, locate the operative provision, check the definitions, read the objects and purpose, apply the relevant interpretation legislation, identify the cases and evidence, then explain the outcome and next step.

THE CORE METHOD FOR THIS BOOK

**FACTS -> ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUE -> JURISDICTION -> DECISION-MAKER ->
EXACT ACT / PART / DIVISION / SECTION / SUBSECTION / PARAGRAPH ->
DEFINITIONS -> OBJECTS / PURPOSE -> ACTS INTERPRETATION ACT -> CASE /
AUTHORITY -> SCIENTIFIC OR EXPERT EVIDENCE -> APPLICATION ->
CONCLUSION -> ADVICE -> NEXT STEP / APPROVAL / CONDITION / REVIEW /
ENFORCEMENT RESPONSE.**

1.2 Environmental law is about relationships

Environmental law regulates the relationship between human activity and the environment. It is therefore broader than conservation law. A planning decision about housing, a mining approval, clearing native vegetation, pollution controls, the protection of threatened species, a road through habitat, contaminated land, a corporate acquisition and a judicial review application can all become environmental law problems.

The field is also interdisciplinary. Lawyers work with ecologists, planners, hydrologists, engineers, economists, heritage specialists, scientists and government officers. The experts answer scientific and technical questions. The lawyer identifies the legal test those experts must address, the evidence required to satisfy that test, the decision-maker who has power, the procedure that must be followed and the consequence if the law is breached.

Practice point. A good environmental lawyer does not try to become the ecologist, engineer or hydrologist. The lawyer must instead understand enough to frame the correct legal question for the expert and then translate the expert evidence back into the statutory test.

1.3 Environmental ethics: why values matter to law

Environmental ethics examines the values and norms that govern relationships between humans and the natural world. In a law subject this may initially seem philosophical rather than legal. It matters because environmental statutes are created within political and social systems. Parliament decides what to protect, what to regulate, what to permit, what to prohibit, what evidence to require and which interests a decision-maker must consider.

Those choices are influenced by different views about the value of nature. The Week 1 seminar frames two principal positions on a spectrum: **anthropocentric** values and **ecocentric** values. The point is not that one end of the spectrum cares about the environment and the other does not. Both can support environmental protection. Their reasons for doing so are different.

1.4 Anthropocentrism: nature valued through human welfare

Anthropocentric reasoning is human-centred. The environment is valuable because it contributes to human welfare, health, safety, comfort, prosperity, recreation, culture or quality of life. This is sometimes described as **instrumental value**: nature is valuable because of the benefit it provides to people.

Anthropocentrism can justify strong environmental protection. Clean air matters because pollution causes disease. Wetlands may be protected because they reduce flooding and improve water quality. Forests may be protected because they provide recreation, water catchment functions and climate benefits. A reef may be protected because it supports tourism, food, cultural identity and economic activity.

The distinction appears when environmental protection conflicts with another human interest. An anthropocentric decision-maker may be more willing to accept environmental damage where the countervailing human benefit is sufficiently important. Cost, convenience, housing, jobs, infrastructure or health care may therefore become central to the balance.

1.5 Ecocentrism: nature has value in its own right

Ecocentric reasoning treats ecosystems and nature as having **intrinsic value**.

Protection is justified even where no immediate human benefit can be demonstrated. Species, habitats, rivers, forests, reefs and ecological processes matter because they are part of a functioning ecological community.

An ecocentric perspective therefore asks a different question. Instead of asking only what the environment does for people, it asks what the ecosystem needs in order to remain healthy, intact and resilient. That may justify protection even where conservation imposes economic costs or restricts development.

EASY WAY TO REMEMBER THE DIFFERENCE

Anthropocentric: protect nature **for people**.

Biocentric: protect **living things** because they have value.

Ecocentric: protect the **whole ecological system** because nature itself has value.

1.6 Biocentrism: the value of living things

Biocentrism is a useful third concept. It focuses on the inherent value of living beings. Ecocentrism is broader because it can include the integrity of habitats, water systems, soils and the relationships between living and non-living components of ecosystems.

In legal analysis, these labels are explanatory tools rather than substitutes for statutory interpretation. A statute may contain ecocentric language about ecosystems and biodiversity while also requiring consideration of communities, economic consequences and development. Modern environmental law is often *integrated* or *hybrid* rather than purely anthropocentric or purely ecocentric.

1.7 The spectrum matters more than the label

Environmental disputes rarely fit into clean philosophical boxes. Consider a proposal to clear a wetland for a hospital. A strongly ecocentric response may emphasise irreversible habitat loss. An anthropocentric response may emphasise access to essential medical care. A pluralist position may accept that both interests matter and ask whether the need can be met through a lower-impact alternative.

This is why the seminar treats environmental values as a spectrum. In tutorials, assessments and practice, the better analysis usually identifies the competing values,

explains why they conflict and then moves to the legal framework that determines how the conflict is resolved.

HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT

1.8 The evolution of environmental thought

Modern environmental law developed over time. Early legal controls often protected property, public health or access to resources rather than the environment for its own sake. During the twentieth century, scientific understanding and environmental writing increasingly challenged the assumption that nature existed principally for human use.

1700s-1800s	Industrialisation accelerates extraction, urbanisation and large-scale transformation of land and resources.
1949	Aldo Leopold's <i>A Sand County Almanac</i> advances a "land ethic" and challenges the idea of humanity as conqueror of nature. ²⁰
1962	Rachel Carson's <i>Silent Spring</i> draws public attention to the far-reaching effects of pesticides such as DDT. ²¹
1971-1972	<i>The Lorax</i> , Christopher Stone's "Should Trees Have Standing?" and <i>Sierra Club v Morton</i> bring the idea of speaking for nature into public and legal debate. ^{22, 23, 24}
1970s onward	Modern environmental statutes, environmental impact assessment systems and specialist regulatory institutions expand.
1990s onward	International environmental conferences, treaties and sustainable-development principles increasingly influence domestic law.
2026	Australian environmental law continues to change, including the operation of the National Environmental Protection Agency from 1 July 2026. ^{25, 26}

1.9 Aldo Leopold: from conqueror to member of the ecological community

Aldo Leopold's 1949 work *A Sand County Almanac* is important because it challenged the prevailing anthropocentric assumption that humans stand above nature. His "land ethic" proposed that humans should understand themselves as members of a wider ecological community.²⁷

^{20.} Aldo Leopold, *A Sand County Almanac, and Sketches Here and There* (Oxford University Press, 1949).

^{21.} Rachel Carson, *Silent Spring* (Houghton Mifflin, 1962).

^{22.} Dr Seuss, *The Lorax* (Random House, 1971).

^{23.} Christopher D Stone, 'Should Trees Have Standing? - Toward Legal Rights for Natural Objects' (1972) 45 *Southern California Law Review* 450.

^{24.} *Sierra Club v Morton*, 405 US 727 (1972).

^{25.} National Environmental Protection Agency, 'What is the National EPA?' (Web Page).

^{26.} *National Environmental Protection Agency Act 2025 (Cth)* ss 2-3.

For law students, the significance is not that Leopold created a legal rule. He did not. His importance is conceptual. Environmental law later began to reflect a similar shift: ecosystems, biodiversity and ecological integrity increasingly appeared as objects of legal protection rather than as matters protected only because of their usefulness to people.

1.10 Rachel Carson: environmental harm can travel through systems

Rachel Carson's *Silent Spring* (1962) exposed the broader ecological consequences of pesticide use, especially DDT. A chemical applied to one target could affect many species, move through waterways and food chains, and ultimately affect human health as well.²⁸

The deeper legal lesson is that environmental harm may be indirect, cumulative and delayed. Environmental regulation therefore cannot always wait for visible damage. Modern environmental assessment and precautionary approaches are partly responses to this difficulty: by the time harm is obvious, it may be costly or impossible to reverse.

1.11 Christopher Stone and the idea of legal rights for nature

Christopher D Stone, a law professor, attempted to translate environmental ethics into legal doctrine. In [“Should Trees Have Standing? - Toward Legal Rights for Natural Objects” \(1972\) 45 Southern California Law Review 450](#)²⁹, Stone argued that legal systems are capable of recognising legal interests in entities that cannot act personally and must be represented through human agents.

Stone's question was radical for its time: if corporations and other legal entities can possess legally recognised interests, could a river, forest or other natural object also be represented before a court? Whether or not a legal system accepts that proposition, the article changed the way environmental standing and rights of nature could be discussed.

1.12 Sierra Club v Morton: standing and the difficulty of speaking for nature

[Sierra Club v Morton, 405 US 727 \(1972\)](#)³⁰

Facts. The Sierra Club challenged federal action connected with a major ski-development proposal in Mineral King Valley. It relied on the environmental and

²⁷ Aldo Leopold, *A Sand County Almanac, and Sketches Here and There* (Oxford University Press, 1949).

²⁸ Rachel Carson, *Silent Spring* (Houghton Mifflin, 1962).

²⁹ Christopher D Stone, 'Should Trees Have Standing? - Toward Legal Rights for Natural Objects' (1972) 45 *Southern California Law Review* 450.

aesthetic importance of the area but did not allege that the organisation or its members themselves would suffer the necessary injury.

Issue. Was a special interest in environmental protection enough to establish standing?

Holding. The majority held that environmental and aesthetic injury could be legally cognisable, but the plaintiff had to show injury to itself or its members. Sierra Club had not done so on the pleaded case.

Why it matters. Justice Douglas's dissent argued for a more ecocentric model in which natural objects could effectively be represented by guardians. For Australian students, the decision is not binding authority. Its importance here is conceptual: it places the rights-of-nature debate on a legal stage.

THE LEGAL MEANING OF “ENVIRONMENT”

1.13 Why definitions matter

In environmental law, ordinary words often have statutory meanings. The word *environment* is a good example. A statutory definition can determine what a decision-maker must consider, what counts as environmental harm, what an approval can regulate and whether an offence or duty is engaged.

The first professional habit is therefore simple: **never assume you know what a statutory word means until you have checked the Act.** The Week 1 seminar repeatedly emphasises the need to move between the operative provision, the Act's dictionary, surrounding provisions and subordinate legislation.

1.14 The Mon Repos case and the meaning of “environment”

The Mon Repos litigation arose from a proposed residential subdivision near the well-known turtle rookery at Mon Repos on the Queensland coast. The governing legislation required the decision-maker to consider whether the proposal would cause a deleterious effect on “the environment”, but it did not define the word.

The legal problem was therefore not simply whether turtles are important. The problem was interpretive: what did *environment* mean in the particular statutory context, and what was the relevant reference point?

The Crown v Murphy [1990] HCA 42; (1990) 64 ALJR 593³¹

³⁰. *Sierra Club v Morton*, 405 US 727 (1972).

Rule and reasoning. The High Court explained that what constitutes the relevant environment must be identified by reference to the person, object or group surrounded or affected. The land the subject of the proposal was surrounded by coastal land used by turtles as a rookery. A use of the land that reduced turtle use or hatchling survival could alter a feature of that surrounding land and therefore alter the environment of the subject land.

Exam point. Do not reduce the case to “turtles are the environment”. The stronger statement is that the statutory word was interpreted contextually and that the turtle rookery was a feature of the relevant surrounding environment.

1.15 How statutes define the environment

Definitions have evolved. Older legislation sometimes described the environment mainly by reference to human surroundings. Modern legislation more commonly includes ecosystems, natural and physical resources, places, ecological relationships, heritage and social, economic or cultural conditions.

This does not mean every modern definition is purely ecocentric. A contemporary definition may recognise ecosystems and intrinsic ecological value while also expressly including people, communities and economic conditions. That is why a lawyer must apply the enacted wording rather than impose a philosophical label on the statute.

1.16 Current Queensland definition - Environmental Protection Act 1994 (Qld) s 8

The current [Environmental Protection Act 1994 \(Qld\)](#)³² uses an inclusive definition. Section 8 includes:

- ecosystems and their constituent parts, including people and communities;
- all natural and physical resources;
- the physical characteristics of locations, places and areas;
- the physical surroundings of people, including land, waters, atmosphere, climate, sound, odours and tastes; and
- social, economic, aesthetic and cultural conditions that affect, or are affected by, the preceding matters.

^{31.} [The Crown v Murphy](#) [1990] HCA 42; (1990) 64 ALJR 593.

^{32.} [Environmental Protection Act 1994 \(Qld\) s 8.](#)

Current-law alert. Section 8 was amended in 2024. When older educational materials reproduce earlier wording, a current-law problem should be checked against the authorised current legislation.

1.17 Commonwealth definition - EPBC Act s 528

The [Environment Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act 1999 \(Cth\)](#)³³ contains an extensive general dictionary in s 528. The Act's definition of *environment* is broad and supports a national regime concerned with ecosystems, natural resources, places, heritage and social, economic and cultural aspects.

For a lawyer, the important method is not to memorise a definition in isolation. Read the definition together with the specific protected matter, approval test, object and decision-making provision that makes the definition legally relevant.

³³. [Environment Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act 1999 \(Cth\) s 528](#).

STATUTORY INTERPRETATION

1.18 Reading environmental legislation properly

Environmental law is statute-heavy. The ability to navigate and interpret legislation is therefore a core professional skill. It is not enough to locate a section that looks relevant. You must determine how the section fits into the Act, whether key terms are defined, whether exceptions or subordinate instruments apply, what purpose the Act serves and how courts have interpreted the provision.

**TEXT -> DEFINITION -> CONTEXT -> OBJECTS / PURPOSE ->
INTERPRETATION ACT -> EXTRINSIC MATERIAL (WHERE PERMITTED) ->
CASE LAW -> EVIDENCE -> APPLICATION -> CONSEQUENCE.**

1.19 What did Parliament intend?

Students often say that statutory interpretation is about discovering “what Parliament intended”. That is useful shorthand only if it is expressed carefully. Courts do not ordinarily search for the private mental state of an individual minister or parliamentarian. The task is objective: interpret the enacted text in context and in a way that best achieves the statutory purpose or object, using legally recognised interpretive materials where appropriate.

This matters in environmental law because legislation often reflects compromise. An Act may pursue environmental protection while also establishing workable approval processes, recognising social or economic conditions, allocating responsibility between levels of government, or creating enforcement and review pathways.

1.20 Queensland - Acts Interpretation Act 1954 (Qld) ss 14A-14B

[Section 14A of the Acts Interpretation Act 1954 \(Qld\)](#)³⁴ requires the interpretation that will best achieve the purpose of the Act to be preferred. The rule applies whether or not the purpose is expressly stated, subject to the statutory limits.

Section 14B permits consideration of relevant extrinsic material capable of assisting interpretation in the circumstances specified by the section. Examples include explanatory notes, certain reports, treaties mentioned in the Act and the speech introducing the Bill.

³⁴. [Acts Interpretation Act 1954 \(Qld\)](#) ss 14A-14B.

HOW TO USE THIS IN A PROBLEM

Do not simply cite s 14A and move on. First identify the competing interpretations. Then explain the Act's purpose and why one interpretation better achieves that purpose. If you use extrinsic material, explain what material it is and why the legislation permits you to consider it.

1.21 Commonwealth - Acts Interpretation Act 1901 (Cth) ss 15AA-15AB

[Section 15AA of the Acts Interpretation Act 1901 \(Cth\)](#)³⁵ requires the interpretation that would best achieve the purpose or object of the Act to be preferred. Section 15AB governs consideration of extrinsic material capable of assisting the ascertainment of meaning.

These provisions are especially important when working with Commonwealth environmental legislation such as the EPBC Act. The practical sequence remains the same: start with text, read the provision in context, identify purpose, check definitions and then use cases or extrinsic material where relevant.³⁶

1.22 Scientific meaning and legal meaning are not always identical

Scientists may use terms according to their discipline. Legislation may define the same term differently. That is not a mistake; it is a feature of statutory law. An ecologist may explain what constitutes habitat, a hydrologist may describe a catchment, and a planner may assess land use. The lawyer must then identify whether the legislation adopts, modifies or replaces the scientific concept with a legal definition.

Professional habit. Before briefing an expert, identify the exact statutory question the expert needs to answer. An excellent scientific report can still be legally unhelpful if it does not address the relevant statutory test.

³⁵. [Acts Interpretation Act 1901 \(Cth\) ss 15AA-15AB](#).

³⁶. [Environment Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act 1999 \(Cth\)](#).

FROM LAW STUDENT TO LAWYER

1.23 The professional method

Environmental legal work usually begins before litigation. A client may want to know whether a development can proceed, whether an approval is required, whether land can be cleared, whether contamination creates a disclosure or remediation issue, whether a federal referral is required, or whether a regulator's decision can be challenged.

The lawyer's first job is therefore to organise the problem. The following method can be used throughout this book.

Step	Question	Professional purpose
1	What activity is proposed or what harm has occurred?	Define the factual action precisely.
2	Where is the site and who is acting?	Identify jurisdiction, land tenure, government level and potential statutory regimes.
3	What environmental values or protected matters may be affected?	Identify habitat, species, water, heritage, contamination, emissions, vegetation or other triggers.
4	Which Act and operative provision control?	Move from environmental concern to legal rule.
5	What definitions, objects, exceptions and instruments matter?	Read the statutory scheme as a whole.
6	What evidence is required?	Brief the correct experts and collect factual material.
7	Who decides and what procedure applies?	Map referral, assessment, application, consultation and decision pathways.
8	What are the risks?	Identify delay, refusal, conditions, offences, civil penalties, remediation, review and reputational exposure.
9	What should the client do next?	Give clear advice, not merely legal description.

1.24 Example: advising a developer before site acquisition

Assume a developer is considering purchasing land for a residential project. The land contains native vegetation, a drainage line and possible habitat for a listed threatened species. The client asks a simple commercial question: "Can we develop it?"

A poor answer is: “Environmental approvals may be required.” A useful legal answer identifies the investigation pathway. Before acquisition, the lawyer should consider the site's planning controls, State environmental legislation, vegetation constraints, species records, Commonwealth protected-matter risk, water issues, heritage and any contamination history. The lawyer may recommend ecological due diligence and searches before the client becomes contractually committed.

If a potential Commonwealth protected matter is identified, the lawyer should assess whether the proposed action may engage the EPBC referral and approval regime. Section 67 defines a controlled action; s 67A prohibits taking a controlled action without the required approval or recognised legal basis; s 68 deals with referral by the person proposing the action; and s 69 permits a State, Territory or relevant agency to refer a proposal in the circumstances specified.

The point is not that every project goes to the Commonwealth. The point is to identify whether a federal trigger exists instead of assuming that State planning approval is the whole answer.

1.25 Current federal institutional context

The [National Environmental Protection Agency](#)³⁷ began operating on 1 July 2026. It is Australia's national environmental regulator and brings together regulatory functions under national environmental laws, including assessment and approvals functions under the updated EPBC framework.,^{38, 39}

Institutional change reinforces an important research lesson: environmental law changes. A textbook can teach the structure and method, but a lawyer must still verify the current statute, current agency, current delegation and current regulatory process before giving advice.

1.26 The cost of getting environmental advice wrong

Environmental mistakes can produce more than an administrative inconvenience. They may cause project delay, refusal, remediation obligations, civil penalties, criminal prosecution, legal costs and reputational damage. The Week 1 seminar uses the Taylors Beach prosecution to demonstrate this professional risk.⁴⁰

Gordon Plath ... v Fish; ... v Orogen Pty Ltd [2010] NSWLEC 144⁴¹

A consultant had accepted a role involving legislative compliance for vegetation-clearing works. The clearing affected koala habitat and movement corridors. The

³⁷. National Environmental Protection Agency, 'What is the National EPA?' (Web Page) <<https://www.nationalepa.gov.au/about/national-epa/what-is>>.

³⁸. [Environment Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act 1999 \(Cth\)](#).

³⁹. [National Environmental Protection Agency Act 2025 \(Cth\)](#) ss 2-3.

adviser and company were prosecuted. Orders included fines, habitat-mapping work, publication orders and prosecution costs.

Why it matters. A lawyer or consultant cannot safely rely on assumptions about whether an approval or licence is required. Statutory due diligence is a professional discipline. The cost of being wrong can greatly exceed the original professional fee.

1.27 From student answer to client advice

THE DIFFERENCE IN WRITING STYLE

Student answer: identify the issue, state the rule with exact authority, apply the facts and reach a conclusion.

Client advice: explain the conclusion in practical terms, identify uncertainty, quantify or describe the risk, identify information still required, and recommend the next step.

A client does not usually need a lecture on every legal principle. The client needs to know what the law means for the project or decision. The lawyer's work behind the advice may be complex; the advice itself should be clear.

1.28 How to write an Environmental Law problem in IRAC form

- | | |
|--------------------|---|
| Issue | Identify the proposed action, environmental harm or decision, the relevant jurisdiction, decision-maker and legal trigger. Break broad disputes into separate legal issues. |
| Rule / Law | Start with the exact Act and operative provision. Add definitions, objects, interpretation provisions, exceptions, regulations and the cases that explain the rule. |
| Application | Apply one fact to one legal element at a time. Use expert evidence where the statute requires factual or scientific judgment. Address the strongest alternative argument. |

Conclusion

41. [Gordon Plath of the Department of Environment and Climate Change v Fish; Gordon Plath of the Department of Environment and Climate Change v Orogen Pty Ltd](#) [2010] NSWLEC 144.

40. [Gordon Plath of the Department of Environment and Climate Change v Fish; Gordon Plath of the Department of Environment and Climate Change v Orogen Pty Ltd](#) [2010] NSWLEC 144.

State the likely legal consequence, then add the practical next step: referral, further studies, approval application, condition negotiation, review, compliance action or other response.

1.29 Chapter synthesis

- Environmental law is a body of law that manages relationships between human activity and the environment.
- Anthropocentric, biocentric and ecocentric perspectives explain different reasons for environmental protection.
- Modern environmental statutes often combine ecological, social, cultural and economic values.
- Leopold, Carson and Stone help explain the historical movement toward recognising ecological systems and intrinsic value.
- *Sierra Club v Morton* illustrates the difficulty of translating rights-of-nature ideas into standing doctrine.⁴²
- *The Crown v Murphy* shows why statutory context and the relevant reference point matter when interpreting “environment”.⁴³
- Environmental Protection Act 1994 (Qld) s 8 provides a current broad definition of environment.⁴⁴
- Acts Interpretation Act 1954 (Qld) ss 14A-14B and Acts Interpretation Act 1901 (Cth) ss 15AA-15AB are central interpretive tools.^{45, 46}
- Good environmental legal practice depends on accurate statutory navigation, current-law research and properly framed expert evidence.
- The professional endpoint is advice: tell the client what the law means, the risk, the evidence needed and the next step.

42. *Sierra Club v Morton*, 405 US 727 (1972).

43. *The Crown v Murphy* [1990] HCA 42; (1990) 64 ALJR 593.

44. *Environmental Protection Act 1994 (Qld)* s 8.

45. *Acts Interpretation Act 1954 (Qld)* ss 14A-14B.

46. *Acts Interpretation Act 1901 (Cth)* ss 15AA-15AB.

CHAPTER 1 LAWYER'S CHECKLIST

1. What is the environmental concern?
2. What value conflict sits beneath it?
3. Which level of government has the relevant statutory role?
4. What Act and operative provision control?
5. What does the Act define?
6. What is the statutory purpose?
7. What interpretation legislation applies?
8. What cases or authorities explain the provision?
9. What expert evidence is required?
10. What should the client do next?

CHAPTER 1 FAQ QUESTIONS

Chapter 1 FAQs - Questions

1. Is anthropocentrism anti-environment?

2. Is ecocentrism the same as biocentrism?

3. Why do lawyers care about environmental philosophy?

4. What is the safest way to use *The Crown v Murphy*?

5. Do I always use an ordinary dictionary first?

6. What does “purpose” mean in statutory interpretation?

7. Should I cite tertiary or professional educational material as legal authority?

8. Why is current-law checking so important in Environmental Law?

CHAPTER 1 FAQ ANSWERS

Chapter 1 FAQs - Answers

1. No. Anthropocentric reasoning can support extensive environmental protection. The difference is the reason: protection is justified because environmental quality contributes to human welfare. The position becomes most visible when protection conflicts with another important human interest.

2. No. Biocentrism focuses on the inherent value of living beings. Ecocentrism is broader and includes ecological systems, habitats, relationships and physical components of ecosystems.

3. Because values help explain statutory objects, definitions, protected matters and policy choices. Philosophy does not replace the legal rule, but it helps explain why the legal rule exists and how competing arguments are framed.

4. Use [The Crown v Murphy \[1990\] HCA 42](#) as an example of contextual statutory interpretation. Do not state simply that “turtles are the environment”. Explain that the relevant environment was identified by reference to the land and its surroundings, and the turtle rookery was a feature of that environment.

5. No. First check whether the Act defines the word. A statutory definition controls where applicable. Ordinary meaning becomes more important where the legislation does not define the term or the definition still leaves an interpretive question.

6. It means the objective statutory purpose or object revealed by the enacted text, structure and legally relevant context. It is not simply the private subjective intention of an individual member of Parliament.

7. No. Tertiary and professional education, practical experience and textbooks can help explain the law, but a legal proposition should ultimately be tied to legislation, a case, an authorised regulatory source or another legally relevant authority.

8. Because statutes, agency structures, delegations, standards and regulatory processes change. The current Queensland definition in *Environmental Protection Act 1994* (Qld) s 8 and the commencement of the National EPA in 2026 illustrate why teaching materials must be checked against current authorised sources before legal reliance.

CHAPTER 1 MASTERY QUIZ - MULTIPLE CHOICE

Chapter 1 Mastery Quiz - Multiple Choice

1. Anthropocentric environmental value is best described as:

- A. value that exists only in non-living things
- B. value nature has because of its contribution to human welfare
- C. a rule giving ecosystems legal personality
- D. a rule requiring every development to be refused

2. Ecocentric reasoning is most closely associated with:

- A. intrinsic value in ecological systems
- B. taxation of environmental harm
- C. private property rights only
- D. human convenience as the sole value

3. Christopher Stone's 1972 article is significant because it:

- A. enacted the EPBC Act
- B. abolished standing rules
- C. argued for legal rights for natural objects
- D. created Queensland's Planning and Environment Court^{50, 51}

4. In *Sierra Club v Morton*, the majority held that:

- A. natural objects automatically had standing
- B. Sierra Club lacked standing because it did not allege injury to itself or its members
- C. all environmental claims were non-justiciable
- D. Disney's project was approved by the Supreme Court⁵²

⁵⁰. Christopher D Stone, 'Should Trees Have Standing? - Toward Legal Rights for Natural Objects' (1972) 45 *Southern California Law Review* 450.

⁵¹. [Environment Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act 1999 \(Cth\)](#).

⁵². *Sierra Club v Morton*, 405 US 727 (1972).

5. The best way to state *The Crown v Murphy* is:

- A. every animal is legally the environment
- B. the High Court treated statutory meaning as context-dependent and linked turtle use of surrounding land to the relevant environment
- C. dictionaries can never be used
- D. environmental statutes must always be interpreted ecocentrically⁵³

6. Under Environmental Protection Act 1994 (Qld) s 8, “environment”:

- A. means only land and water
- B. excludes people and communities
- C. includes ecosystems, resources, places, physical surroundings of people and relevant social/economic/aesthetic/cultural conditions
- D. is undefined⁵⁴

7. Acts Interpretation Act 1954 (Qld) s 14A primarily requires:

- A. the narrowest possible interpretation
- B. an interpretation favouring development
- C. the interpretation that best achieves the purpose of the Act
- D. use of ministerial speeches in every case⁵⁵

8. Acts Interpretation Act 1901 (Cth) s 15AB deals with:

- A. extrinsic material
- B. criminal sentencing
- C. standing
- D. environmental impact statements⁵⁶

⁵³. *The Crown v Murphy* [1990] HCA 42; (1990) 64 ALJR 593.

⁵⁴. *Environmental Protection Act 1994* (Qld) s 8.

⁵⁵. *Acts Interpretation Act 1954* (Qld) ss 14A-14B.

⁵⁶. *Acts Interpretation Act 1901* (Cth) ss 15AA-15AB.

9. A controlled action under the EPBC framework is relevant because:

- A. every State approval is automatically federalised
- B. an action may require federal approval where a relevant Part 3 prohibition would otherwise apply
- C. only Commonwealth agencies can refer actions
- D. local government approval replaces federal approval⁵⁷

10. The best professional response to an environmental-law problem is to:

- A. start with tertiary teaching material and stop there
- B. assume technical terms have ordinary meaning
- C. identify facts, jurisdiction, exact law, definitions, purpose, evidence, application and next step
- D. rely on one textbook regardless of amendments

⁵⁷. *Environment Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act 1999* (Cth) ss 67-69.

ANSWERS AND EXPLANATIONS

Chapter 1 Mastery Quiz - Answers and Explanations

1. **B.** Anthropocentrism values environmental protection because of its instrumental benefit to humans.

2. **A.** Ecocentrism recognises intrinsic value in ecological systems and nature.

3. **C.** Stone argued that legal systems could recognise rights or legally cognisable interests in natural objects.⁵⁸

4. **B.** The majority required injury to the plaintiff or its members; Sierra Club had not pleaded that injury.⁵⁹

5. **B.** The case is about contextual statutory meaning and the environmental features surrounding the land.⁶⁰

6. **C.** Current s 8 is broad and expressly includes ecological, physical and human/social dimensions.⁶¹

7. **C.** Section 14A is a purposive interpretation provision.⁶²

⁵⁸ Christopher D Stone, 'Should Trees Have Standing? - Toward Legal Rights for Natural Objects' (1972) 45 *Southern California Law Review* 450.

⁵⁹ *Sierra Club v Morton*, 405 US 727 (1972).

⁶⁰ *The Crown v Murphy* [1990] HCA 42; (1990) 64 ALJR 593.

⁶¹ *Environmental Protection Act 1994* (Qld) s 8.

⁶² *Acts Interpretation Act 1954* (Qld) ss 14A-14B.

8. A. Section 15AB regulates the use of extrinsic material in interpreting Commonwealth Acts.⁶³

9. B. Controlled-action status links a proposed action to the federal approval regime where Part 3 would otherwise prohibit the action without approval.⁶⁴

10. C. The professional method integrates factual, statutory, interpretive, evidentiary and practical analysis.

^{63.} *Acts Interpretation Act 1901* (Cth) ss 15AA-15AB.

^{64.} *Environment Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act 1999* (Cth) ss 67-69.

SHORT ANSWER QUESTIONS

Chapter 1 Short Answer Questions

1. Explain the difference between instrumental value and intrinsic value.

2. Why is the anthropocentric/ecocentric distinction best understood as a spectrum?

3. What contribution did Aldo Leopold make to environmental thought?⁶⁵

4. What is the legal significance of Christopher Stone's "Should Trees Have Standing?" for this chapter?⁶⁶

5. Explain the central interpretive lesson from *The Crown v Murphy*.⁶⁷

6. Why should Environmental Protection Act 1994 (Qld) s 8 be checked in the current authorised legislation rather than copied from older educational material?⁶⁸

7. Explain how Acts Interpretation Act 1954 (Qld) s 14A changes the way a student should approach ambiguous environmental legislation.⁶⁹

8. Why is expert evidence important in environmental law, and what is the lawyer's role in relation to that evidence?

⁶⁵ Aldo Leopold, *A Sand County Almanac, and Sketches Here and There* (Oxford University Press, 1949).

⁶⁶ Christopher D Stone, 'Should Trees Have Standing? - Toward Legal Rights for Natural Objects' (1972) 45 *Southern California Law Review* 450.

⁶⁷ *The Crown v Murphy* [1990] HCA 42; (1990) 64 ALJR 593.

⁶⁸ *Environmental Protection Act 1994* (Qld) s 8.

⁶⁹ *Acts Interpretation Act 1954* (Qld) ss 14A-14B.

SHORT ANSWER MODEL ANSWERS

Chapter 1 Short Answer Model Answers

1. Instrumental value is value derived from usefulness to another end, commonly human welfare. Intrinsic value is value that exists independently of usefulness to humans.

2. Both positions can support environmental protection. They differ in justification and in how they respond when environmental protection conflicts with human cost, convenience or development. Real-world positions often fall between the two ends.

3. Leopold's land ethic challenged human moral superiority over nature and described humans as members of an ecological community rather than conquerors of it. The importance is conceptual rather than statutory.⁷⁰

4. Stone attempted to translate ecocentric ethics into legal form by arguing that natural objects could possess legally recognised rights or interests represented through guardians.⁷¹

5. The meaning of an undefined statutory term must be found contextually. The High Court identified the relevant environment by reference to the land and its surrounding features, including the turtle rookery.⁷²

6. Environmental statutes are amended. The current authorised s 8 differs from older wording and is the correct starting point for a present-day legal problem.⁷³

^{70.} Aldo Leopold, *A Sand County Almanac, and Sketches Here and There* (Oxford University Press, 1949).

^{71.} Christopher D Stone, 'Should Trees Have Standing? - Toward Legal Rights for Natural Objects' (1972) 45 *Southern California Law Review* 450.

^{72.} *The Crown v Murphy* [1990] HCA 42; (1990) 64 ALJR 593.

^{73.} *Environmental Protection Act 1994* (Qld) s 8.

7. Section 14A requires the interpretation that best achieves the Act's purpose. A student should therefore identify competing interpretations, identify statutory purpose and explain why the preferred construction better advances that purpose.⁷⁴

8. Environmental legal tests frequently depend on scientific facts. Experts provide the technical evidence; the lawyer identifies the statutory test, frames the questions for the expert and explains how the evidence satisfies or fails to satisfy the legal elements.

⁷⁴ *Acts Interpretation Act 1954 (Qld)* ss 14A-14B.

IRAC PROBLEM QUESTIONS

Chapter 1 IRAC Problem Questions

IRAC Question 1 - Undefined “environment” and a turtle rookery

A Queensland local authority is required by a hypothetical older statute to consider whether a proposed coastal subdivision will cause a “deleterious effect on the environment”. The Act does not define environment. Ecologists advise that increased lighting and vehicle movement are likely to reduce nesting success on an adjoining turtle rookery. Advise how a court should approach the meaning of environment.

IRAC Question 2 - Developer near threatened-species habitat

A developer proposes 600 residential lots on land containing potential habitat for a nationally listed threatened species. State planning approval appears achievable. The developer asks whether the State approval is enough to start clearing. Identify the environmental-law steps a lawyer should take before advising that works may commence.

IRAC Question 3 - Professional advice and unlawful clearing

An environmental consultant is retained to “ensure all environmental approvals for clearing are identified”. The consultant advises that no further approval is required. Clearing begins and destroys protected habitat. A regulator alleges that a licence was in fact required. Explain the legal and professional issues that should be investigated before advising the consultant and its director.

IRAC MODEL ANSWERS

Chapter 1 Detailed IRAC Model Answers

IRAC Answer 1 - Undefined “environment” and a turtle rookery

Issue

What does “environment” mean where the governing statute does not define it, and can predicted effects on turtle nesting amount to a deleterious effect on the environment of the proposed subdivision land?

Rule

Begin with the statutory text and context. Where the term is undefined, ordinary meaning may assist, but the provision must be read purposively. In Queensland, Acts Interpretation Act 1954 (Qld) s 14A requires the interpretation that best achieves the Act's purpose. The Crown v Murphy illustrates that the relevant environment is identified by reference to the object or land surrounded or affected and that the turtle rookery can be a feature of that surrounding environment.^{75 76}

Application

The subdivision land adjoins a turtle rookery. The ecological evidence links lighting and traffic generated by the proposed use to reduced nesting success. The court should therefore consider whether that predicted change alters a feature of the surrounding coastal environment relevant to the land rather than artificially separating the turtles from their habitat.

Conclusion

There is a strong basis to treat the predicted effect on the rookery as an effect on the relevant environment. The exact conclusion would still depend on the statute's purpose and factual evidence.

IRAC Answer 2 - Developer near threatened-species habitat

Issue

Whether State planning approval alone authorises clearing, or whether additional State or Commonwealth environmental approvals/referrals are required.

Rule

The lawyer must identify all applicable statutory layers. At Commonwealth level, EPBC Act ss 67 and 67A address controlled actions and the prohibition on taking

⁷⁵ *Acts Interpretation Act 1954 (Qld)* ss 14A-14B.

them without the required approval or recognised legal basis; s 68 provides for referral by the person proposing the action. Relevant protected matters include listed threatened species and ecological communities. State legislation and planning controls must also be checked.⁷⁷

Application

Potential habitat for a nationally listed species creates a federal-risk question but does not automatically prove that federal approval is required. The lawyer should obtain current species and habitat information, define the proposed action, commission ecological assessment if necessary, assess likely impacts, review the current referral guidance and determine whether a referral is required or prudent. State clearing, vegetation, water, heritage and other approvals must be mapped separately.

Conclusion

The developer should not be advised that State planning approval alone is sufficient. Further due diligence is required before clearing. The advice should identify approval risk, required studies, referral options, program implications and the risk of enforcement if works commence prematurely.

IRAC Answer 3 - Professional advice and unlawful clearing

Issue

What statutory exposure and professional responsibility may arise where a consultant accepted responsibility for identifying approvals but advised incorrectly and protected habitat was cleared?

Rule

First identify the actual clearing offence or approval requirement and the parties to whom liability can attach under the current legislation. Investigate any executive-officer provisions, accessorial liability, due-diligence obligations and sentencing/remedial powers. The Taylors Beach / Orogen prosecution is a useful historical illustration of the consequences that can follow when a professional adviser accepts a compliance role and gets the approval position wrong.⁷⁸

Application

The retainer wording is important because it may show the scope of responsibility accepted. The lawyer should review the advice, factual assumptions, site information provided, whether the consultant undertook appropriate searches, whether further expert work was required, who made the clearing decision and

⁷⁶ *The Crown v Murphy* [1990] HCA 42; (1990) 64 ALJR 593.

⁷⁷ *Environment Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act 1999* (Cth) ss 67-69.

⁷⁸ *Gordon Plath of the Department of Environment and Climate Change v Fish; Gordon Plath of the Department of Environment and Climate Change v Orogen Pty Ltd* [2010] NSWLEC 144.

whether the director was personally involved. Separate civil/professional-negligence exposure may also require investigation.

Conclusion

The adviser should not assume liability follows automatically from a wrong answer, but the facts create serious regulatory and professional-risk issues. Immediate steps should include preserving documents, stopping further potentially unlawful works, identifying remediation or regulator-notification obligations and obtaining advice on response strategy.

WEEK 1 APPLICATION / TUTORIAL QUESTIONS

Chapter 1 Tutorial Questions

These questions test the transition from environmental values and definitions to legal analysis. Read the questions first and attempt your own response before turning to the model answers on the following page.

Question 1 — Comparing statutory definitions of “environment”

Find two different Acts, other than those discussed in the Week 1 seminar, from any Australian State or Territory that have “environment” or “environmental” in their title. Compare their definitions of “environment”. What reasons can be advanced for any differences?

Question 2 — Wildlife fight taken to the top

(a) Identify the stakeholders with an interest or role in the development. **(b)** Using the Mineral King / *Sierra Club v Morton* discussion and Christopher Stone’s “Should Trees Have Standing?”, identify stakeholders who may need others to speak for them. **(c)** Explain what it means, in environmental-law terms, to take the dispute “to the federal arena” and seek Commonwealth action. **(d)** If stopping the project is unlikely, explain how an “adequate buffer” or other improvement could be achieved legally.

Question 3 — Environmental ethics and competing development needs

A proposed supermarket in regional Queensland would destroy the only Queensland breeding ground of an endangered legless lizard, and no alternative site or translocation option exists. The nearest supermarket is about 180 km away. Assume there is no governing environmental law and decide the problem purely from an environmental-ethics perspective. Would your answer change if the project were a hospital, affordable housing, the affected species were a koala, or the proposal were agricultural clearing in a developing nation?

WEEK 1 APPLICATION / MODEL ANSWERS

Chapter 1 Tutorial Model Answers

Question 1 — Model answer. The legal lesson is that “environment” is not a universal statutory constant. Compare, for example, the [*Environmental Management and Pollution Control Act 1994 \(Tas\)*](#), whose interpretation provisions and statutory objectives operate within a broad pollution-control and environmental-management scheme, with the [*Environmental Planning and Assessment Act 1979 \(NSW\)*](#), where “environment” is framed around the surroundings of humans within a planning-and-assessment statute. A lawyer should not simply label one statute “ecocentric” and another “anthropocentric”. The better method is to connect the definition to the Act’s date, subject matter, objects, operative provisions and regulatory purpose. A broader definition may be needed where the statute regulates pollution, ecosystems and diffuse environmental harm; a planning statute may use a definition that reflects the human and built environment as well as natural systems. The key examination and professional point is: **read the definition with the statutory purpose, then ask what legal work the definition performs in the operative provision you are applying.**

Question 2(a) — Stakeholders. The development illustrates why environmental practice begins with stakeholder mapping. Relevant interests may include the developer; current and future residents; construction and operational employees; commercial participants; Tweed Shire Council; the City of Gold Coast where cross-border effects arise; State decision-makers; the Commonwealth Environment Minister and regulator; local communities using the water system for recreation or drinking water; flora, fauna, habitat, terrestrial and aquatic ecosystems; and environmental organisations advocating for interests that cannot speak for themselves.

Question 2(b) — Representation and standing. The species, habitat and ecological systems cannot commence proceedings themselves under conventional legal personality rules. The Mineral King debate, [*Sierra Club v Morton*, 405 US 727 \(1972\)](#), and Christopher Stone’s “Should Trees Have Standing?” show the conceptual problem: who may invoke legal processes to protect nature where the environmental interest is not reducible to ownership or commercial injury? The correct legal answer in a real Australian matter then depends on the standing provisions and review/enforcement pathways in the governing statute.

Question 2(c) — “Federal arena”. This means asking whether Commonwealth environmental law is engaged, rather than assuming State or local approval is the end of the matter. Under the [*Environment Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act 1999 \(Cth\)*](#), a proposed action may engage a controlling provision if it has, will have or is likely to have a significant impact on a protected matter. The legal inquiry is therefore: identify the protected matter; identify the relevant controlling provision; determine whether referral/approval obligations arise; and consider Commonwealth enforcement if unlawful works are threatened or undertaken.

Question 2(d) — Conditions, mitigation and enforcement. Environmental disputes are not always binary “approve/refuse” contests. A decision-maker may have statutory power to impose enforceable approval conditions requiring buffers, habitat protection, timing restrictions, monitoring, rehabilitation, water-quality controls or other mitigation. A lawyer must identify the exact source and limits of the conditioning power and ensure the condition is sufficiently certain and connected to the statutory purpose. Breach of a valid condition can then create an enforcement issue.

Question 3 — Model reasoning. The point is not to discover one morally “correct” answer. It is to expose how the weight assigned to environmental and human interests changes with the facts. The supermarket scenario pits irreversible extinction and habitat loss against cost-of-living and access to essentials. A hospital strengthens the human-life and health interest. Affordable housing introduces need, social equity and infrastructure consequences. Replacing an obscure lizard with a koala tests whether decision-makers subconsciously value species differently because of cultural, economic or emotional significance. Moving the problem to a developing nation introduces the “North–South” tension between conservation and poverty alleviation, food security, employment and development. In actual legal practice, however, a minister or regulator cannot decide merely on personal values. The decision-maker is constrained by the governing statute, mandatory considerations, protected-matter rules, evidence and legally permissible discretion. That transition—from values to lawful statutory decision-making—is the bridge from Chapter 1 into Chapter 2.

CHAPTER 1 FINAL REVISION

From Student to Lawyer - One-Page Attack Sheet

IF YOU REMEMBER ONLY ONE METHOD

WHAT HAPPENED? -> WHERE? -> WHO IS ACTING? -> WHICH GOVERNMENT LEVEL? -> WHICH ACT? -> WHICH SECTION? -> WHAT DOES THE ACT DEFINE? -> WHAT IS THE PURPOSE? -> WHAT DOES THE INTERPRETATION ACT REQUIRE? -> WHAT DO THE CASES SAY? -> WHAT EVIDENCE IS NEEDED? -> WHAT IS THE CONSEQUENCE? -> WHAT SHOULD THE CLIENT DO NEXT?

Core concepts

- **Anthropocentric:** nature protected because of human benefit.
 - **Biocentric:** living things have inherent value.
 - **Ecocentric:** ecosystems and nature have intrinsic value.
 - **Instrumental value:** value through usefulness.
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- **Intrinsic value:** value in its own right.
- **Purposive interpretation:** prefer the construction that best achieves the Act's purpose, subject to the text and statutory framework.

Authorities to know from Chapter 1

- *Sierra Club v Morton*, 405 US 727 (1972) - standing and the rights-of-nature debate.⁷⁹
- [The Crown v Murphy \[1990\] HCA 42; \(1990\) 64 ALJR 593](#)⁸⁰ - contextual meaning of “environment”.
- Environmental Protection Act 1994 (Qld) s 8 - current Queensland definition of environment.⁸¹
- Acts Interpretation Act 1954 (Qld) ss 14A-14B - purpose and extrinsic material.⁸²
- Acts Interpretation Act 1901 (Cth) ss 15AA-15AB - Commonwealth purposive interpretation and extrinsic material.⁸³
- EPBC Act ss 67-69 - controlled-action/referral framework introduced here and developed later in the book.⁸⁴

PROFESSIONAL ENDPOINT

The chapter is complete when you can do more than define the concepts. You should be able to explain why they matter, find the controlling law, apply the law to facts, identify the evidence still needed, and tell a real client what to do next.

^{79.} *Sierra Club v Morton*, 405 US 727 (1972).

^{80.} *The Crown v Murphy* [1990] HCA 42; (1990) 64 ALJR 593.

^{81.} *Environmental Protection Act 1994* (Qld) s 8.

^{82.} *Acts Interpretation Act 1954* (Qld) ss 14A-14B.

^{83.} *Acts Interpretation Act 1901* (Cth) ss 15AA-15AB.

^{84.} *Environment Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act 1999* (Cth) ss 67-69.

CHAPTER 1 SOURCES

Bibliography

The consolidated bibliography at the end of the completed book will build cumulatively from these chapter sources and will be arranged in AGLC4 categories.

A Articles / Books / Reports

Bates, Gerry, *Environmental Law in Australia* (LexisNexis Butterworths, 11th ed, 2023)

Carson, Rachel, *Silent Spring* (Houghton Mifflin, 1962)

Leopold, Aldo, *A Sand County Almanac, and Sketches Here and There* (Oxford University Press, 1949)

Seuss, Dr, *The Lorax* (Random House, 1971)

Stone, Christopher D, 'Should Trees Have Standing? - Toward Legal Rights for Natural Objects' (1972) 45 *Southern California Law Review* 450

B Cases

Gordon Plath of the Department of Environment and Climate Change v Fish; Gordon Plath of the Department of Environment and Climate Change v Orogen Pty Ltd [2010] NSWLEC 144

Sierra Club v Morton, 405 US 727 (1972)

The Crown v Murphy [1990] HCA 42; (1990) 64 ALJR 593

C Legislation

Acts Interpretation Act 1901 (Cth)

Acts Interpretation Act 1954 (Qld)

Environment Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act 1999 (Cth)

Environmental Protection Act 1994 (Qld)

National Environmental Protection Agency Act 2025 (Cth)

CHAPTER 1 RESEARCH

Resources

[Gerry Bates, *Environmental Law in Australia* \(11th ed, 2023\) - prescribed text](#)

[Federal Register of Legislation](#) - current Commonwealth Acts, regulations, compilations, commencement and historical versions.

[Queensland Legislation](#) - current Queensland Acts, subordinate legislation and authorised historical versions.

[AustLII](#) - free Australian judgments and legislation.

[National Environmental Protection Agency](#) - current national regulatory information, EPBC assessment and approvals material.

[The Crown v Murphy \[1990\] HCA 42](#)

[Sierra Club v Morton, 405 US 727 \(1972\)](#)

[Christopher D Stone, 'Should Trees Have Standing? - Toward Legal Rights for Natural Objects'](#)

[Gordon Plath ... v Fish; ... v Orogen Pty Ltd \[2010\] NSWLEC 144](#)

RESEARCH RULE

Use hyperlinks as navigation aids, not as substitutes for authority. The legal proposition in the text must be supported by its AGLC4 footnote and the current source should be checked before reliance.

End of Chapter 1.

CHAPTER 2

ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES FOR ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION

Federalism, constitutional power, cooperative regulation and the EPBC Act — learning how to identify the correct government, statute, decision-maker and protected matter before advising a client.

THE PROFESSIONAL QUESTION

When a client asks, “Can we do this project?”, an environmental lawyer cannot begin with a yes or no. The first task is jurisdictional mapping: **who has legal authority over the land, the actor, the activity and the environmental impact?** In Australia the answer may involve Commonwealth, State and local government at the same time.

2.1 Why roles and responsibilities come before approval analysis

Environmental regulation in Australia is layered. A development may require local planning approval, State environmental authorisation and Commonwealth approval under the [Environment Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act 1999 \(Cth\) \(EPBC Act\)](#). Those regimes do not become relevant merely because an activity is “environmental”. They become relevant because a Constitution, statute, regulation, planning instrument or delegation gives a particular government or decision-maker legal power.

This is why issue spotting in Environmental Law starts with more than the environmental harm. Suppose a corporation proposes a port, mine, subdivision, road, energy project or tourism development. The lawyer must identify: the site and tenure; the proponent; the activity; the environmental receptors; whether a Commonwealth place or Commonwealth agency is involved; whether a matter of national environmental significance (MNES) may be affected; which State statutes regulate the activity; which local planning instruments apply; and whether any law is inconsistent with another.

PROFESSIONAL METHOD: CLIENT + OBJECTIVE → SITE / TENURE → ACTOR → ACTIVITY → IMPACT → LEVEL(S) OF GOVERNMENT → CONSTITUTIONAL / STATUTORY SOURCE OF POWER → EXACT PROVISION → DECISION-MAKER → APPROVAL / CONDITION / PROHIBITION / ENFORCEMENT PATHWAY.

2.2 Australia's federal structure

Australia is a federation. The Constitution distributes legislative power between the Commonwealth and the States. The starting point is the [Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act](#). The environmental-law significance is immediate: there is no single general Commonwealth “environment power”. Commonwealth environmental legislation therefore depends on one or more constitutional heads of power.

Question	Legal source	Why it matters to environmental advice
What powers remain with the States?	Constitution ss 107–108	States retain broad law-making capacity except where the Constitution gives exclusive power to the Commonwealth or another constitutional limitation applies.
What powers are exclusive to the Commonwealth?	Constitution ss 52 and 90	Commonwealth places, parts of the Commonwealth public service and customs/excise can create distinct federal regulatory pathways.
What powers are shared?	Constitution s 51	Many Commonwealth environmental laws are supported by concurrent heads of power such as trade and commerce, corporations and external affairs.
What if Commonwealth and State laws are inconsistent?	Constitution s 109	The Commonwealth law prevails to the extent of inconsistency. The State law is not destroyed; it is inoperative to that extent while the inconsistency remains.

Lawyer's issue-spotting trigger. When facts mention Commonwealth land, an airport, defence facility, a Commonwealth department, interstate trade, a corporation, a treaty, an internationally protected species or heritage place, or inconsistent State/Commonwealth requirements, ask immediately which constitutional head of power and which federal statute are engaged.

2.3 Local government: powerful in practice, but not a third constitutional sovereign

Local government is not separately recognised as a law-making tier in the Australian Constitution. Its existence and powers derive from State legislation. In Queensland, relevant sources include the [Local Government Act 2009 \(Qld\)](#), the [Planning Act 2016 \(Qld\)](#), local planning instruments and, in some contexts, delegated or devolved functions under the *Environmental Protection Act 1994 (Qld)*.

Historically councils were associated with “roads, rates and rubbish”. Modern environmental practice is much broader. Local planning schemes, development assessment, vegetation controls, stormwater, local laws and infrastructure decisions can make local government the first regulator a property developer encounters. The legal source remains State legislation, which means State law defines the extent of local power and State supervision.

2.4 Commonwealth places and Commonwealth immunity

Section 52(i) of the Constitution gives the Commonwealth exclusive power over places acquired by the Commonwealth for public purposes with State consent. Airports and defence facilities are classic environmental-law examples. State legislation may state that it binds the Crown or even the Commonwealth “so far as Parliament permits”, but that wording cannot expand State legislative power beyond constitutional limits.

The practical lesson is to identify **tenure and legal status** before assuming a State planning or environmental statute applies. Commonwealth legislation may expressly or impliedly displace State law, and s 109 may make an inconsistent State law inoperative. Conversely, Commonwealth legislation can adopt or apply State rules. Never advise from labels such as “airport land” alone; identify the legal interest, the federal statute and any express application or exclusion provisions.

2.5 Marine jurisdiction and the Offshore Constitutional Settlement

Marine regulation demonstrates how jurisdiction can be geographically divided. The [Seas and Submerged Lands Act 1973 \(Cth\)](#) asserted Commonwealth sovereignty over Australia’s territorial sea. The Offshore Constitutional Settlement later allocated title and legislative arrangements for coastal waters to the States and Northern Territory, supported by the [Coastal Waters \(State Title\) Act 1980 \(Cth\)](#) (the Act remains unamended, so the as-made text is the current text) and [Coastal Waters \(State Powers\) Act 1980 \(Cth\)](#).

For a practitioner, the question is spatial: where exactly is the activity or impact? A project near the coast may cross local, State coastal-water and Commonwealth marine jurisdictions. Mapping is therefore legal analysis, not merely background geography.

2.6 There is no express Commonwealth “environment” power

Section 51 contains many express heads of Commonwealth legislative power, but “the environment” is not one of them. That does not mean the Commonwealth lacks environmental power. The High Court has interpreted several heads of power broadly enough to support laws with environmental objectives where the law can properly be characterised as a law with respect to the constitutional subject.

KEY HEADS OF POWER

s 51(i) trade and commerce; **s 51(xx)** foreign, trading and financial corporations; **s 51(xxix)** external affairs; plus other powers including taxation, fisheries and quarantine in appropriate contexts.

2.7 Trade and commerce: *Murphyores*

[*Murphyores Inc Pty Ltd v Commonwealth* \[1976\] HCA 20; \(1976\) 136 CLR 1](#)

Facts. Murphyores held Queensland leases to mine mineral sands on Fraser Island (K’gari). Export of the minerals required Commonwealth approval under customs legislation. The Commonwealth Minister deferred export approval pending inquiry into environmental effects.

Issue. Could a law supported by the trade and commerce power be administered by taking environmental considerations into account?

Principle. The High Court accepted that if the law is properly characterised as a law with respect to trade and commerce, environmental considerations do not make it constitutionally invalid merely because environmental protection is the practical objective.

Why it matters. Constitutional characterisation asks whether the law is sufficiently connected to a head of power, not whether environmental protection is the sole or dominant policy purpose. For advisers, this explains how Commonwealth control over exports and interstate/overseas trade can influence environmentally significant projects.

2.8 Section 92 and conservation: *Cole v Whitfield*

[*Cole v Whitfield* \[1988\] HCA 18; \(1988\) 165 CLR 360](#)

Tasmanian rules imposed minimum-size requirements for crayfish. The High Court held that s 92 prohibits discriminatory burdens of a protectionist kind. The Tasmanian rule burdened imported crayfish, but the same requirement applied to local crayfish and the conservation object could not effectively be achieved by regulating only locally caught stock.

Professional use. If a State environmental law affects interstate trade, do not assume s 92 invalidates it. Ask whether the burden is discriminatory in a protectionist sense and examine the law's practical operation and legitimate non-protectionist purpose.

2.9 External affairs and the Tasmanian Dam Case

[*Commonwealth v Tasmania* \[1983\] HCA 21; \(1983\) 158 CLR 1](#)

Facts. Tasmania supported construction of a hydro-electric dam in the Franklin/Gordon river system. The Commonwealth relied on legislation protecting World Heritage properties after Australia had ratified the World Heritage Convention.

Issue. Could the Commonwealth use the external affairs power in s 51(xxix) to implement international environmental obligations in an area otherwise falling within State responsibility?

Outcome and principle. A majority upheld key Commonwealth provisions. The case established the major practical significance of the external affairs power for environmental regulation and confirmed that treaty implementation can support Commonwealth legislation within constitutional limits.

Why it matters. When facts identify a World Heritage property, Ramsar wetland, migratory species or another international environmental obligation, the lawyer should connect the treaty dimension to the statutory provision implementing it. The treaty itself is not automatically self-executing domestically; the question is what Australian legislation gives it legal effect.

2.10 Corporations power

Section 51(xx) supports laws with respect to foreign corporations and trading or financial corporations formed within Australia. In the Tasmanian Dam litigation, the corporations power also supported provisions directed to the Hydro-Electric Commission as a trading corporation. For modern practice this matters because many environmentally significant actors are corporations: developers, miners, energy companies, banks and infrastructure operators.

The method is not “corporation = Commonwealth can regulate anything”. The lawyer must identify whether the entity falls within the constitutional category and whether the statutory provision is sufficiently connected to the corporation or its activities.

2.11 Cooperative federalism: why governments cooperate instead of litigating every overlap

Although s 109 provides a constitutional rule for inconsistency, environmental regulation cannot function efficiently if every overlap becomes a constitutional contest. Cooperative federalism describes arrangements through which Commonwealth, State, Territory and local-government interests are coordinated through agreements, accredited processes, national measures and shared programs.

The 1992 Intergovernmental Agreement on the Environment and the 1997 COAG Heads of Agreement helped shape a national division of responsibility and influenced the architecture later reflected in the EPBC Act. These agreements are important historically and institutionally even where they are not themselves directly enforceable as legislation.

2.12 Murray–Darling Basin: cooperative federalism under pressure

The Murray–Darling Basin crosses Queensland, New South Wales, Victoria, South Australia and the ACT. Water extraction, agriculture, communities and ecological health therefore cannot be managed coherently by one State acting alone. The [Water Act 2007 \(Cth\)](#) established a federal statutory framework including the Murray–Darling Basin Authority and the Basin Plan.

As at September 2026, implementation remains active. The [Water Amendment \(Restoring Our Rivers\) Act 2023](#) extended key deadlines, including the 450 GL additional environmental-water target to December 2027. Current Commonwealth reporting in 2026 records ongoing water recovery and a 2026 Basin Plan Review. The teaching point is broader than one set of numbers: cooperative schemes evolve, so

legal advisers must distinguish the statutory framework from current implementation policy and then verify both.

2.13 The EPBC Act: Australia's principal Commonwealth environmental statute

The [Environment Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act 1999 \(Cth\)](#) consolidates major elements of Commonwealth environmental regulation. The course uses the Act repeatedly because it provides a structured way to ask whether a proposed action engages nationally protected environmental matters.

Do not begin an EPBC problem by jumping to “approval”. Begin with the jurisdictional trigger. Identify the action, the protected matter, the impact and the controlling provision. The current authorised compilation must be checked because the EPBC framework has been amended over time.

2.14 Matters of National Environmental Significance (MNES)

The classic EPBC structure recognises nine categories of MNES. The Chapter 2 task is to learn what they are and how to locate the controlling provision; detailed assessment and approval procedure is developed later.

MNES	Key EPBC Act references used in this chapter	Issue-spotting trigger
World Heritage values	ss 12, 15A	World Heritage property and significant impact on listed values.
National Heritage values	ss 15B, 15C; pt 15 heritage provisions	National Heritage List place such as the former High Court at 450 Little Bourke Street.
Ramsar wetlands	ss 16, 17B	Declared Ramsar wetland and potential impact on ecological character.
Listed threatened species and ecological communities	ss 18, 18A; s 178 species list	Habitat or population of a nationally listed threatened species/community.
Listed migratory species	ss 20, 20A; s 209	Migratory fauna protected through international agreements.
Nuclear actions	ss 21–22	Reactor, uranium mining/milling, spent fuel, specified radioactive-waste facilities.
Commonwealth marine area	ss 23–24A	

MNES	Key EPBC Act references used in this chapter	Issue-spotting trigger
		Action in, or impacting, the Commonwealth marine environment.
Great Barrier Reef Marine Park	ss 24B–24C	Action in or affecting the Reef Marine Park environment.
Water resources — unconventional gas / large coal mining	ss 24D–24E	Large coal mining or unconventional gas action affecting a water resource.

2.15 “Controlled action” thinking

The controlling provisions generally prohibit taking an action that has, will have or is likely to have a significant impact on the relevant protected matter unless an applicable approval, exemption or other statutory pathway exists. That means a lawyer must distinguish four questions:

1. Is there an “action”?
2. Is a protected matter engaged?
3. Is the impact significant or likely significant under the relevant statutory framework?
4. What procedural step follows before the action can lawfully proceed?

The [Protected Matters Search Tool \(PMST\)](#) is a useful due-diligence tool for identifying potential protected matters in or around a project area. It is indicative, not exhaustive. A PMST report is evidence-gathering, not a legal conclusion that referral is or is not required.

2.16 Commonwealth law does not automatically replace State and local law

A recurring client mistake is to ask, “If I get the federal approval, am I finished?” Usually not. Commonwealth, State and local requirements can operate concurrently. The EPBC framework contains mechanisms intended to reduce duplication, but federal environmental approval does not ordinarily erase separate planning, pollution, heritage, vegetation or licensing requirements imposed under State or local law.

Exam and practice trap. Do not treat “approval” as one permission. Build an approvals matrix. For each approval or prohibition record the jurisdiction, statute,

section, regulator, trigger, application/referral step, decision criteria, conditions, review rights and enforcement consequences.

2.17 From issue spotting to advice: four recurring client perspectives

Client	First questions	Typical legal focus
Developer / corporation	What can stop or delay the project? What approvals are needed? What studies must be commissioned?	Jurisdiction, referrals, approvals, conditions, sequencing, due diligence, finance and enforcement risk.
Government / regulator	What power do we have? What process must we follow? What evidence supports the decision?	Statutory authority, mandatory considerations, procedural fairness, rationality, conditions and enforcement.
Community / environmental organisation	What protected matter or legal error exists? Who has standing? What remedy is available?	Standing, referral, review, injunction, judicial review, merits review where available and enforcement pathways.
Board / C-suite / financier	What is the material regulatory risk and what should happen before commitment of capital?	Approval certainty, timing, conditions, liabilities, disclosure, contractual allocation and project-governance controls.

2.18 Chapter 2 synthesis

THE CHAPTER 2 DECISION TREE

WHO IS THE CLIENT? → WHAT ACTION IS PROPOSED? → WHERE? → WHO OWNS / CONTROLS THE LAND? → WHICH LEVELS OF GOVERNMENT HAVE POWER? → WHICH CONSTITUTIONAL HEAD SUPPORTS COMMONWEALTH INVOLVEMENT? → WHICH STATE / LOCAL LAWS ALSO APPLY? → IS AN MNES PRESENT? → WHICH CONTROLLING PROVISION? → WHAT EVIDENCE SHOWS SIGNIFICANT IMPACT? → WHAT REFERRAL / APPROVAL / CONDITION / ENFORCEMENT PATHWAY FOLLOWS? → WHAT SHOULD THE CLIENT DO NOW?

TUTORIAL INTEGRATION — FROM DATABASE SEARCH TO LEGAL ADVICE

2.19 What the Week 3 tutorial adds to Chapter 2

The first hour of the Week 3 seminar returns to the Week 2 questions and shows how the Chapter 2 rules are actually used. The important lesson is methodological. An environmental lawyer does not answer an EPBC Act question by naming a species, opening a database and stopping at the search result. The lawyer moves from the facts to the statutory category, checks the legal source of the listing, identifies any geographic or population limitation, and then connects the result to the controlling provision and the client's proposed action.

**FACTS → IDENTIFY POSSIBLE MNES → CHECK PRIMARY LEGAL SOURCE
→ USE SPRAT / HERITAGE DATABASE / PMST AS RESEARCH TOOLS →
READ THE LISTING SCOPE CAREFULLY → IDENTIFY THE CONTROLLING
PROVISION → TEST THE PROPOSED ACTION AND IMPACT → VERIFY ON
THE GROUND WHERE NECESSARY → ADVISE THE CLIENT.**

2.20 SPRAT is a research interface, not a substitute for the legal source

The tutorial uses the **Species Profile and Threats (SPRAT) database** to investigate threatened and migratory species. This is the practical tool students will repeatedly use, but the lecturer emphasised an important lawyer's habit: the statutory lists and instruments are the primary legal source. SPRAT is the convenient interactive interface that helps you identify the listed species, category, distribution, listing history and recovery information.

Professional habit. Use SPRAT to find the answer efficiently, but when the legal consequence matters, confirm the result against the current EPBC Act listing instrument or other primary source. Read the detail, not merely the species name.

The koala example demonstrates why. A search may show that the koala is listed as endangered, but the protected listing is geographically confined to the relevant populations in Queensland, New South Wales and the Australian Capital Territory. A lawyer advising about a project must therefore ask not only *"Is the species listed?"* but also *"Is this population, subspecies or geographic occurrence within the legal listing?"*

The same exercise distinguishes the Tasmanian devil, common kangaroos and wombats. The Tasmanian devil is listed as endangered. A generic search for “kangaroo” can produce misleading hits because the database contains many names incorporating that word; the ordinary kangaroo is not simply an MNES by reason of being iconic. The common wombat is not listed, while the northern hairy-nosed wombat is critically endangered. The tutorial also illustrates that threatened-species lists are dynamic: nominations are scientifically assessed and species can be added or moved between categories as their conservation status changes.

2.21 Migratory species: connect the database result to constitutional power

The whale question teaches students to work in both directions. A scientific-name search identifies the animal as a whale and SPRAT identifies its migratory status. The legal analysis then moves to the EPBC Act provisions for listed migratory species and the international agreement supporting the listing. The tutorial identifies the Bonn Convention as the relevant international source for the whale and links the Commonwealth’s legislative capacity back to the **external affairs power in s 51(xxix) of the Constitution**. The species does not need to be native to Australia before Commonwealth environmental protection can be supported by an international obligation.

2.22 Nuclear facilities problem: begin with application, then prohibition, definition, exception and constitutional escape routes

The nuclear PPP problem is a model of statutory navigation. Before jumping to the prohibition, the tutorial directs students to ask whether the Queensland Act purports to bind the relevant actor. Only then should the lawyer move to the operative prohibition, the definition of “nuclear facility”, and any express exception. The Week 2 question uses the *Nuclear Facilities Prohibition Act 2007 (Qld)*.

STATUTORY METHOD

**APPLICATION → OPERATIVE PROHIBITION → DEFINED TERMS →
EXCEPTIONS → CONSTITUTIONAL LIMIT → CONSEQUENCE →
PRACTICAL SOLUTION.**

The radioactive-waste facility must be analysed separately from the reactor. The tutorial identifies an exception for relevant medical-purpose radioactive waste, while the nuclear reactor remains within the type of facility the State legislation seeks to prohibit.

The constitutional analysis then asks how the Commonwealth might lawfully proceed: enact valid inconsistent Commonwealth legislation so that s 109 operates; rely on an appropriate Commonwealth head of power; locate the project on a Commonwealth place where s 52 and Commonwealth immunity become relevant; or use a Commonwealth agency structure where legally appropriate.

The tutorial also highlights the distinction between **law and politics**. The Queensland legislation's plebiscite mechanism is not itself a legally binding referendum capable of defeating valid Commonwealth law. Its function is political: it can demonstrate public opposition, influence Commonwealth politicians and affect the political feasibility of the project.

2.23 Heritage due diligence: the protected value matters more than the label

The former High Court redevelopment problem teaches a critical heritage-law point. Finding a site on the Australian Heritage Database or through the Protected Matters Search Tool does not end the analysis. For a National Heritage place, the lawyer must identify the **National Heritage values for which the place is listed**, obtain the official Statement of Values, and then ask whether the proposed action is likely to significantly impact those values.

That is why retaining a façade cannot automatically answer the question. If the protected values extend to the building's historic form, setting, internal spaces or other architectural characteristics, an eight-storey addition at the rear may still affect the protected values. Conversely, listing does not mean that no development can ever occur. The professional task is to understand the legal values, redesign or mitigate where possible, and then determine whether the EPBC assessment and approval pathway is engaged.

2.24 PMST reports are desktop information: environmental due diligence requires ground-truthing

The Protected Matters Search Tool is designed to identify possible MNES in and around a site. The tutorial adds a crucial practice step: its output is based on available desktop information. It tells the lawyer what may be present, not necessarily what is actually present on the site at the relevant time.

Ground-truthing. Where a PMST report identifies a possible threatened species, ecological community, wetland or other protected matter, the next step may be to engage the appropriate ecologist, botanist, zoologist, hydrologist, heritage expert

or other specialist to verify the conditions on the ground. The lawyer frames the legal question; the expert tests the physical facts.

Search areas also matter. Where a site is near a watercourse or another pathway through which impacts may travel, the tutorial recommends using an appropriate buffer rather than drawing the project boundary too narrowly. This links directly back to professional due diligence: the legal risk may extend beyond the cadastral boundary of the development site.

2.25 What Chapter 2 should now teach you to do

CHAPTER 2 PRACTITIONER CHECKLIST

Identify the client and objective. Identify the land and tenure. Identify each level of government. Identify the constitutional source of Commonwealth power. Identify each potentially applicable Act. Start with application and definitions before operative provisions. Identify the MNES and its exact legal listing. Use official databases intelligently. Check geographic and population limitations. Distinguish desktop data from verified site conditions. Identify the controlling provision. Analyse Commonwealth-State inconsistency if it arises. Separate legal effect from political pressure. Then give the client a practical next step.

CHAPTER 2 — PINPOINT LAW & AUTHORITY CONSOLIDATION

Chapter 2 Precision Consolidation: Powers, Interaction and EPBC Architecture

This section consolidates the exact constitutional and statutory architecture expressly taught in the Week 2 materials. It is designed as an exam-and-practice bridge: identify the governmental actor, locate the head of power, identify the operative statute, then ask how any overlapping State law interacts with the Commonwealth law.

2.26A Commonwealth constitutional map — use the right power for the right issue

Provision	What it does	Why it matters in Environmental Law
Constitution ss 107-108	Preserve State constitutional powers and pre-existing State laws, subject to the Commonwealth Constitution.	Start here when explaining why States retain broad environmental, planning and land-use responsibility.
s 51(i)	Trade and commerce with other countries and among the States.	Supports Commonwealth laws regulating imports/exports and interstate trade even where environmental protection is the practical policy objective.
s 51(xx)	Foreign corporations, and trading or financial corporations formed within the Commonwealth.	Allows environmental obligations to be framed around constitutional corporations. This helps explain why some EPBC provisions are drafted differently from treaty-based provisions.
s 51(xxix)	External affairs.	Supports implementation of international environmental treaties and, in appropriate cases, matters of international concern.
s 52	Exclusive Commonwealth powers in specified areas, including Commonwealth places.	Land tenure and Commonwealth-place status can alter the regulatory map before the environmental merits are even considered.
s 90	Exclusive Commonwealth customs/excise power.	Important to the constitutional distribution of fiscal and trade-related powers referred to in the course.

Provision	What it does	Why it matters in Environmental Law
s 92	Interstate trade, commerce and intercourse must be absolutely free, as interpreted by the High Court.	Environmental regulation cannot be used as a protectionist burden on interstate trade: <i>Cole v Whitfield</i> .
s 109	Valid Commonwealth law prevails over inconsistent State law to the extent of inconsistency.	Do not say “Commonwealth always wins”. First establish validity, then identify actual inconsistency.

2.26B *O'Sullivan v Noarlunga Meat Ltd*: trade power can reach the factory gate

***O'Sullivan v Noarlunga Meat Ltd* (1954) 92 CLR 565**

Facts and issue. Commonwealth export regulation intersected with State regulation of meat processing. The constitutional question was how far the Commonwealth trade-and-commerce power could extend into local production steps connected with overseas trade.

Reasoning and principle. The High Court accepted that effective regulation of overseas trade may require Commonwealth law to reach activities occurring before the physical act of export — in the course materials' shorthand, sometimes it is necessary to “enter the factory or the field or the mine”.

Why it matters. Environmental regulation attached to export, import or interstate-trade systems is not automatically invalid merely because the regulated physical activity occurs inside one State. The legal question is characterisation and sufficient connection to the constitutional head of power.

Application. When advising an exporter, mine, agricultural producer or resource company, do not ask only whether the environmental activity is “intrastate”. Ask whether the Commonwealth rule is genuinely connected to overseas/interstate trade and what State rules also apply.

Counterargument. A State may argue the Commonwealth has intruded into local production. The response is not that the Commonwealth has a free-standing environment power; it is that regulation of production may be incidental to an otherwise valid trade-and-commerce law.

Conclusion. The case reinforces the course method: identify the constitutional source first, then assess the environmental operation of the law.

2.26C *Richardson v Forestry Commission*: interim protection can be part of treaty implementation

[*Richardson v Forestry Commission* \[1988\] HCA 10; \(1988\) 164 CLR 261](#)⁸⁵

Facts. Commonwealth legislation established an inquiry into Tasmanian forests that might warrant World Heritage protection and imposed interim restrictions on forestry and related works while that inquiry occurred.

Issue. Could s 51(xxix) support protective Commonwealth legislation before the relevant land had finally been nominated or listed under the World Heritage Convention?

Reasoning. The majority upheld the legislation. The external-affairs power is not confined to the final moment of treaty implementation; measures reasonably directed to identifying and preserving potential World Heritage values can fall within the implementation task.

Why it connects to the Tasmanian Dam Case. *Commonwealth v Tasmania* demonstrates the breadth of Commonwealth treaty-implementation power once World Heritage obligations are engaged. *Richardson* confirms that appropriately adapted interim protection and inquiry machinery may also be supported.

Exam use. If the problem concerns Commonwealth legislation that protects a possible treaty-related environmental value before a final listing/decision, use *Richardson* to explain why implementation may include precautionary or preparatory machinery.

Counterargument. The State argument is that the Commonwealth is regulating land before the treaty obligation has crystallised for that precise parcel. The response is that implementation can include measures genuinely conducive to determining and protecting the treaty subject matter.

Conclusion/advice. A developer or government adviser should not assume that absence of final heritage listing removes all Commonwealth constitutional risk.

2.26D EPBC Act matters taught in Week 2 — controlling provision versus listing/definition provision

The course materials refer to both the *controlling provisions* in Part 3 and the provisions that define/list the protected matter. Keep those functions separate. For example, listed

⁸⁵. [*Richardson v Forestry Commission* \[1988\] HCA 10; \(1988\) 164 CLR 261](#).

threatened species are listed under s 178, but the project-level significant-impact prohibition/approval gateway is in ss 18/18A. Listed migratory species are identified under s 209, while the project-level gateway is ss 20/20A. The current EPBC Act also places World Heritage in ss 12-15A, National Heritage in ss 15B-15C, Ramsar wetlands in ss 16-17B, nuclear actions in ss 21-22A, the marine environment in ss 23-24A, Great Barrier Reef Marine Park in ss 24B-24C and water resources in ss 24D-24E.⁸⁶

CLIENT METHOD

1. Identify the protected matter. **2.** Identify the listing/definition provision. **3.** Identify the Part 3 controlling provision. **4.** Identify the evidence of impact. **5.** Determine whether the impact threshold is engaged. **6.** Then map referral/approval and parallel State/local approvals. This avoids the common exam error of treating a database listing as if it were itself the approval test.

CHAPTER 2 FAQ QUESTIONS

Chapter 2 FAQs — Questions

1. Why can the Commonwealth regulate environmental matters even though the Constitution contains no express “environment” power?

2. What is the practical difference between exclusive, concurrent and residual State power?

3. Why is local government important if it is not mentioned in the Constitution?

4. What does s 109 inconsistency do?

^{86.} *Environment Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act 1999 (Cth)* pt 3 div 1.

5. Why is the external affairs power central to environmental law?

6. What is cooperative federalism?

7. What is an MNES?

8. Does a PMST report decide whether referral is required?

CHAPTER 2 FAQ ANSWERS

Chapter 2 FAQs — Answers

1. The Commonwealth uses constitutionally recognised heads of power—especially trade and commerce, corporations and external affairs—to enact laws with environmental operation. Constitutional validity depends on legal characterisation, not on the word “environment” appearing in s 51.
2. Exclusive power is reserved to the Commonwealth; concurrent power can be exercised by both Commonwealth and States; residual/general State power remains with States subject to constitutional limits. The classification tells the lawyer who may legislate and whether overlap is possible.
3. Local government exercises functions conferred by State law, particularly planning and local regulation. For a developer, council may be operationally central even though its constitutional status is derivative.
4. Where a valid Commonwealth law and State law are inconsistent, s 109 makes the State law inoperative to the extent of the inconsistency while the inconsistency exists.
5. Australia is party to major environmental treaties. Section 51(xxix) allows Commonwealth legislation to implement international obligations within constitutional limits, as demonstrated by the Tasmanian Dam Case.
6. Cooperative federalism uses agreements, accreditation, shared institutions and coordinated programs to manage overlapping responsibilities without relying solely on constitutional conflict.

7. A Matter of National Environmental Significance is a nationally protected matter identified by the EPBC framework. The legal significance is that actions with significant impacts may engage a controlling provision and federal referral/approval obligations.

8. No. PMST is a screening and information tool. It identifies potential protected matters but does not replace site-specific evidence, statutory interpretation or a legal assessment of significant impact.

CHAPTER 2 MULTIPLE CHOICE — QUESTIONS

Chapter 2 Multiple Choice Questions

1. Which constitutional provision resolves inconsistency between valid Commonwealth and State laws?

A. s 51 B. s 52 C. s 92 D. s 109

2. Which power was central to the treaty-implementation reasoning in the Tasmanian Dam Case?

A. taxation B. external affairs C. defence D. acquisition

3. Local governments principally derive their law-making authority from:

A. s 51 Constitution B. State legislation C. international law D. the EPBC Act

4. The best statement of *Murphyores* is:

A. environmental purpose always invalidates trade legislation B. a trade-and-commerce law can operate with environmental objectives if constitutionally characterised as trade/commerce C. Queensland mining law always prevails D. export permits cannot consider environmental impacts

5. A PMST report is:

A. a Commonwealth approval B. an automatic referral decision C. an indicative screening tool D. a State planning permit

6. Which is an MNES?

A. every local park B. every State heritage place C. a declared Ramsar wetland D. every native species

7. Section 92 is relevant to:

- A. free interstate trade and protectionist discrimination B. judicial power C. local government creation D. treaty ratification

8. Federal approval under the EPBC Act ordinarily means:

- A. all State/local laws disappear B. separate State/local requirements may still apply C. the council loses all power D. the project cannot have conditions

CHAPTER 2 MULTIPLE CHOICE — ANSWERS

Chapter 2 Multiple Choice Answers

1. **D — s 109.** It is the constitutional inconsistency rule.
2. **B — external affairs.** Section 51(xxix) supported implementation of the World Heritage Convention.
3. **B — State legislation.** Local government is a statutory creation of the States.
4. **B.** The constitutional character of the law, rather than a pure environmental motive, is central.
5. **C.** PMST assists due diligence but is not an approval or legal determination.
6. **C.** Ramsar wetlands are one of the nationally protected categories.
7. **A.** *Cole v Whitfield* explains protectionist discrimination under s 92.
8. **B.** Multiple regimes commonly operate together.

CHAPTER 2 SHORT ANSWER — QUESTIONS

Chapter 2 Short Answer Questions

1. Explain why a developer's lawyer should identify land tenure before giving environmental advice.

2. Explain how ss 51 and 109 can operate together.

3. Explain the constitutional significance of *Commonwealth v Tasmania*.

4. Explain the difference between a protected matter and the evidence of a significant impact.

5. Why are the Murray–Darling Basin arrangements an example of cooperative federalism?

6. What should an approvals matrix contain?

CHAPTER 2 SHORT ANSWER — MODEL ANSWERS

Chapter 2 Short Answer Model Answers

- 1.** Tenure can determine jurisdiction. Commonwealth places may involve exclusive Commonwealth power or federal statutory regimes; State and local rules may apply differently. Site identification is therefore part of legal issue spotting.

- 2.** Section 51 supplies concurrent heads of Commonwealth power. A State may also legislate on the same subject. If valid laws are inconsistent, s 109 gives Commonwealth law priority to the extent of inconsistency.

- 3.** The Tasmanian Dam Case confirms the breadth of the external affairs power as a basis for implementing international obligations and demonstrates how Commonwealth constitutional power can support environmental protection within a State.

- 4.** The protected matter identifies what the EPBC Act protects. Significant impact is the factual/legal threshold connecting the proposed action to the controlling provision. The presence of a protected matter alone does not automatically answer the impact question.

- 5.** The Basin crosses several jurisdictions, so water allocation and environmental outcomes depend on shared institutions, federal legislation and intergovernmental cooperation rather than one State acting independently.

- 6.** For each required permission or prohibition: jurisdiction; Act/instrument; exact provision; regulator; trigger; documents/evidence; timing; decision criteria; conditions; review/appeal rights; enforcement consequences; dependencies on other approvals.

WEEK 2 TUTORIAL — QUESTIONS

Chapter 2 Tutorial Questions

Question 1 — Species and MNES

Is the koala a matter of national environmental significance? What about the Tasmanian devil, kangaroo and wombat?

Question 2 — Antarctic minke whale

Balaenoptera bonaerensis was described from a specimen found near Buenos Aires. On what basis is it a matter of national environmental significance under the EPBC Act?

Question 3 — Nuclear PPP in Queensland

A national law firm acts for NuEnergy Management Limited in a proposed \$95 million public-private partnership with the Commonwealth. The Commonwealth proposes to construct in Queensland a nuclear reactor for nuclear energy and a radioactive-waste management facility for medical-purpose nuclear material. Advise whether the *Nuclear Facilities Prohibition Act 2007* (Qld) would effectively prohibit the Commonwealth construction.

Question 4 — Former High Court, 450 Little Bourke Street

JurisPrudent Pty Ltd proposes mixed-use redevelopment of the former High Court site at 450 Little Bourke Street, Melbourne. Will the EPBC Act potentially be relevant?

Question 5 — Murray–Darling Basin Plan

What is the current status of the Basin Plan?

Question 6 — Protected Matters Search Tool

Use the PMST for an Australian location, define the search area and generate a report. Explain what the report can and cannot tell a legal adviser.

WEEK 2 TUTORIAL — LECTURER-INTEGRATED MODEL ANSWERS

Chapter 2 Tutorial Model Answers

SOURCE INTEGRATION

These answers incorporate the lecturer's first-hour Week 3 discussion of the Week 2 tutorial. They preserve the tutorial methodology: identify the precise statutory question, use official databases as research tools, confirm the legal source, and turn the result into practical advice.

Question 1 — Koala, Tasmanian devil, kangaroo and wombat

Issue. Which of the named species is protected as a matter of national environmental significance under the EPBC Act, and how should a lawyer determine that status?

Method and law. Begin with the threatened-species controlling provisions in Part 3, Division 1, Subdivision C, including **s 18**, and the statutory threatened-species list referred to in **s 178**. The tutorial then uses the **SPRAT database** as the practical research interface. SPRAT is reliable and routinely used in practice, but the statutory listing instrument remains the primary legal source.

Application. The **koala** is listed as endangered, but the listing is limited to the relevant populations in **Queensland, New South Wales and the Australian Capital Territory**. That limitation matters: a lawyer must read the listing scope and cannot assume that every koala everywhere in Australia attracts the same MNES protection. The **Tasmanian devil** is listed as endangered. A search for **kangaroo** produces many hits, including species and place names, but the ordinary kangaroo is not simply listed as an MNES. The **common wombat** is not listed, while the **northern hairy-nosed wombat** is critically endangered and occurs in very limited Queensland locations. The tutorial also discussed the southern hairy-nosed wombat as a nominated species, illustrating that the list evolves through scientific assessment.

Conclusion. The correct answer is not “iconic species = MNES”. The legal question is whether the precise species, subspecies or population is currently

listed in a protected category and whether the client's project affects that legally protected population.

Exam / practice lesson. Search the database, open the species profile, read the category and geographic limitation, then confirm the primary legal listing before advising.

Question 2 — *Balaenoptera bonaerensis* and migratory-species protection

Issue. On what basis can a whale species first described from a specimen found outside Australia nevertheless be a matter of national environmental significance under Australian law?

Rule. The EPBC Act protects **listed migratory species**. The tutorial directs students to **s 209** and to the international agreements underlying migratory-species protection. A search of the scientific name identifies the species as a whale and SPRAT identifies it as migratory under the **Bonn Convention**.

Constitutional connection. The Commonwealth can rely on the **external affairs power in s 51(xxix) of the Constitution** to implement international environmental obligations. A protected migratory species therefore does not need to be native to Australia before Commonwealth legislation can validly protect it.

Conclusion. The whale is relevant as an MNES because it is a listed migratory species protected through the EPBC framework and the associated international convention.

Exam / practice lesson. Use the scientific name, identify the legal category, identify the treaty or agreement, and then connect that international source to the constitutional head of power.

Question 3 — Nuclear PPP in Queensland

Issue. Can the Queensland nuclear-facilities legislation prevent the Commonwealth's proposed nuclear reactor and medical radioactive-waste facility, and what legal pathways may allow the project to proceed?

Statutory method. Do not begin with the prohibition alone. First check the Act's **application provision** to identify whom it purports to bind. Then read **s 7(1)**, the definition of "nuclear facility", and the exceptions in s 7. The tutorial treats NML,

the private corporate partner, as a “person” capable of being caught by the prohibition.

Application to the two facilities. The **nuclear reactor** falls within the type of facility the State Act seeks to prohibit. The **radioactive-waste management facility** must be analysed separately because the tutorial identifies an express exception for relevant waste arising from medical or research uses. That means the medical-waste facility may not be prohibited on the same basis as the reactor.

Commonwealth-State interaction. The State Act purports to bind the Commonwealth only to the extent Queensland legislative power permits. A lawyer must therefore move to the Constitution. Possible Commonwealth pathways discussed in the tutorial include: (1) enact valid Commonwealth legislation that is inconsistent with the Queensland law, engaging **s 109**; (2) rely on a valid Commonwealth head of power such as external affairs or corporations where the facts support it; (3) use a **Commonwealth place**, engaging **s 52** and the principles of Commonwealth immunity; or (4) establish or use a Commonwealth agency where that structure is legally available.

Political dimension. The Queensland Act’s **s 21 plebiscite mechanism** is designed to obtain the views of Queensland voters where the Commonwealth proposes a prohibited nuclear facility. The tutorial emphasises that the plebiscite is not legally binding on the Commonwealth. Its force is political: it can influence voters, investors and Commonwealth decision-makers.

Conclusion. The medical-waste facility may fall within the statutory exception, while the reactor presents a direct State-law prohibition for ordinary actors. But the ultimate advice cannot stop at State legislation: Commonwealth constitutional power, immunity and any inconsistent federal legislation must be analysed before concluding that Queensland can legally prevent the Commonwealth project.

Question 4 — Former High Court, 450 Little Bourke Street

Issue. Does an urban redevelopment of the former High Court site potentially engage the EPBC Act, and what exactly must the lawyer investigate?

Method. Start with the site. Use the **Australian Heritage Database** and, where appropriate, the **Protected Matters Search Tool**. The tutorial identifies the property as a National Heritage place. The critical legal question is not merely whether the building is listed, but **which National Heritage values are protected**.

Rule. For National Heritage, the controlling analysis focuses on the protected **National Heritage values**, including the framework reflected in **s 15B**. The official listing and Statement of Values explain why the place is protected and therefore what characteristics a development must avoid significantly impacting.

Application. Retaining the ground-level façade is relevant but is not automatically sufficient. The eight-storey serviced-apartment addition must be tested against the listed architectural and historic values, including the visual form, setting and any protected internal or contextual features. A project can be redesigned or conditioned to reduce impact; listing does not mean that all development is automatically forbidden.

Conclusion. The EPBC Act is potentially relevant. JurisPrudent should obtain the formal listing material and Statement of Values, map the proposed works against those values, and assess whether design changes, mitigation, referral or later approval processes are required before committing to the redevelopment.

Question 5 — Murray–Darling Basin Plan

Issue. What does the current Basin Plan process illustrate about cooperative federalism?

Answer. The Basin spans Queensland, New South Wales, Victoria, South Australia and the ACT, so its management requires coordination across political boundaries. The tutorial uses it as an example of the difficulty of cooperative federalism: competing water demands, environmental objectives and State interests have made implementation contentious and expensive. The seminar discussion described the existing arrangements as having performed less effectively than intended and referred to the significant public cost of the reform program.

The class discussion also noted that a long-term monitoring and review process is continuing, that consultation on the review had concluded, and that a further draft Basin Plan was expected as the review process advanced. Because this is a changing policy and statutory implementation area, students should use the *Water Act 2007*, the current Basin Plan and current Commonwealth/Murray-Darling Basin Authority material rather than relying on an old tutorial statement of status.

Professional lesson. Distinguish the permanent legal architecture from changing implementation milestones. Cooperative federalism is a legal and institutional

structure, but its success depends on continuing intergovernmental cooperation, funding, water recovery and implementation.

Question 6 — Protected Matters Search Tool and ground-truthing

Issue. What does a PMST report tell a lawyer, and what must happen after the desktop search?

Rule / method. The **Protected Matters Search Tool** identifies potential MNES in or near a defined area and generates a desktop report. The search boundary should be chosen sensibly. Where impacts can move beyond the site—for example through a watercourse—the tutorial recommends using an appropriate buffer rather than drawing the search polygon too tightly.

Limitation. The report is based on existing government-held information about where protected matters have been recorded, modelled or are thought to occur. It does not prove that the matter is physically present on the project site and it does not itself determine whether an impact will be significant.

Next step. Where the desktop result identifies a material risk, the project team may need **ground-truthing**: appropriately qualified experts inspect the site and test whether the relevant habitat, species, ecological community, wetland, heritage value or other matter is actually present and how the proposed activity would affect it.

Conclusion. PMST is an essential first-pass due-diligence tool, not the end of the legal inquiry. The lawyer uses the report to identify what expert evidence is required and then applies the verified facts to the controlling EPBC provisions.

CHAPTER 2 IRAC PROBLEMS — QUESTIONS

Chapter 2 IRAC Problem Questions

IRAC 1 — Port expansion and overlapping governments

A Queensland corporation proposes a port expansion partly within State coastal waters and with dredging effects extending into the Commonwealth marine area. Migratory shorebird habitat is nearby. State development approval is likely. Advise the board what jurisdictional questions must be resolved before works commence.

IRAC 2 — State conservation law and interstate trade

A State prohibits possession of undersized shellfish regardless of whether the shellfish were caught locally or imported from another State. An interstate trader argues the law breaches s 92. Advise.

IRAC 3 — World Heritage project

A State-owned corporation proposes infrastructure within a World Heritage property. The State argues the project is entirely intrastate and therefore outside Commonwealth power. Advise on the constitutional and EPBC issues that should be investigated.

CHAPTER 2 IRAC PROBLEMS — MODEL ANSWERS

Chapter 2 Detailed IRAC Model Answers

IRAC 1 — Port expansion and overlapping governments

Issue. Whether State approval alone authorises the port works and what Commonwealth environmental triggers may apply.

Rule. State/local approvals can coexist with Commonwealth EPBC requirements. Potential Commonwealth triggers include listed migratory species and impacts on the Commonwealth marine area. The exact controlling provisions must be checked in the current EPBC Act. Marine jurisdiction also requires spatial identification of coastal waters and Commonwealth waters.

Application. The corporation should map the dredge footprint, plume and ecological effects; identify migratory species and habitat; obtain a PMST report and targeted ecology; determine whether impacts extend to the Commonwealth marine environment; and analyse significant impact under each relevant controlling provision. State approval should be tracked separately in an approvals matrix. Contract and construction programs should prevent physical works until all conditions precedent are satisfied.

Counterargument. The proponent may argue impacts are minor, temporary or adequately mitigated. That argument requires evidence; it cannot be assumed from the existence of State approval.

Conclusion. State approval is not enough to advise that works may begin. Commonwealth screening/referral advice and evidence should be completed first.

IRAC 2 — State conservation law and interstate trade

Issue. Whether the State shellfish law imposes a constitutionally prohibited burden on interstate trade.

Rule. Section 92 prohibits discriminatory burdens of a protectionist kind. *Cole v Whitfield* upheld a materially similar minimum-size conservation rule because it applied to local and imported crayfish and was not protectionist in character.

Application. The law applies the same size rule irrespective of origin. If the conservation objective cannot practically be achieved by regulating only locally caught stock, the burden on interstate traders does not by itself establish protectionist discrimination.

Counterargument. Evidence of practical discrimination or a disguised economic preference for local traders could alter the analysis.

Conclusion. On the stated facts, the law is likely consistent with the *Cole v Whitfield* approach and not invalid merely because it burdens interstate trade.

IRAC 3 — World Heritage project

Issue. Whether the Commonwealth can regulate an intrastate State-corporation project affecting World Heritage values.

Rule. Section 51(xxix) external affairs supports Commonwealth implementation of international obligations; *Commonwealth v Tasmania* is the central authority. The corporations power may also be relevant depending on the legal character of the State-owned corporation. The EPBC Act contains controlling provisions for significant impacts on World Heritage values.

Application. The fact that construction occurs wholly within one State does not resolve Commonwealth power. The lawyer should identify the World Heritage listing and protected values, the international obligation implemented by federal law, the status/activities of the State corporation, and the project's likely impacts. State authorisation does not displace a valid federal prohibition or approval requirement.

Counterargument. The State may contest whether the federal statutory provision is engaged on the facts or whether the impact is significant, but a bare "intrastate project" argument does not answer the constitutional authorities.

Conclusion. There is a substantial Commonwealth constitutional and EPBC pathway requiring investigation before the State-owned corporation proceeds.

CHAPTER 2 RESEARCH

Chapter 2 Resources

[Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act — Federal Register of Legislation](#)

[Environment Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act 1999 \(Cth\) — current authorised compilation](#)

[Local Government Act 2009 \(Qld\) — current](#)

[Planning Act 2016 \(Qld\) — current](#)

[Nuclear Facilities Prohibition Act 2007 \(Qld\)](#)

[Water Act 2007 \(Cth\)](#)

[Murphyores Inc Pty Ltd v Commonwealth \[1976\] HCA 20](#)

[Cole v Whitfield \[1988\] HCA 18](#)

[Commonwealth v Tasmania \[1983\] HCA 21](#)

[Protected Matters Search Tool](#)

[Former High Court of Australia — National Heritage listing](#)

[Murray–Darling Basin Plan implementation dashboard](#)

CHAPTER 2 RESEARCH RULE

Never advise from the name of a government agency or a general understanding of “federal versus State”. Identify the constitutional source of power, the current statute, the exact provision, the legal status of the site and actor, and the evidence connecting the proposed action to the statutory trigger.

End of Chapter 2.

CHAPTER 3

INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND ECOLOGICALLY SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT

How international rules become Australian law; sovereignty and transboundary harm; ESD; climate change; marine pollution; biodiversity; and the whaling litigation.

CHAPTER 3 - COMPLETE THROUGH WEEK 3

This chapter incorporates the complete Week 3 seminar material presently supplied, together with the Week 2 tutorial learning carried forward from Chapter 2. The law, cases, treaties and statutory links have been checked against authoritative sources as at **30 September 2026**. Chapter 4 will build on this foundation when the next seminar/tutorial materials are supplied.

THE CHAPTER 3 LEGAL METHOD

FACTS → ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUE → INTERNATIONAL OR DOMESTIC SOURCE → LEGAL STATUS OF THAT SOURCE → CONSTITUTIONAL HOOK → IMPLEMENTING LEGISLATION → EXACT SECTION / ARTICLE → AUTHORITY → EVIDENCE → APPLICATION → COUNTERARGUMENT → CONSEQUENCE / REMEDY → CLIENT ADVICE.

International environmental law can look remote from ordinary Australian legal practice. It is not. Many of the rules that govern threatened species, World Heritage, migratory wildlife, ozone-depleting substances, climate obligations, marine pollution and biodiversity exist in Australian legislation because Australia has undertaken international commitments and the Commonwealth Parliament has legislated to give those commitments domestic effect. Chapter 3 therefore teaches a lawyer to move across legal levels rather than treating international and domestic law as separate subjects.

The central question is always practical: **what is the environmental problem, what legal rule answers it, why does that rule bind the relevant actor, and what must the client do next?**

3.1 Why environmental problems cross legal borders

Political borders are human constructs. Air pollution does not stop at a customs checkpoint. Rivers flow through several jurisdictions. Migratory animals move across national boundaries. Greenhouse gases mix in a global atmosphere. Marine pollution can travel enormous distances. A decision made within one country can therefore create environmental consequences in another country or in areas beyond national jurisdiction.

This creates a structural problem. States are sovereign, but environmental systems are interconnected. International environmental law develops rules for managing that tension. It does not abolish sovereignty. Rather, it supplies rules through which States accept duties, coordinate conduct, exchange information, prevent or reduce harm and resolve disputes.

Issue spotting. Whenever an environmental fact pattern crosses a border, ask: *What crosses the border?* Pollution? Water? Wildlife? Trade? Greenhouse emissions? Waste? Then ask whether the problem is principally between private parties or between States. That classification directs the lawyer toward private international law, public international law, or both.

3.2 Private international environmental disputes: jurisdiction, governing law and enforcement

Private international law, often called conflict of laws, deals with disputes involving private actors and a cross-border element. The environmental dimension does not change the core conflict-of-laws questions. The lawyer must ask which court can hear the dispute, which jurisdiction's substantive law applies, how evidence and parties can be brought before the court, and whether any judgment can be recognised and enforced where the defendant or its assets are located.

The Week 3 seminar uses the **Baia Mare cyanide spill** in Romania as the teaching example. A mining operation used cyanide in gold processing. A containment failure during severe weather released contaminated water into a river system and the pollution moved across national borders. The legal lesson is more important than any disputed numerical estimate of the spill: an environmental event can originate in one State, cause damage in another, involve corporations connected with a third country and leave a successful claimant with a further enforcement problem if the responsible corporate structure or assets are elsewhere.

PRIVATE TRANSBOUNDARY PROBLEM → identify the defendant → identify where the harmful conduct occurred → identify where damage occurred → identify available forums → determine governing law → obtain evidence → obtain judgment → ask where assets are → test recognition and enforcement.

A student should therefore resist writing, “Pollution crossed the border, so international law applies.” That is incomplete. A private claim may still be brought under domestic tort, statutory or compensation law, while conflict-of-laws principles determine the forum and applicable law.

3.3 Public international environmental law: rules between States

Public international law regulates legal relations between States and, in appropriate contexts, international organisations. Environmental disputes at this level can involve treaty obligations, customary international law, State responsibility, diplomatic processes, arbitration or adjudication before an international tribunal such as the International Court of Justice.

This distinction matters because an Australian domestic court does not become the International Court of Justice merely because facts have an international dimension. A domestic court applies Australian law within its jurisdiction. A public international law dispute between States proceeds through the international mechanisms available to them.

3.4 The three principal sources students must distinguish

Source	What it is	Why the distinction matters
Treaty / convention / protocol	A written international agreement governed by international law. Treaties create binding obligations for parties according to their terms once the relevant consent-to-be-bound requirements are satisfied.	Do not assume the treaty itself is directly enforceable by an Australian citizen. Ask whether and how Australia implemented it domestically.
Declaration / soft law	A political or normative instrument that may articulate principles without itself having treaty status.	Soft law can influence legislation, policy and interpretation, but its legal force must not be overstated.
	A rule developed through sufficiently widespread and consistent State practice	Both elements must be identified. Repeated conduct alone is not

Source	What it is	Why the distinction matters
Customary international law	accompanied by acceptance that the practice is legally required (<i>opinio juris</i>).	enough if States do not treat it as legally obligatory.

Exam trap. “International rule” is not a complete legal classification. State whether the proposition comes from a treaty, soft-law declaration, customary international law, a judicial decision interpreting international law, or domestic legislation implementing an international commitment.

3.5 Customary international law: State practice plus *opinio juris*

Customary international law requires two related elements: **general State practice** and **acceptance as law**, commonly expressed by the Latin term *opinio juris*. The second element is what distinguishes a legal custom from habit, convenience or diplomatic courtesy.

The Week 3 seminar connects this idea with [Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay \(Argentina v Uruguay\)](#). The International Court of Justice stated that where there is a risk that proposed industrial activity may have a significant adverse transboundary impact, the requirement to undertake an environmental impact assessment can be regarded as a requirement under general international law. The teaching significance is substantial: environmental impact assessment is not merely an Australian planning technique. In an appropriate transboundary context, assessment is part of the international legal architecture for prevention and due diligence.

[Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay \(Argentina v Uruguay\) \(Judgment, 20 April 2010\)](#)

Facts. Argentina challenged Uruguay's authorisation of pulp mills on a boundary river and alleged breaches of a bilateral river regime and environmental obligations.

Issue. What procedural and substantive environmental obligations applied to a project capable of transboundary effects?

Principle. The Court treated environmental assessment as part of the due-diligence framework where significant transboundary adverse impact is risked. It also distinguished procedural cooperation obligations from substantive environmental obligations.

Why it matters. It teaches students that environmental assessment, notification, cooperation and scientific evidence can have international legal significance before damage occurs.

3.6 Sovereignty is the starting point - not the end of the analysis

The seminar describes **permanent sovereignty** as a foundational idea. A State exercises legal authority over its territory, subject to international law. Sovereignty explains why each State ordinarily controls activities within its jurisdiction. It does not mean that the State may use its territory without regard to the rights of other States or shared environmental systems.

In the marine context, the [United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea \(UNCLOS\)](#) provides the legal framework students should recognise. The territorial sea may extend up to **12 nautical miles** from the applicable baselines. The exclusive economic zone (EEZ) may extend up to **200 nautical miles**. The rights in an EEZ are not identical to full territorial sovereignty; they are sovereign rights and jurisdiction for purposes recognised by UNCLOS. Beyond national maritime zones, different high-seas and international regimes apply.

Professional precision. Do not write “a country owns the ocean to 200 nautical miles.” Identify the legal zone and the rights that attach to it. Territorial sea, contiguous zone, EEZ, continental shelf and high seas are different legal concepts.

3.7 The no-harm principle and *Trail Smelter*

Sovereignty is qualified by responsibility. The classic environmental expression is the **no-harm principle**: a State should not allow activities within its jurisdiction or control to cause serious environmental injury to another State. The Week 3 seminar explains the idea by analogy with the common-law intuition that a landowner cannot use property in a way that unlawfully harms a neighbour.

[Trail Smelter Arbitration \(United States v Canada\) \(1938 and 1941\), 3 RIAA 1905](#)

Facts. Emissions from a lead and zinc smelter in Trail, British Columbia crossed into Washington State and caused damage.

Issue. Could Canada permit activities in its territory that produced proven cross-border injury in the United States?

Outcome and principle. The arbitral tribunal imposed responsibility in the circumstances and required control of the transboundary pollution. The case became a foundational authority for the proposition that territorial sovereignty is accompanied by obligations regarding serious transboundary harm.

Use it when. A problem involves pollution moving from one State into another, prevention of transboundary harm, State responsibility or the historical development of international environmental law.

3.8 Treaties: signature, ratification and domestic implementation are different steps

A treaty can be negotiated and signed at the international level, but students must distinguish **signature** from **ratification** and both from **domestic implementation**. The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties supplies the general treaty framework, but the central Australian constitutional point for this chapter is simpler: Australian treaties are ordinarily **not self-executing**. Ratification does not, by itself, rewrite domestic law or create every treaty rule as a directly enforceable cause of action for individuals.

Where domestic legal rights, prohibitions, licences or penalties are required, Parliament generally legislates. For Commonwealth environmental legislation, the constitutional source frequently includes [s 51\(xxix\) of the Constitution - the external affairs power](#).

INTERNATIONAL PROBLEM → TREATY / CONVENTION → AUSTRALIA
 CONSENTS TO BE BOUND → COMMONWEALTH IDENTIFIES
 CONSTITUTIONAL POWER → DOMESTIC ACT IMPLEMENTS OBLIGATIONS
 → REGULATOR / MINISTER APPLIES THE ACT → COURT REVIEWS OR
 ENFORCES THE DOMESTIC LAW.

3.9 External affairs power: why *Commonwealth v Tasmania* matters

Section 51(xxix) gives the Commonwealth Parliament power to make laws with respect to **external affairs**. In environmental law its importance is illustrated by the Tasmanian Dam Case.

[Commonwealth v Tasmania \[1983\] HCA 21; \(1983\) 158 CLR 1](#)

Facts. Tasmania sought to proceed with the Gordon-below-Franklin hydro-electric project in an area associated with Australia's World Heritage obligations.

Commonwealth legislation sought to prevent conduct affecting the protected property.

Issue. Could the Commonwealth validly legislate to implement Australia's international obligations even though land and resource development were occurring inside a State?

Outcome. The High Court upheld important parts of the Commonwealth scheme. The external affairs power was central to the Commonwealth's capacity to implement Australia's World Heritage Convention obligations.

Why it matters in Chapter 3. It supplies the constitutional bridge between an international environmental commitment and binding Commonwealth domestic legislation.

3.10 Treaties and administrative decision-making: the *Teoh* caution

The seminar refers to the doctrine associated with [Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Teoh \[1995\] HCA 20; \(1995\) 183 CLR 273](#). Historically, the High Court held that ratification of a treaty could contribute to a legitimate expectation in administrative decision-making even where the treaty had not been incorporated into domestic law.

Students must not turn that proposition into “ratified treaties are Australian law.” They are not. Nor should *Teoh* be taught without its later context. In [Re Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs; Ex parte Lam \[2003\] HCA 6; \(2003\) 214 CLR 1](#), the High Court's treatment of legitimate expectation substantially limited the utility of that terminology. For environmental advice, the safe method is to identify the domestic statute and the legally mandatory considerations rather than assume an unincorporated treaty is directly enforceable.

3.11 Ozone protection: the international-to-domestic chain in one example

Ozone protection provides a clean illustration of the chapter's method. International concern about ozone depletion produced the [Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer](#) and the [Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer](#). Australia then enacted domestic controls.

The current [Ozone Protection and Synthetic Greenhouse Gas Management Act 1989 \(Cth\)](#) makes the connection explicit. Section 3 states objectives that include giving effect to Australia's obligations under the Vienna Convention and Montreal Protocol,

while s 69B identifies the external affairs power and relevant international agreements as part of the Act's constitutional basis.

WHY THIS EXAMPLE IS SO USEFUL

The international instrument is not decorative background. It explains **why** the Commonwealth legislates, **where** constitutional power comes from, and **how** a global environmental problem becomes a domestic licensing and control regime.

3.12 From sustainable development to ESD: the Brundtland-Rio-Australia pathway

The conceptual origin of modern sustainable-development language is commonly associated with the 1987 World Commission on Environment and Development report, *Our Common Future*, known as the **Brundtland Report**. Its enduring idea is development that meets present needs without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs.

The 1992 United Nations Conference on Environment and Development - the Rio Earth Summit - then produced several influential instruments, including the [Rio Declaration on Environment and Development](#), Agenda 21 and the Forest Principles, as well as major treaty developments in climate change and biological diversity.

The Rio Declaration is **soft law**, not a treaty. Its importance lies in articulating principles that have influenced treaties, domestic legislation, environmental policy and judicial reasoning. Australia developed the domestic expression **ecologically sustainable development (ESD)**, reflected in the 1992 Intergovernmental Agreement on the Environment and subsequently embedded in legislation.

3.13 EPBC Act ss 3, 3A and 136: turning ESD into operative legal reasoning

The current [Environment Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act 1999 \(Cth\)](#) does more than mention sustainability. Section 3 includes promotion of ecologically sustainable development among the Act's objects. Section 3A identifies five ESD principles:

1. integration of long-term and short-term economic, environmental, social and equitable considerations;
2. the precautionary principle;
3. intergenerational equity;

4. conservation of biological diversity and ecological integrity as a fundamental consideration; and
5. improved valuation, pricing and incentive mechanisms.

The distinction between an **object** and an **operative decision rule** matters. Section **136(1)** sets mandatory considerations for approval decisions, including matters relevant to controlling provisions and economic and social matters. Under **s 136(2)(a)**, the Minister must take into account the principles of ESD when considering those matters.

How to write this in an exam. Do not say merely, “The EPBC Act supports sustainability.” Identify **s 3** (objects), **s 3A** (the principles), and the relevant substantive decision provision such as **s 136**. Explain what legal work each provision performs.

3.14 The precautionary principle: uncertainty is part of the legal problem

Section 3A(b) expresses the precautionary principle: where there are threats of **serious or irreversible environmental damage**, lack of full scientific certainty should not be used as a reason for postponing measures to prevent environmental degradation.

The principle is often misunderstood. It does not mean “ban anything uncertain.” Nor does it mean “science is irrelevant.” It means that serious environmental risk cannot be ignored merely because the evidence is incomplete. The legal decision-maker should identify the threat, assess the uncertainty, evaluate the consequences of being wrong and adopt proportionate preventative measures where the legal framework requires it.

[*Leatch v National Parks and Wildlife Service* \[1993\] NSWLEC 191; \(1993\) 81 LGERA 270](#)

Facts. Shoalhaven City Council proposed a link road. A licence had been granted under State fauna-protection legislation. The evidence concerning the giant burrowing frog was incomplete: the area was not treated as prime habitat and the species had not been directly observed on the project site, but evidence indicated a male call had been heard and the species could travel significant distances.

Issue. How should a decision-maker respond when the possible impact on a threatened species is serious but the scientific evidence is uncertain?

Reasoning. Stein J treated precaution as a common-sense decision principle suited to uncertainty about species population, habitat and behaviour. Lack of complete knowledge did not justify assuming the risk away.

Outcome. The licence was not granted on the material then available, while leaving open the possibility that better scientific knowledge could support a different decision later.

Why it matters. *Leatch* teaches the difference between **prevention**, where harm is sufficiently known, and **precaution**, where uncertainty itself is legally relevant because the possible harm is serious or irreversible.

3.15 How to apply precaution step by step

Step 1 - Identify the environmental harm. What exactly could be damaged: a species, ecological community, wetland, water resource, heritage value, coastal system or human environment?

Step 2 - Characterise seriousness and reversibility. Extinction, irreversible habitat loss and permanent contamination are qualitatively different from temporary and readily reversible disturbance.

Step 3 - Identify scientific uncertainty. What is unknown? Presence? Population size? Pathway? Toxicity? Cumulative impact? Future sea-level response?

Step 4 - Do not convert uncertainty into “no risk”. Ask whether surveys, conditions, redesign, buffers, monitoring, adaptive management or refusal are required.

Step 5 - Explain proportionality. Precaution changes how risk is managed; it does not automatically dictate the most restrictive outcome in every case.

3.16 Intergenerational equity: decisions are not confined to today's impacts

Section 3A(c) describes intergenerational equity: the present generation should ensure that the health, diversity and productivity of the environment are maintained or

enhanced for future generations. This principle expands the decision horizon. A project may produce immediate benefits while transferring environmental costs to people who cannot participate in today's decision.

[Gray v Minister for Planning \[2006\] NSWLEC 720; \(2006\) 152 LGERA 258](#)

Facts. Peter Gray challenged aspects of the environmental assessment process for the proposed Anvil Hill open-cut coal mine in New South Wales. The greenhouse analysis addressed direct mine emissions but did not adequately account for downstream emissions from burning the coal.

Issue. Could assessment stop at emissions physically produced at the mine gate?

Reasoning. The Court treated ESD, including intergenerational equity, as relevant to the statutory assessment process and required a broader understanding of environmental consequences.

Why it matters. Students learn to ask about **indirect, downstream and cumulative impacts**, not merely immediate site disturbance. A complete environmental assessment can require attention to consequences occurring later or elsewhere.

3.17 ESD does not always operate against development: *Taralga*

Environmental principles do not mechanically select one side. A renewable-energy project may itself advance long-term environmental objectives while causing local amenity, landscape or ecological impacts. The lawyer must therefore identify the statutory criteria and weigh the evidence rather than label one party “pro-environment”.

[Taralga Landscape Guardians Inc v Minister for Planning \[2007\] NSWLEC 59; \(2007\) 161 LGERA 1](#)

Teaching point. The Land and Environment Court considered objections to a wind farm and the broader environmental benefits of renewable energy. The case demonstrates that ESD principles can support a project where its long-term environmental benefits form part of the statutory balance.

Exam use. Use *Taralga* to resist the simplistic proposition that ESD always means refusing development. ESD is a disciplined framework for integrated decision-making.

3.18 Climate change: from framework convention to domestic law

Climate change illustrates layered international regulation. The [United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change \(UNFCCC\)](#) establishes the foundational framework and recognises differentiated responsibilities and capabilities. The [Kyoto Protocol](#) developed quantified and market-based mechanisms for participating developed-country parties, while the [Paris Agreement](#) establishes a global framework based on nationally determined contributions, progression and review.

Students should distinguish a **framework convention** from later protocols or agreements. The convention establishes the institutional and legal architecture; later instruments can add or refine commitments.

3.19 Australian climate legislation: targets are not the same thing as reporting

The [Climate Change Act 2022 \(Cth\)](#) sets national emissions-reduction targets. Section 10(1) identifies a target of reducing net greenhouse gas emissions to **43% below 2005 levels by 2030** and to **net zero by 2050**.

That legislation must be distinguished from the [National Greenhouse and Energy Reporting Act 2007 \(Cth\)](#), which establishes a reporting framework for greenhouse gas emissions, energy production and energy consumption and supports administration of related regulatory mechanisms. One statute contains national targets; the other creates reporting and data obligations. Conflating them produces bad legal advice.

Correction from automated transcript summary. The Commonwealth statute is the **Climate Change Act 2022 (Cth)**, not a “Climate Change Act 2017”. The seminar audio truncated the year during transcription.

3.20 Climate adaptation in planning: today's approval can create tomorrow's hazard

Climate law is not only about reducing emissions. Planning and development law also deals with **adaptation**: flooding, sea-level rise, coastal erosion, heat, bushfire and infrastructure resilience. The seminar's coastal subdivision example asks whether land should be approved for development where modelling indicates serious future inundation and loss of access.

The legal technique is familiar: identify the planning statute and scheme, identify the relevant hazard policy or assessment requirement, obtain technically competent

evidence, and determine whether the proposal is acceptable over the planning horizon. Precaution and intergenerational equity can explain why a decision-maker should not ignore a foreseeable future hazard merely because it may occur beyond the present owner's lifetime.

Client advice. A property developer wants a yes/no answer. The environmental lawyer should instead provide a risk pathway: what modelling is required, which climate horizon applies, what design response is possible, whether safe access remains available, what conditions may be imposed, and whether residual risk makes approval legally or commercially unrealistic.

3.21 Marine pollution: international liability translated into domestic statutes

Marine oil pollution requires rapid response. International conventions allocate liability and support compensation mechanisms so that clean-up need not wait for final resolution of every fault dispute. Australian law gives effect to that architecture through several statutes rather than one generic “oil pollution Act”.

Two central Commonwealth statutes students should recognise are the [Protection of the Sea \(Civil Liability\) Act 1981 \(Cth\)](#) and the [Protection of the Sea \(Oil Pollution Compensation Funds\) Act 1993 \(Cth\)](#). Sea dumping is separately addressed through the [Environment Protection \(Sea Dumping\) Act 1981 \(Cth\)](#).

The teaching lesson is structural: identify the source of marine pollution, identify the relevant international convention, then identify the Australian implementing statute. Liability for oil carried by tankers, pollution from ships, dumping of waste at sea and emergency response do not necessarily sit in the same Act.

3.22 Biological diversity: more than counting species

The [Convention on Biological Diversity \(CBD\)](#) defines biological diversity broadly to include variability among living organisms and diversity **within species, between species and of ecosystems**. Article 1 identifies three objectives: conservation of biological diversity, sustainable use of its components, and fair and equitable sharing of benefits arising from genetic resources.

This breadth matters because environmental law is not simply a list of charismatic animals. Habitat, ecological processes, genetic variation and ecosystem relationships can be legally and scientifically important. A species may appear locally abundant yet depend on a threatened habitat, breeding area, food source or migration route.

The seminar identifies recurring causes of biodiversity loss including habitat destruction, over-exploitation, invasive species and climate change. It also emphasises two reasons biodiversity regulation is difficult: extinction and habitat loss can be irreversible, and human knowledge of ecological relationships is incomplete.

3.23 Biosphere 2 as a teaching analogy: why ecological humility matters

The seminar uses the Biosphere 2 experiment as an analogy for ecological uncertainty. The deeper lesson is not the precise number of species or engineering details; it is that humans can misjudge which ecological interactions are necessary to maintain a functioning system. Environmental decision-making therefore requires humility about incomplete knowledge.

This links directly back to precaution. If a development would remove the only known breeding habitat of a threatened species, the absence of complete knowledge about the species' ecological role does not logically prove that its loss is harmless. The legal task is to apply the governing statute and evidence without pretending that uncertainty equals safety.

3.24 International biodiversity instruments become specific domestic hooks

The CBD is broad, but biodiversity law also includes instruments directed to particular sites, habitats, species and forms of trade. Students should recognise the architecture:

International instrument	Environmental focus	Australian legal connection to investigate
World Heritage Convention	Cultural and natural heritage of outstanding universal value	EPBC Act World Heritage provisions and constitutional external-affairs basis.
Ramsar Convention	Wetlands of international importance	EPBC Act protection of declared Ramsar wetlands.
Convention on Migratory Species (Bonn Convention) and relevant bilateral migratory-bird agreements	Migratory wildlife crossing national boundaries	EPBC Act listed migratory species provisions.
CITES	International trade in endangered species	EPBC Act wildlife-trade controls and permits.
International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling 1946	Conservation and regulation of whaling	

International instrument	Environmental focus	Australian legal connection to investigate
		International Whaling Commission regime; Australian cetacean protection under the EPBC Act.

3.25 Whaling: one problem, two legal pathways

The whaling material is a powerful synthesis because it shows the same environmental conduct being examined through both **Australian domestic law** and **public international law**.

Under the [International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling \(ICRW\)](#), the International Whaling Commission adopted a commercial whaling moratorium. Article VIII permits a contracting government to issue special permits authorising its nationals to kill, take and treat whales for purposes of scientific research. Japan relied on the special-permit mechanism for its Antarctic research programmes, including JARPA II.

The legal issue was not simply whether a permit had the word “scientific” on it. It was whether the programme was genuinely within the treaty exception when assessed against its design and implementation.

3.26 Antarctica: sovereignty claims are legally sensitive

Australia claims sovereignty over the Australian Antarctic Territory, but Antarctic sovereignty is internationally complex and is not universally recognised. The [Antarctic Treaty](#) preserves the positions of claimant and non-claimant States through Article IV while enabling peaceful use, scientific cooperation and a stable legal framework without requiring final resolution of territorial claims.

Do not write: “Antarctica belongs to Australia.” Australia claims a defined Australian Antarctic Territory; other States’ recognition differs. In legal analysis, identify the claim, the treaty framework and the specific jurisdictional provision being relied upon.

3.27 The Australian Whale Sanctuary: start with EPBC Act s 225

Part 13 of the EPBC Act contains Commonwealth cetacean protections. Section **225** establishes the **Australian Whale Sanctuary**. The statutory definition and application must be read carefully rather than reduced to the shorthand “3 nautical miles to 200 nautical miles”. Sections **229** and **230** form part of the offence/civil-penalty regime

concerning killing or injuring cetaceans in the Sanctuary, subject to statutory exceptions and permits.

Inside Queensland coastal waters, separate State wildlife rules may also apply. The current [Nature Conservation \(Animals\) Regulation 2020 \(Qld\)](#) contains whale and dolphin approach rules, including no-approach and caution zones. Again, the professional lesson is layered regulation rather than a single universal rule.

3.28 *Humane Society International v Kyodo Senpaku Kaisha*: domestic enforcement

Humane Society International (HSI), an environmental organisation, sought to use Australian domestic law against a Japanese whaling company operating in waters Australia treated as part of the Australian Whale Sanctuary adjacent to the Australian Antarctic Territory. The litigation raised difficult questions of extraterritorial service, international relations, enforceability and the proper role of a domestic court.

[Humane Society International Inc v Kyodo Senpaku Kaisha Ltd \[2005\] FCA 664](#)

First instance. Allsop J refused leave to serve the proceeding outside Australia. The international and diplomatic setting, including the practical enforceability of any injunction, formed part of the context.

[Humane Society International Inc v Kyodo Senpaku Kaisha Ltd \[2006\] FCAFC 116](#)

Appeal. The Full Federal Court allowed HSI's appeal. The judicial task of applying Australian law could not simply be displaced by executive concerns about diplomatic consequences. The case returned for further steps, including substituted service.

[Humane Society International Inc v Kyodo Senpaku Kaisha Ltd \[2008\] FCA 3](#)

Injunction. The Federal Court ultimately granted declaratory and injunctive relief restraining the company from conduct contrary to the EPBC Act in the Sanctuary. Enforcement remained practically difficult while the company and vessels remained outside ordinary Australian enforcement reach.

Teaching significance. A legal right and a practical remedy are not the same thing. Jurisdiction, service, enforcement assets and diplomatic context all matter after the substantive environmental prohibition has been identified.

3.29 The same controversy at international law: *Whaling in the Antarctic*

[*Whaling in the Antarctic \(Australia v Japan: New Zealand intervening\)* \(Judgment, 31 March 2014\)](#)

Issue. Was Japan's JARPA II programme genuinely “for purposes of scientific research” within Article VIII of the ICRW?

Outcome. The International Court of Justice concluded that the special permits granted in connection with JARPA II did not fall within Article VIII in the relevant respects and required Japan to revoke existing permits and refrain from granting further permits under that programme.

Why it matters. Compare this with the HSI litigation. The Federal Court proceedings concerned enforcement of Australian domestic legislation against a company. The ICJ proceeding was a State-to-State international law case brought by Australia against Japan, with New Zealand intervening. Same environmental controversy; different parties, sources of law, forums and remedies.

3.30 Bringing the whole chapter together: the international-to-domestic map

ONE CONNECTED LEGAL SYSTEM

ENVIRONMENTAL PROBLEM → INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION → TREATY / CUSTOM / SOFT LAW → AUSTRALIAN CONSTITUTIONAL POWER → COMMONWEALTH / STATE LEGISLATION → ADMINISTRATIVE DECISION → EVIDENCE → COURT / TRIBUNAL → REMEDY / ENFORCEMENT.

A student who remembers only a list of treaties has missed the chapter. The objective is to understand **legal transmission**: how an environmental problem becomes an international commitment, how that commitment can support Australian legislation, how the legislation creates concrete prohibitions or decision criteria, and how a lawyer applies those rules to a project or dispute.

3.31 Practitioner issue-spotting checklist

1. **Define the environmental harm.** Pollution, habitat loss, greenhouse emissions, marine spill, species impact or cumulative harm?

2. **Locate the geography.** One State, multiple States, another country, territorial sea, EEZ, Antarctic waters or global commons?
3. **Identify the actors.** Private company, individual, Commonwealth, State, foreign State, regulator or NGO?
4. **Classify the source.** Treaty, soft law, custom, Constitution, Commonwealth Act, State Act, regulation or case?
5. **Explain legal force.** Is the treaty implemented domestically? What constitutional power supports the Act?
6. **Find the exact operative law.** Section, subsection, paragraph, article, definition, exception and permit power.
7. **Match the authority.** What case explains the provision or principle and what does it actually establish?
8. **Test evidence and uncertainty.** What is known? What is modelled? What is missing? What expert work is required?
9. **Apply counterarguments.** Is the impact serious, indirect, reversible, mitigable, uncertain, socially necessary or outweighed by another statutory objective?
10. **Advise the next lawful step.** Assess, refer, obtain permit, redesign, condition, monitor, challenge, seek injunction or negotiate.

CHAPTER 3 — PINPOINT CASE & INTERNATIONAL-LAW CONSOLIDATION

Chapter 3 Precision Consolidation: International Rule → Australian Law → Practical Advice

3.32 *Myers v South Gippsland Shire Council*: climate adaptation is a present planning issue

[*Myers v South Gippsland Shire Council* \(No 1\) \[2009\] VCAT 1022; \(No 2\) \[2009\] VCAT 2414](#)⁸⁷

Facts. A coastal property at Waratah Bay was proposed to be subdivided. The site was separated from the coast by a road, but climate-change policy raised concerns about sea-level rise, storm tide, storm surge and long-term coastal processes.

Issue. Could the decision-maker responsibly determine the subdivision application without adequate evidence of future coastal hazard?

Reasoning. VCAT first required a coastal hazard vulnerability assessment. When that evidence showed future inundation/access risk, the Tribunal refused permission. The course uses the case to show that environmental assessment is forward-looking: a current approval can create foreseeable burdens for future owners, infrastructure and government.

Why it matters. The case operationalises precaution and intergenerational thinking in planning. The relevant question is not “is the land safe today?” but whether the statutory/policy framework requires the decision-maker to account for credible future environmental risk.

Counterargument. A developer may argue that the owner accepts the risk or that forecasts are uncertain. The legal response is that private risk acceptance does not necessarily answer broader planning, public-infrastructure and future-generation concerns.

⁸⁷. [*Myers v South Gippsland Shire Council* \(No 1\) \[2009\] VCAT 1022; \(No 2\) \[2009\] VCAT 2414](#).

Professional advice. Commission climate/coastal evidence before acquisition or design is locked in. Model access, inundation and adaptation pathways, and align engineering evidence with the legal decision criteria.

Conclusion. Climate adaptation is not merely future policy; where the applicable planning framework requires it, it is part of present lawful decision-making.

3.33 International environmental law — source hierarchy and domestic translation

International source	Course proposition	Australian legal significance
Treaty / convention	Binding internationally after the relevant consent-to-be-bound process; not automatically self-executing domestically.	Parliament may implement treaty obligations through Commonwealth legislation supported by s 51(xxix), subject to constitutional doctrine.
Declaration / soft law	Examples include the Rio Declaration principles.	Not equivalent to an Australian Act, but may influence legislation, policy, statutory objects and the development of ESD concepts.
Customary international law	Requires sufficiently general/consistent State practice plus <i>opinio juris</i> .	The course uses <i>Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay</i> to illustrate international recognition of EIA as a general international-law requirement in transboundary-risk settings.

The practical method is always: **identify the international rule** → **ask whether Australia is bound internationally** → **identify any domestic implementing legislation** → **identify the constitutional head of power** → **apply the domestic statute first in Australian litigation**.

3.34 Biodiversity and whaling — the international-to-domestic chain

The Week 3 materials connect the Convention on Biological Diversity, CITES, the migratory-species treaties and the International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling to specific domestic EPBC mechanisms. The legal lesson is not to cite the treaty and stop. Identify the Australian provision that gives the treaty objective legal effect. For cetaceans, the course specifically points to the Australian Whale Sanctuary in EPBC Act s 225 and the prohibitions/permit framework in ss 229-232 and 238; the *Humane Society International v Kyodo Senpaku Kaisha* litigation then demonstrates

the practical enforcement problem when the regulated actor is foreign and diplomatic/enforcement issues sit beside the domestic cause of action.⁸⁸

EXAM / ADVICE SEQUENCE

International obligation → constitutional implementation power → Australian implementing statute → exact statutory test → authority interpreting that test → facts/evidence → counterargument → conclusion → available domestic/international response. Do not mix the international and domestic levels into one undifferentiated rule.

CHAPTER 3 FAQ QUESTIONS

Chapter 3 FAQs - Questions

1. Why is international environmental law relevant to an Australian environmental lawyer?

2. What is the difference between private and public international environmental law?

3. What two elements create customary international law?

4. Does ratifying a treaty automatically make every treaty rule enforceable in an Australian court?

5. Why is Constitution s 51(xxix) important?

⁸⁸ *Environment Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act 1999* (Cth) ss 225, 229-232, 238; *Humane Society International Inc v Kyodo Senpaku Kaisha Ltd* [2005] FCA 664; *Humane Society International Inc v Kyodo Senpaku Kaisha Ltd* [2006] FCAFC 116.

6. What legal work do EPBC Act ss 3, 3A and 136 perform?

7. Does the precautionary principle require refusal whenever science is uncertain?

8. How does intergenerational equity change environmental assessment?

9. What is the difference between the Climate Change Act 2022 and the NGER Act 2007?

10. Why are the HSI/Kyodo Federal Court cases different from *Whaling in the Antarctic* in the ICJ?

CHAPTER 3 FAQ ANSWERS

Chapter 3 FAQs - Answers

1. Because Australian environmental statutes often implement or respond to international obligations. International law can explain constitutional power, statutory purpose, protected categories and the policy architecture behind domestic regulation.
2. Private international law handles cross-border disputes involving private parties and asks forum, governing-law and enforcement questions. Public international law governs legal relations between States and international organisations.
3. Widespread and sufficiently consistent State practice plus *opinio juris* - acceptance that the practice is legally required.
4. No. Australian treaties are ordinarily not self-executing. Domestic legislation is generally required before treaty obligations operate as domestic rights, duties, offences or approval rules.
5. The external affairs power can support Commonwealth legislation implementing Australia's international treaty obligations, as illustrated by *Commonwealth v Tasmania*.
6. Section 3 states objects, s 3A defines ESD principles, and s 136 connects those principles to approval decision-making by requiring them to be taken into account in the relevant statutory process.

7. No. Precaution requires serious or irreversible environmental threat plus relevant uncertainty to be confronted rather than ignored. The appropriate response may be further studies, conditions, redesign, monitoring or refusal depending on the statute and evidence.
8. It requires the decision-maker to look beyond immediate benefits and impacts and consider whether environmental health, diversity and productivity are being maintained for future generations, including downstream and cumulative effects where legally relevant.
9. The Climate Change Act 2022 sets national emissions-reduction targets. The NGER Act 2007 establishes reporting obligations and the national greenhouse and energy data framework.
10. HSI/Kyodo applied Australian domestic EPBC legislation in the Federal Court against a company. *Whaling in the Antarctic* was a public international law dispute in the ICJ between Australia and Japan, with New Zealand intervening.

CHAPTER 3 MULTIPLE CHOICE - QUESTIONS

Chapter 3 Multiple Choice Questions

1. Which is required for customary international law?

- A. A UN General Assembly vote only
- B. State practice plus *opinio juris*
- C. An Australian regulation
- D. A private contract

2. Which constitutional provision is especially important to implementation of environmental treaties?

- A. s 51(xxix)
- B. s 92 only
- C. s 128 only
- D. s 116

3. Which statement about treaties in Australia is most accurate?

- A. Ratification automatically amends every State Act
- B. Treaties are always directly enforceable by individuals
- C. Domestic legislation is generally required to give treaty obligations domestic legal effect
- D. A treaty is merely political soft law

4. EPBC Act s 3A(b) expresses which principle?

- A. Polluter immunity
- B. Precautionary principle
- C. Separation of powers
- D. Common law nuisance

5. Which case is the giant burrowing frog authority discussed in the seminar?

- A. *Gray*
- B. *Leatch*
- C. *Teoh*
- D. *Kyodo*

6. What was central in *Gray v Minister for Planning*?

- A. Nuclear waste storage
- B. Whale sanctuary boundaries
- C. Downstream greenhouse consequences of coal
- D. Ozone-depleting substances

7. Which Commonwealth Act sets the national 2030 and 2050 emissions targets?

- A. Climate Change Act 2022
- B. Environment Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act 1999
- C. Water Act 2007
- D. Sea Dumping Act 1981

8. Which international instrument defines the framework for law of the sea zones?

- A. CITES
- B. UNCLOS
- C. Ramsar Convention
- D. Paris Agreement

9. Which case is associated with transboundary smelter pollution?

- A. *Trail Smelter*
- B. *Taralga*
- C. *Cole v Whitfield*
- D. *Teoh*

10. What is the correct relationship between HSI/Kyodo and the ICJ whaling case?

- A. They are the same proceeding
- B. Both were High Court cases
- C. One is Australian domestic litigation and the other is State-to-State international litigation
- D. Neither concerned whaling

11. Which CBD objective is NOT one of the three core objectives?

- A. Conservation of biodiversity
- B. Sustainable use
- C. Fair sharing of benefits from genetic resources
- D. Automatic prohibition of all development

12. What is the best first response to an uncertain but potentially irreversible species impact?

- A. Treat uncertainty as proof there is no risk
- B. Identify the seriousness of harm, the uncertainty and proportionate preventative measures
- C. Ignore expert evidence
- D. Approve automatically

CHAPTER 3 MULTIPLE CHOICE - ANSWERS

Chapter 3 Multiple Choice Answers

1. **B.** Custom requires State practice plus *opinio juris*.
2. **A.** Section 51(xxix) is the external affairs power.
3. **C.** Treaties are ordinarily not self-executing domestically.
4. **B.** Section 3A(b) states the precautionary principle.
5. **B.** *Leatch* is the giant burrowing frog case.
6. **C.** *Gray* concerned assessment of downstream greenhouse emissions.
7. **A.** Climate Change Act 2022, s 10.
8. **B.** UNCLOS.
9. **A.** *Trail Smelter*.
10. **C.** They used different legal systems, parties and forums.
11. **D.** The CBD does not create an automatic ban on development.

12. B. That is the disciplined precautionary analysis.

CHAPTER 3 SHORT ANSWER - QUESTIONS

Chapter 3 Short Answer Questions

1. Explain why sovereignty and the no-harm principle must be read together.

2. Explain the difference between a treaty and a declaration such as the Rio Declaration.

3. Explain why *Pulp Mills* matters to environmental impact assessment.

4. Trace the ozone-protection pathway from international law to Australian legislation.

5. Explain the exact relationship between EPBC Act ss 3A(b) and 3A(c).

6. Explain what *Leatch* teaches about scientific uncertainty.

7. Explain why *Taralga* is important when advising on renewable-energy projects.

8. Explain why enforcement was a practical difficulty in the HSI/Kyodo litigation.

CHAPTER 3 SHORT ANSWER - MODEL ANSWERS

Chapter 3 Short Answer Model Answers

1. Sovereignty gives a State authority within its territory, but international law does not treat that authority as a licence to export serious environmental harm. The no-harm principle expresses the accompanying responsibility to control activities within jurisdiction so they do not unlawfully injure other States.

2. A treaty is a binding international agreement for its parties according to its terms and the law of treaties. A declaration such as Rio is soft law: politically and normatively influential, but not a treaty merely because States endorsed it.

3. *Pulp Mills* connects assessment to international due diligence. Where an activity risks significant adverse transboundary impact, environmental impact assessment can be required under general international law before the activity proceeds.

4. Scientific concern led to the Vienna Convention, followed by the Montreal Protocol. Australia then implemented international commitments through the Ozone Protection and Synthetic Greenhouse Gas Management Act 1989, supported expressly by the external affairs power and treaty obligations.

5. Section 3A(b) addresses serious or irreversible harm under scientific uncertainty; s 3A(c) addresses fairness across generations. They often overlap where uncertain present decisions could impose irreversible future environmental costs.

6. *Leatch* teaches that uncertainty about a threatened species cannot simply be treated as absence of risk. Where the potential harm is serious, precaution may justify more evidence, conditions or refusal until uncertainty is responsibly addressed.

7. *Taralga* shows ESD can support development as well as constrain it. Renewable-energy benefits can form part of the statutory environmental balance even where a project also causes local impacts.

8. The defendant was a Japanese company operating far from mainland Australian enforcement. Obtaining an injunction did not itself place assets or vessels within reach of Australian enforcement processes. The case therefore separates legal entitlement from practical enforceability.

**TUTORIAL QUESTIONS — INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
AND EIA INTRODUCTION**

Tutorial Questions

Question 1

For each of the matters of national environmental significance under the EPBC Act, identify whether its inclusion in the EPBC Act is underpinned by an international treaty/convention that Australia has ratified.

Question 2

This question will require you to do some learning in advance of the Weeks 4 and 5 seminars, as to answer them you will need to deal with concepts that we will cover in those seminars, but doing this a week ahead will assist you in being ready for the mid-semester exam in Week 6. Use the [EPBC Act database — All EPBC Projects · EPBC Act Public Portal](#) to answer the following questions for each of the referrals listed in the table below.

1. Who is the proponent?
2. Is it a controlled action?
3. If it is not a controlled action because of the particular manner in which it is to be undertaken, summarise what that particular manner involves.
4. If it is a controlled action:
 1. what matters of national environmental significance are involved?
 2. what assessment approach is/was used?
 3. if the controlled action has been approved — what was the date it was approved and how long was this after the referral date?

#	Referral	EPBC No.
1	Brisbane Stadium, National Aquatic Centre and associated precinct infrastructure, QLD	2026/10472
2	Sydney Opera House building renewal, NSW	2016/7825
3	Construction of a secondary school at Hammond Park, WA	2016/7741
4	National Radioactive Waste Management Facility, SA	2021/9128
5	Work on Mawsons Huts, Antarctica	2005/2359
6	Offshore powerboat race, Townsville, QLD	2013/6758
7	New hospital at the University of Canberra, ACT	2013/6987
8	Neighbourhood shopping centre and mixed business centre at Dawesville, WA	2006/3155
9	Yass Valley wind farm at Yass, NSW	2013/7002
10	Upgrade of the Pacific Highway from Tintenbar to Ewingsdale, NSW	2009/5103
11	Tourist resort and associated facilities at Wolgan Valley, NSW	2006/2567

#	Referral	EPBC No.
12	Open cut and underground coal mine, rail link and associated infrastructure on Moray Downs cattle station near Clermont, QLD	2010/5736
13	Cruise ship terminal on the Gold Coast, QLD	2017/7899
14	Central Queensland Coal Project, QLD	2016/7851
15	Asian Renewable Energy Hub, WA	2021/8891
16	Child Street Residential Development, QLD	2024/10003

TUTORIAL MODEL ANSWERS

Tutorial Model Answers

Question 1 — treaty foundations of the nine MNES

Method. Do not answer this by merely naming a treaty beside every MNES. Ask whether the Commonwealth trigger is directly implementing an international obligation, is strongly connected to an international environmental regime, or is principally a domestic trigger supported by other constitutional powers.

MNES	Treaty / international foundation	Precise exam point
World Heritage properties	World Heritage Convention 1972	Yes — direct. This is the clearest external-affairs example; <i>Commonwealth v Tasmania</i> explains the constitutional bridge.
National Heritage places	No single treaty creates the National Heritage List.	Primarily domestic. The Act uses carefully drafted constitutional hooks rather than treating National Heritage as if it were simply World Heritage.
Ramsar wetlands	Convention on Wetlands (Ramsar Convention)	Yes — direct. Protection is tied to wetlands of international importance.
Listed threatened species and ecological communities	Convention on Biological Diversity is a central biodiversity foundation.	Yes — international biodiversity obligations materially underpin the regime, but do not confuse CBD habitat conservation with CITES, which principally regulates international trade in listed species.
Listed migratory species	Bonn Convention/CMS , JAMBA, CAMBA and ROKAMBA.	Yes — direct and specific. Migratory species protection is the classic bilateral/multilateral migratory-bird example.
Commonwealth marine area	UNCLOS forms part of the international marine-law setting.	Internationally connected, but not reducible to one treaty. Commonwealth territorial and constitutional jurisdiction also matter.
Great Barrier Reef Marine Park	World Heritage Convention is highly relevant because the Reef is World Heritage listed; the Park also has a distinct domestic statutory regime.	International + domestic. Do not collapse the separate GBRMP trigger into the World Heritage trigger.
Nuclear actions		No single treaty should be presented as the sole foundation of the MNES

MNES	Treaty / international foundation	Precise exam point
	Australia is party to several international nuclear-safety/ non-proliferation instruments.	trigger. Treat it as a specific domestic national trigger within a wider international nuclear framework.
Water resources in relation to CSG or large coal mining	No specific treaty is the legal source of the water trigger.	Domestic trigger. It was added to address nationally significant water-resource impacts from specified resource development.

High-Distinction conclusion. The EPBC Act is constitutionally and conceptually shaped by international environmental law, but the nine MNES do not all rest on the same constitutional or treaty foundation. A strong answer identifies the treaty where it genuinely supplies the international hook and expressly distinguishes domestic MNES where it does not.

Question 2 — how to interrogate the EPBC Public Portal

The purpose of this exercise is not to memorise sixteen projects. It is to learn the **screening architecture**. For every file, build the same legal map: **proponent** → **referral date** → **s 75 outcome** → **controlling provisions** → **s 87 assessment approach (if controlled)** → **approval/refusal** → **elapsed time** → **conditions/particular manner**.

EPBC No.	Model-answer status / learning point
2026/10472	GIICA; not a controlled action. Referral commenced 20 March 2026 and the s 75 decision was made 5 May 2026. It is an excellent example of screening ending the Commonwealth assessment pathway at the referral stage.
2016/7825	Sydney Opera House building renewal; controlled action; post-approval. The project engages heritage values and illustrates that works to an iconic existing building can still trigger federal assessment.
2016/7741	Hammond Park Secondary School; controlled action; post-approval. A useful reminder that ordinary social infrastructure can become a federal environmental matter when protected biodiversity is affected.
2021/9128	National Radioactive Waste Management Facility; controlled action. The referral engages the nuclear-action framework and other applicable controlling provisions; the assessment approach is an environmental impact statement.
2005/2359	Mawsons Huts, Antarctica. Use the portal to distinguish the Commonwealth/ Antarctic dimension from an ordinary State development file; identify the controlling provision and decision from the published referral record rather than assuming that heritage significance alone answers the s 75 question.
2013/6758	Offshore powerboat race, Townsville; not a controlled action if undertaken in a particular manner. This is the seminar's practical example of s 77A: mitigation commitments operate as legally significant constraints on how the action may be carried out.
2013/6987	University of Canberra Public Hospital; controlled action; post-approval. It demonstrates that a public hospital can still trigger EPBC assessment and that public-benefit arguments do not displace the statutory environmental trigger.
2006/3155	Dawesville commercial development. Trace the referral through decision and approval records and record both the federal biodiversity trigger and the elapsed time; do not infer the Commonwealth outcome from the fact that State/local development approval may also have been required.
2013/7002	

EPBC No.	Model-answer status / learning point
	Yass Valley Wind Farm; controlled action and approved. The project is especially useful for testing threatened-species/ecological-community impacts in a renewable-energy context.
2009/5103	Pacific Highway, Tintenbar–Ewingsdale. A major linear-infrastructure example: identify the designated proponent, controlling biodiversity provisions, assessment route and conditions; the file shows why road projects can generate substantial Commonwealth assessment work.
2006/2567	Wolgan Valley tourist resort; approved with conditions. This shows that tourism/conservation branding does not remove the need for statutory assessment and conditions.
2010/5736	Carmichael Coal Mine and Rail Project; controlled action and ultimately approved subject to conditions. It is a major-resource example involving a long assessment history and subsequent compliance activity.
2017/7899	Gold Coast Cruise Ship Terminal; not a controlled action if undertaken in a particular manner. The published s 75/s 77A decision required measures addressing listed threatened species and communities and listed migratory species.
2016/7851	Central Queensland Coal Project; controlled action. Queensland records identify a coordinated/single EIS assessment process; the Commonwealth proposal was ultimately refused. This is a powerful contrast with projects that survive screening and obtain conditional approval.
2021/8891	Asian Renewable Energy Hub; clearly unacceptable. The seminar uses it to show that even a renewable-energy project can be stopped very early where unacceptable and irreversible impacts on a Ramsar wetland and protected migratory values are apparent.
2024/10003	Child Street Residential Development; controlled action. Quaystone Development Pty Ltd; listed threatened species and communities (ss 18, 18A); assessment by preliminary documentation; s 75/s 87 decision dated 29 May 2025.

Professional lesson. A portal result is not a substitute for reading the decision notice. The lawyer should open the referral, s 75 decision, assessment approach decision, approval/refusal and conditions, then record the exact statutory basis and dates. The portal is an evidence trail, not merely a search engine.

WEEK 3 SEMINAR APPLICATION / TUTORIAL-STYLE QUESTIONS

Chapter 3 Seminar Application Questions

Teaching note. These are original book questions constructed from the Week 3 seminar material. They are not represented as separate official Bond University tutorial questions. Attempt them before turning to the model answers on the following page.

Question 1 - Classifying a cross-border environmental dispute

A privately owned Australian mining company operates through a subsidiary in Country A. A containment failure contaminates a river that flows into Country B. Farmers in Country B suffer losses and the government of Country B also alleges a breach of international environmental obligations. Identify the different legal pathways that may arise and explain why private international law and public international law must not be collapsed into one analysis.

Question 2 - Treaty to Australian law

Australia ratifies a new multilateral treaty requiring protection of an internationally significant ecosystem. A developer argues that the treaty has no relevance because the project is entirely within Queensland. Explain the steps a lawyer must investigate before accepting or rejecting that argument, including the role of Constitution s 51(xxix).

Question 3 - Precaution and uncertain threatened-species evidence

A project survey records no threatened frog during two daytime inspections. A specialist later records a call consistent with the species after heavy rain and says the species may travel substantial distances from breeding habitat. The proponent says the species is “not proven to be present”. Explain how a decision-maker should reason through the precautionary principle and *Leatch*.

Question 4 - Intergenerational equity and downstream climate impacts

A proposed coal project quantifies operational emissions but excludes emissions from future combustion of the product. The governing statutory scheme requires ESD to be considered. Explain why *Gray v Minister for Planning* is relevant and what further information the decision-maker may need.

Question 5 - International instrument to domestic statutory hook

Choose one of the World Heritage Convention, Ramsar Convention, Bonn Convention/CMS, CITES or the International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling. Trace the pathway from the international instrument to the Australian legal provision or regulatory regime a practitioner would investigate.

Question 6 - Whaling: forum, remedy and enforcement

An overseas whaling company is alleged to have taken whales in waters Australia treats as part of the Australian Whale Sanctuary, but the company has no office or assets in Australia. Explain the difference between an Australian EPBC Act enforcement proceeding against the company and a State-to-State international dispute under the whaling convention.

WEEK 3 SEMINAR APPLICATION - MODEL ANSWERS

Chapter 3 Seminar Application Model Answers

Question 1 - Model answer

Issue. The same event can create private claims and public international law issues. The lawyer must classify each relationship before choosing a forum or rule.

Law and method. Private international law asks which domestic court has jurisdiction, which law governs, how process is served, and whether a judgment can be recognised and enforced. Public international law separately asks whether one State owes another State a treaty or customary-law obligation and whether there is a jurisdictional basis for arbitration or international adjudication.

Application. Farmers may have domestic tort, statutory or compensation claims against private corporate defendants. Country B may raise State responsibility, diplomatic or treaty issues against Country A. The existence of international environmental principles does not turn private farmers into parties before the ICJ, and the existence of domestic litigation does not exhaust any State-to-State issue.

Conclusion. Build two maps: a private cross-border claims map and a public international law map, then identify where they interact.

Question 2 - Model answer

Issue. Whether an international obligation can support Australian domestic regulation of a project located wholly within one State.

Law. A treaty is ordinarily not self-executing in Australian domestic law. The practitioner must identify whether Parliament has enacted implementing legislation and whether that law is supported by a constitutional head of power. Constitution s 51(xxix), the external affairs power, is a central source of Commonwealth legislative capacity to implement bona fide international obligations. *Commonwealth v Tasmania* demonstrates that the intrastate location

of the physical activity does not, by itself, prevent Commonwealth regulation supported by external affairs.

Application. Identify the treaty obligation, the implementing Commonwealth Act, the exact controlling provision, the protected value or matter, the statutory trigger and any required referral/approval pathway. State approvals must be mapped separately.

Conclusion. “The project is entirely in Queensland” is not a complete constitutional answer.

Question 3 - Model answer

Issue. Whether incomplete evidence can be treated as proof that the threatened species is absent.

Law. EPBC Act s 3A(b) states the precautionary principle in the federal ESD framework. *Leatch v National Parks and Wildlife Service* illustrates how serious potential biodiversity harm and material scientific uncertainty can require precautionary decision-making.

Application. The daytime surveys reduce but do not eliminate uncertainty. The acoustic record, weather conditions and species movement ecology create a credible risk requiring further targeted surveys, habitat assessment, route redesign, buffers, timing controls or other proportionate measures. Precaution does not automatically mean permanent refusal, but it prevents the decision-maker from converting uncertainty into assumed safety.

Conclusion. The correct legal response is to manage the uncertainty before irreversible harm occurs.

Question 4 - Model answer

Issue. Whether an assessment that excludes downstream combustion emissions may fail to give the decision-maker legally relevant information.

Law. Intergenerational equity requires attention to future environmental consequences. *Gray v Minister for Planning* is important because it demonstrates that downstream greenhouse emissions may be relevant to an adequate environmental assessment where ESD forms part of the statutory decision framework.

Application. The assessment should identify and, where reasonably possible, quantify downstream emissions, disclose methodology and uncertainty, and explain how those impacts relate to the statutory test. Questions of causation, control and weight can be argued after the information is before the decision-maker.

Conclusion. Excluding downstream emissions merely because combustion occurs elsewhere can create legal risk where the statute requires a broader ESD assessment.

Question 5 - Model answer

Method. Start with the international instrument and identify the obligation or protected subject matter. Then identify the Australian constitutional source supporting implementation, the implementing statute, the exact protected category and the operative provision. For example, the World Heritage Convention connects to the EPBC Act World Heritage controlling provisions; migratory-species treaties connect to the listed migratory species regime; CITES connects to wildlife-trade controls; and the whaling convention sits alongside Part 13 cetacean protections. Do not stop at the treaty name: the practitioner needs the domestic legal hook.

Question 6 - Model answer

Issue. Domestic statutory enforcement and international State responsibility are distinct.

Domestic pathway. The NGO must identify the Australian Whale Sanctuary and the precise EPBC prohibition, establish standing and jurisdiction, serve the foreign company and seek available relief. The HSI/Kyodo litigation shows that service outside Australia and practical enforcement can be difficult even where the court grants relief.

International pathway. A dispute that the foreign State has breached the ICRW is a public international law dispute requiring State parties and an international jurisdictional basis. *Whaling in the Antarctic* illustrates that separate pathway.

Conclusion. Always identify the party, source of law, forum and remedy before using the label “international whaling case”.

CHAPTER 3 IRAC PROBLEMS - QUESTIONS

Chapter 3 IRAC Problem Questions

IRAC 1 - Cross-border chemical discharge

An Australian-controlled mining company operates a processing facility in Country A, five kilometres from the border with Country B. Following unusually heavy rain, a waste pond overflows and contaminated water enters a river flowing into Country B. Farmers in Country B lose crops and drinking-water supplies are disrupted. There is no specific bilateral pollution treaty. Advise the company about the legal issues that must be investigated before it assumes either that only Country A law applies or that an international court will determine the dispute.

IRAC 2 - Uncertain threatened-species habitat

A road authority proposes a bypass through degraded woodland. No endangered frog has been visually recorded on the site for twenty years, but a qualified ecologist records a call consistent with the species and explains that adults may move kilometres from breeding habitat. The proponent argues that there is no “scientific proof” the frog is present. Advise the decision-maker on precautionary reasoning.

IRAC 3 - Coal project and downstream emissions

A company proposes a new Australian coal mine. Its environmental assessment calculates diesel, electricity and fugitive emissions from the mine but excludes emissions from combustion of exported coal because those emissions will occur overseas. The governing statute requires ESD principles to be considered. Advise whether the assessment methodology creates a legal risk.

IRAC 4 - Antarctic whaling and enforcement

An overseas company takes whales in waters Australia regards as part of the Australian Whale Sanctuary adjacent to the Australian Antarctic Territory. The company has no office or assets in Australia. An Australian environmental NGO wants an injunction. Advise on the domestic statutory pathway, procedural obstacles and the distinction between domestic litigation against the company and any international dispute with the company's State.

CHAPTER 3 IRAC PROBLEMS - MODEL ANSWERS

Chapter 3 Detailed IRAC Model Answers

IRAC 1 - Cross-border chemical discharge

Issue. The principal issues are whether the dispute is a private cross-border claim, a public international law dispute between States, or both; which courts have jurisdiction; which domestic law governs liability; whether customary international environmental principles are relevant; and whether a judgment can be enforced against the company or its assets.

Rule. Private international law addresses forum, governing law, service and recognition/enforcement where private parties and events span jurisdictions. Public international law separately regulates duties between States. The no-harm principle, historically illustrated by *Trail Smelter*, recognises that territorial sovereignty is accompanied by responsibility regarding serious transboundary environmental harm. *Pulp Mills* demonstrates the importance of due diligence, cooperation and environmental assessment where significant transboundary harm is risked.

Application. The company's facility and alleged failure occurred in Country A, while much of the damage occurred in Country B. A claimant may therefore explore proceedings in one or more domestic forums depending on their jurisdictional rules. The company must identify corporate entities, insurance, contractual arrangements, applicable environmental licences and tort/statutory causes of action. The absence of a bespoke bilateral pollution treaty does not prove there is no liability. Equally, affected farmers cannot simply commence an ICJ case: the ICJ adjudicates disputes between States that have a jurisdictional basis. Country B might pursue diplomatic or State-to-State avenues, while farmers pursue private claims. Evidence concerning design, rainfall foreseeability, containment capacity, warning, causation and damage will be essential.

Counterargument. The company may argue an extraordinary natural event broke causation or that it complied with domestic standards. Those arguments require factual and legal testing; compliance with one licence does not automatically answer negligence, statutory liability or transboundary responsibility.

Conclusion. The correct advice is a multi-jurisdictional investigation, not a categorical statement that one country's law or one international tribunal controls the entire dispute.

IRAC 2 - Uncertain threatened-species habitat

Issue. Whether the absence of direct visual confirmation permits the decision-maker to disregard potential serious harm to the endangered frog.

Rule. Under the precautionary principle, reflected in EPBC Act s 3A(b) and explained in authorities such as *Leatch*, lack of full scientific certainty should not be used to postpone preventative measures where threats of serious or irreversible environmental damage exist.

Application. The potential loss of habitat for an endangered species is capable of being serious and irreversible. Scientific uncertainty plainly exists: visual surveys have not confirmed presence, but qualified acoustic evidence and known movement behaviour support a plausible risk. The decision-maker should therefore ask what further surveys, seasonal work, habitat mapping, route redesign, buffers or conditions could reduce uncertainty and risk. The proponent's argument wrongly converts "not conclusively proven" into "not present".

Counterargument. Precaution is not automatic refusal. If rigorous further surveys establish absence, or if redesign eliminates material risk, approval may become legally supportable.

Conclusion. The decision-maker should not approve on the assumption of no frog merely because the science is incomplete. Uncertainty must be managed through proportionate evidence and preventative measures.

IRAC 3 - Coal project and downstream emissions

Issue. Whether excluding combustion emissions creates a legally inadequate environmental assessment where ESD is mandatory.

Rule. Intergenerational equity under EPBC Act s 3A(c) and analogous State ESD provisions directs attention to future environmental consequences. *Gray v Minister for Planning* is a leading authority showing that environmental assessment may need to consider downstream greenhouse emissions rather than confining analysis to direct mine-site emissions.

Application. The exported coal is mined precisely so it can be combusted. Although combustion occurs overseas and separate legal questions arise about control and causation, excluding downstream emissions altogether may prevent the decision-maker from understanding the project's full climate consequences. Because the statute requires ESD to be considered, the safer legal course is to quantify or reasonably estimate relevant downstream emissions, explain methodological limitations, avoid double counting and state how the information bears on the statutory decision.

Counterargument. The company can argue overseas combustion is undertaken by independent actors and that the decision-maker's statutory jurisdiction is project-specific. That may affect the weight assigned to downstream emissions, but it does not necessarily justify withholding the information.

Conclusion. There is a material legal risk in an assessment that simply omits downstream emissions. *Gray* supports a broader assessment approach where ESD forms part of the statutory decision framework.

IRAC 4 - Antarctic whaling and enforcement

Issue. The issues are whether the conduct falls within the EPBC Act's Australian Whale Sanctuary provisions, whether the NGO can obtain and serve Australian proceedings on the foreign company, whether an injunction would be practically enforceable, and how this differs from an international dispute between Australia and the foreign State.

Rule. EPBC Act s 225 establishes the Australian Whale Sanctuary and ss 229-230 form part of the cetacean prohibition regime. The HSI/Kyodo litigation shows that extraterritorial service, judicial discretion and practical enforcement can become central where the respondent is foreign. The Full Federal Court held that diplomatic concerns did not simply displace the court's judicial task. Separately, a State-to-State treaty dispute proceeds under public international law, illustrated by *Whaling in the Antarctic*.

Application. The NGO should first establish the exact location, species, conduct and statutory prohibition. It must then address standing, originating process and service outside Australia. If ordinary service cannot be achieved, substituted service may be sought if the procedural rules permit. Even if an injunction is granted, the company may have no assets or vessels within Australian enforcement reach. That practical difficulty should be explained without confusing it with the court's power to declare and restrain unlawful conduct. Any contention

that the foreign State breached the ICRW is a different legal controversy involving States and an international jurisdictional basis.

Counterargument. The respondent may contest Australian jurisdiction, sanctuary coverage, treaty-sensitive territorial assumptions, service and enforceability. Those objections require precise statutory and procedural analysis.

Conclusion. Domestic EPBC enforcement against the company and international proceedings against a State are distinct pathways. A competent adviser must identify both and never collapse them into one “whaling case”.

CHAPTER 3 RESEARCH

Chapter 3 Resources

[Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act - Federal Register of Legislation](#)

[Environment Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act 1999 \(Cth\) - current authorised compilation](#)

[Climate Change Act 2022 \(Cth\)](#)

[National Greenhouse and Energy Reporting Act 2007 \(Cth\)](#)

[Ozone Protection and Synthetic Greenhouse Gas Management Act 1989 \(Cth\)](#)

[Protection of the Sea \(Civil Liability\) Act 1981 \(Cth\)](#)

[Protection of the Sea \(Oil Pollution Compensation Funds\) Act 1993 \(Cth\)](#)

[Environment Protection \(Sea Dumping\) Act 1981 \(Cth\)](#)

[Nature Conservation \(Animals\) Regulation 2020 \(Qld\)](#)

[United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea - UN](#)

[Trail Smelter Arbitration - UN Reports of International Arbitral Awards](#)

[Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay - International Court of Justice](#)

[Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer - UNEP](#)

[Montreal Protocol - UNEP](#)

[Rio Declaration on Environment and Development - United Nations](#)

[UNFCCC](#)

[Kyoto Protocol](#)

[Paris Agreement](#)

[Convention on Biological Diversity](#)

[Convention on Migratory Species \(Bonn Convention\)](#)

[CITES Convention text](#)

[Antarctic Treaty - official Secretariat](#)

[International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling - IWC](#)

[Whaling in the Antarctic \(Australia v Japan: New Zealand intervening\) - ICJ](#)

[Commonwealth v Tasmania \[1983\] HCA 21](#)

[Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Teoh \[1995\] HCA 20](#)

[Ex parte Lam \[2003\] HCA 6](#)

[Leatch v National Parks and Wildlife Service \[1993\] NSWLEC 191](#)

[Gray v Minister for Planning \[2006\] NSWLEC 720](#)

[Taralga Landscape Guardians Inc v Minister for Planning \[2007\] NSWLEC 59](#)

[Humane Society International Inc v Kyodo Senpaku Kaisha Ltd \[2005\] FCA 664](#)

[Humane Society International Inc v Kyodo Senpaku Kaisha Ltd \[2006\] FCAFC 116](#)

[Humane Society International Inc v Kyodo Senpaku Kaisha Ltd \[2008\] FCA 3](#)

RESEARCH RULE

Blue text is used as a research pathway, not decoration. Start with the authoritative source, confirm the current provision or judgment, and then return to the narrative to understand why it matters and how to use it.

End of Chapter 3 - complete through the Week 3 materials supplied as at 30 September 2026.

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CHAPTER 4

ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT ASSESSMENT UNDER THE EPBC ACT: REFERRAL, SCREENING, CONTROLLED ACTIONS AND THE ROAD TO APPROVAL

From identifying the legal action and federal trigger to building the evidence, screening the proposal, managing Commonwealth-State overlap and advising a real project team.

THE LEARNING JOURNEY

ENVIRONMENTAL PROBLEM → ACTOR / PROPONENT → ACTION → JURISDICTION
 → MNES / OTHER PROTECTED MATTER → CONTROLLING PROVISION →
 SIGNIFICANT IMPACT → REFERRAL → SCREENING → ASSESSMENT →
 APPROVAL / CONDITIONS / REFUSAL → COMPLIANCE → PROFESSIONAL ADVICE

CURRENT-LAW ALERT - EPBC REFORMS ARE STILL COMMENCING (8 OCTOBER 2026)

The Week 4 referral and screening pathway is being taught against **EPBC Act Compilation No. 70 (24 August 2026)**, while the [Environment Protection Reform Act 2025 \(Cth\)](#) continues to commence in stages. Tranche 1 commenced on 20 February 2026; the National EPA commenced on 1 July 2026; four National Environmental Standards were made on 19 August 2026; a further tranche commenced on 24 August 2026; and the remaining reforms are due to commence on or before 1 December 2026. The Standards will apply to project assessments and approval decisions only when the new approval tests commence. Compilation No. 70 already reflects current amendments, including the revised s 391 framework for Minister and CEO decisions. Always use the current authorised EPBC Act text for ss 74A, 75, 77A, 133-136 and related provisions.

Environmental impact assessment (EIA) is one of the most important practical mechanisms in environmental law because it forces environmental consequences to be

identified *before* a project becomes legally and commercially irreversible. It is not simply a scientific report and it is not simply a permit application. It is a structured legal decision-making process: identify the potentially significant environmental consequences and risks of a proposal; obtain reliable information; test alternatives and mitigation; expose the proposal to scrutiny; and provide the statutory decision-maker with enough material to decide whether the action should proceed, proceed in a modified form or with conditions, or be refused.¹

The immediate aim is therefore informational: identify consequences and risks so that the decision is informed. The ultimate aim is more ambitious: improve environmental outcomes by embedding ecologically sustainable development (ESD), avoidance and mitigation in project design, and by making the proponent take primary responsibility for understanding and minimising the environmental effects of its proposal. The Week 4 teaching materials emphasise an important professional lesson: EIA costs money and time, but early EIA can prevent far greater redesign, delay, enforcement and rehabilitation costs later. A sophisticated client does not ask, “How late can we do the environmental work?” It asks, “What environmental work must be done early enough to change the project intelligently?”

4.1 The generic EIA architecture — learn the sequence before the sections

SCREENING → **SCOPING** → **IMPACT ANALYSIS** → **MITIGATION** →
REPORTING → **REVIEW** → **DECISION-MAKING** → **FOLLOW-UP**

Screening determines whether EIA is required and at what level. **Scoping** defines what must be investigated. **Impact analysis** predicts effects and evaluates their significance. **Mitigation** asks how effects can be avoided, reduced, repaired or otherwise managed. **Reporting** assembles the evidence. **Review** tests the adequacy of that material. **Decision-making** determines whether to approve, refuse or impose conditions. **Follow-up** monitors whether the proponent actually does what it promised and whether the impacts unfold as predicted.

This generic architecture is deliberately taught before the EPBC Act sections because it gives students a mental map. Once the map is understood, every statutory provision has a place. Section 68 is not an isolated number: it opens the Commonwealth referral gateway. Section 75 is not “the approval section”: it is the screening decision. Section 87 concerns the assessment approach once the action is controlled. Sections 133-134

1. Gerry Bates, *Environmental Law in Australia* (LexisNexis Butterworths, 11th ed, 2023); *Gray v Minister for Planning* [2006] NSWLEC 720, [116].

belong to the later approval and conditions stage. This sequence prevents one of the most common examination errors — using the right statutory words at the wrong stage.

Professional translation. A development lawyer should turn this sequence into a project programme. Ecology, heritage, hydrology, engineering and planning work must be commissioned early enough that the evidence can change design. Survey windows matter: a species cannot reliably be ruled out merely because it was not observed during the wrong season. Public participation also has practical value — it can reveal local knowledge and design problems before they mature into litigation or political conflict.

4.2 The Commonwealth question starts with jurisdiction, not with “environment” generally

The Commonwealth does not possess a free-standing general environmental head of power. The EPBC Act therefore works through constitutional and statutory “hooks”. The Week 4 seminar revisited the external affairs, corporations and trade and commerce powers because the architecture of Part 3 reflects those constitutional foundations. This is why superficially similar provisions can be drafted differently. A student should not merely memorise the nine matters of national environmental significance (MNES); they should ask **why the Commonwealth can regulate this actor, this action and this environmental value**.

At project level the practical federal question is usually: **does the proposed action have, will it have, or is it likely to have a significant impact on a matter protected by Part 3?** If so, the statutory pathway can become a “controlled action” pathway. The EPBC Act also regulates certain actions on or affecting Commonwealth land and actions by Commonwealth agencies. The Commonwealth pathway does not automatically displace Queensland or local-government law: s 10 preserves concurrent State/Territory operation unless a contrary intention appears.²

4.3 The nine MNES — and why exact controlling provisions matter

Protected matter	Core Part 3 provisions to check	Teaching point
World Heritage properties	ss 12, 15A	World Heritage values; strong international/ external-affairs foundation.

² *Environment Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act 1999* (Cth) s 10.

Protected matter	Core Part 3 provisions to check	Teaching point
National Heritage places	ss 15B, 15C	National Heritage values; statutory drafting uses constitutional hooks.
Ramsar wetlands	ss 16, 17B	Ecological character of a declared Ramsar wetland.
Listed threatened species and ecological communities	ss 18, 18A	Ask exactly which listed species/community and classification is protected.
Listed migratory species	ss 20, 20A	Often overlaps with Ramsar/wetland habitat questions.
Nuclear actions	ss 21, 22A	The protected matter is the environment in relation to the nuclear-action trigger.
Commonwealth marine area	ss 23, 24A	Can capture actions in the area and Australian-jurisdiction actions outside it that significantly affect its environment.
Great Barrier Reef Marine Park	ss 24B, 24C	Separate trigger from World Heritage status; analyse both where facts support both.
Water resources — unconventional gas / large coal mining	ss 24D, 24E	Specific water-resource trigger for specified resource development.

The examination habit is: **identify the environmental value** → **identify the exact controlling provision** → **identify the statutory words** → **identify the evidence required to connect the proposed action to the protected matter**. Do not write “the project affects biodiversity” and stop. State which EPBC-listed matter is engaged and why.

4.4 What is the “action”?

Section 523 defines “action” broadly to include a project, development, undertaking, activity or series of activities, and an alteration, enlargement, expansion or intensification of such matters. Sections 524 and 524A then exclude specified governmental decisions/authorisations and specified governmental funding decisions from the concept of “action”.³ This distinction is crucial in problem questions: a government may fund a project without the grant itself being the EPBC “action”, while physical works enabled by the funding may still constitute an action requiring analysis.

3. *Environment Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act 1999* (Cth) ss 523-524A.

Issue-spotting trap. Separate contracts, separate land parcels or separate government departments do not automatically make environmental consequences legally separate. Ask whether the activity is part of a larger coherent action and whether indirect consequences fall within the statutory concept of impact.

4.5 Controlled action, prohibition and referral — ss 67, 67A and 68

Section 67 connects controlled-action status to the Part 3 controlling provisions. Section 67A supplies the core prohibition against taking a controlled action without the required statutory basis. Section 68 then addresses referral by the person proposing the action: if that person thinks the proposed action may be or is a controlled action, it must be referred; even if the person thinks it is not controlled, the person may refer it to obtain a formal decision.⁴

The lawyer's job is therefore not to wait until a client is certain there will be a significant impact. The statutory trigger is deliberately protective: if the action *may* be controlled, referral risk must be addressed. A prudent adviser maps all plausible protected matters, commissions fit-for-purpose evidence, tests avoidance and redesign, and documents why referral is or is not required.

4.6 Referral integrity: s 72, false or misleading information and project splitting

Referral is not a marketing brochure. The statutory form must describe the action and its environmental implications with enough candour and completeness for the statutory decision-maker to screen the proposal. Section 72 regulates form/content. Section 489 creates liability relating to false or misleading information. Section 74A allows the Minister to reject a component referral where the referred action is part of a larger action the same person proposes to take, and to request referral of the larger action.⁵

[*Mees v Roads Corporation* \[2003\] FCA 306](#)

Material facts. VicRoads referred the Scoresby Freeway project. The referral stated that earlier strategies had referred to investigating a link between the Eastern Freeway and Metropolitan Ring Road but that the current government had clearly stated there was no proposal for the new link. Dr Mees argued that

4. *Environment Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act 1999* (Cth) ss 67, 67A, 68.

5. *Environment Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act 1999* (Cth) ss 72, 74A, 489.

this presentation omitted the practical consequence that building the Scoresby Freeway would generate pressure for the missing freeway connection.

Issue. Could information be legally misleading even if the words used were not literally false, because the referral omitted a closely connected consequence of the project?

Reasoning. The Court examined the practical relationship between the referred freeway and the future connection. The concern was not semantic accuracy in isolation; it was whether the referral gave the Minister a materially accurate understanding of the action and its consequences. The Court found the omission misleading in context. The decision also illustrates a structural limitation at screening: the Minister is not conducting a roaming factual investigation that repairs an inadequate referral for the proponent.

Outcome and principle. The case demonstrates that legal completeness requires more than avoiding literal falsehoods. Material connected development can make an apparently accurate statement misleading if omitted.

Statutory connection. The later s 74A larger-action mechanism directly addresses the danger of piecemeal project presentation.

When to use it. Cite *Mees* where facts suggest staging, project splitting, induced infrastructure or an artificially narrow referral description.

Professional lesson. Before signing off a referral, ask: “What would an informed regulator say is missing if it saw the whole commercial project rather than the contract package placed in front of us?”

4.7 Public participation at screening — s 74 and the first legal opportunity to be heard

After an accepted referral is published, s 74(3) provides for public comment on whether the proposed action is a controlled action, ordinarily over 10 business days. The screening exercise is transparent because the referral and decision materials are made available through the EPBC public portal, subject to lawful confidentiality constraints. Public participation is not merely ceremonial: it can supply local knowledge, identify overlooked environmental values, expose weaknesses in the proponent’s evidence and improve accountability.

Section 75 requires the decision-maker to consider timely public comments when deciding whether the action is controlled. At screening, the focus is the adverse impact question. Beneficial project claims — jobs, tourism, revenue or renewable-energy

branding — cannot be used to erase an otherwise significant adverse impact at the stage where the Act requires a raw assessment of protected-matter impacts.⁶

4.8 Section 75 — the screening decision

Section 75 asks two linked questions: **(1) is the action a controlled action? (2) which Part 3 provisions are controlling provisions?** If impacts are relevant, the decision-maker must consider all adverse impacts the action has, will have or is likely to have. This is a screening decision, not the final approval decision. If the action is controlled, the matter proceeds into assessment and ultimately the Part 9 decision. If it is not controlled, the Commonwealth controlled-action pathway ends on the referred facts, although State and local requirements remain.

ACTION → PROTECTED MATTER → IMPACT PATHWAY → LIKELIHOOD → SIGNIFICANCE → s 75 OUTCOME

The Week 4 teaching also connects s 75 to s 391. Under the current Act, the Minister (and, for specified decisions, the National EPA CEO) must take account of the precautionary principle for decisions identified by s 391. The principle is statutory, not merely aspirational: lack of full scientific certainty is not a reason to postpone protective measures where there are threats of serious or irreversible environmental damage.⁷

4.9 “Likely” and “significant” — do not collapse two separate questions

A strong answer separately asks whether the impact is sufficiently possible and whether the impact, if it occurs, is important enough to be legally significant. The course materials use authorities such as *Jarasius v Forestry Commission of NSW* (1988) 77 LGRA 79 for the proposition that “likely” need not mean “more probable than not”, and *Booth v Bosworth* (2001) 114 FCR 39 for the concept of significance as something important, notable or consequential. The current statutory text and any applicable Significant Impact Guidelines must then be applied to the particular protected matter.

Evidence matters. A conclusion of “not significant” is only as reliable as the evidence beneath it. Survey design, seasonal timing, habitat function, hydrological pathways, cumulative effects and the quality of mitigation commitments can all affect whether the decision-maker has a defensible factual basis.

6. *Environment Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act 1999* (Cth) ss 74(3), 75.

7. *Environment Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act 1999* (Cth) s 391.

4.10 Possible screening outcomes

Outcome	What it means	Client consequence
Not controlled action (NCA)	No Part 9 approval is required on the referred proposal.	Commonwealth screening ends, but State/local approvals remain.
NCA - particular manner	The action is not controlled provided it is carried out in the specified manner: s 77A.	The “manner” operates as a legally critical constraint; inconsistency can attract civil consequences.
Controlled action	One or more Part 3 controlling provisions apply.	Assessment under Part 8 and later Part 9 approval decision are required.
Clearly unacceptable	The Act's early refusal pathway in Division 1A applies where unacceptable Part 3 impacts are clear on the referral material.	Project cannot proceed in current form; withdrawal, redesign/new referral or reconsideration options must be assessed.

The 2021 Asian Renewable Energy Hub revised proposal is a powerful teaching example: a project can be environmentally beneficial in one dimension yet still be unacceptable because of serious impacts on Ramsar wetland and migratory-species values. “Renewable” is not a legal exemption.

4.11 No premature physical works — s 74AA

Once the statutory referral process is engaged, s 74AA can make it an offence to take the action while the referral decision-making process is still underway, subject to the statutory exceptions. This is a project-management provision as much as a criminal-law provision. A developer who treats the Commonwealth process as paperwork to be completed after mobilisation can destroy the very environmental values the Act is designed to assess. Legal advice must therefore be embedded in the construction programme, procurement sequence and contractor instructions.⁸

4.12 Indirect and downstream impacts — the Nathan Dam lesson

[*Minister for the Environment and Heritage v Queensland Conservation Council Inc* \[2004\] FCAFC 190; \(2004\) 139 FCR 24 \(Nathan Dam\)](#)

Facts. The proposed Nathan Dam in central Queensland was intended to supply water, including water for large-scale irrigation. Environmental groups argued that

⁸ *Environment Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act 1999* (Cth) s 74AA.

the Commonwealth screening decision unlawfully ignored downstream consequences of agricultural use of the supplied water. The evidentiary chain included likely pesticide use on irrigated crops, river-system transport and potential effects on protected Great Barrier Reef values hundreds of kilometres downstream.

Issue. Is an “impact” of an action confined to the action’s immediate physical effects, or can indirect effects produced through later conduct by third parties form part of the impact analysis?

Reasoning. The Full Federal Court rejected an artificially narrow, site-bound conception of impact. The question was whether the consequence was sufficiently connected to the action and within the relevant contemplation/foreseeability framework. The whole commercial purpose of the dam mattered: downstream irrigation was not an unrelated coincidence.

Outcome. The challenge succeeded and the decision had to be reconsidered according to law; judicial review did not itself substitute the Court’s preferred environmental approval outcome.

Current statutory connection. Parliament later enacted s 527E. The section now provides the statutory framework for when consequences facilitated by the primary action are impacts, including the “major extent” and contemplation/reasonable foreseeability concepts.⁹

When to use it. Use Nathan Dam whenever facts contain downstream pollution, induced land use, new traffic/shipping, associated infrastructure, water supply, secondary development or another impact chain extending beyond the project footprint.

Professional lesson. Draw the causal chain on paper. If the project enables another activity, ask whether it facilitates that activity to a major extent and whether the secondary consequences are within contemplation or reasonably foreseeable.

4.13 EIA and ESD — *Gray v Minister for Planning*

[*Gray v Minister for Planning* \[2006\] NSWLEC 720](#)

Facts. The Anvil Hill open-cut coal mine proposal was assessed under NSW legislation. The environmental assessment addressed direct greenhouse

9. *Environment Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act 1999* (Cth) s 527E; *Minister for the Environment and Heritage v Queensland Conservation Council Inc* [2004] FCAFC 190.

emissions from mining but did not assess downstream emissions from burning the coal, including coal intended for power stations in Australia and Japan.

Issue. Was the assessment legally adequate where the statutory decision-making framework required ESD considerations but a major cumulative/downstream consequence had been omitted?

Reasoning. Pain J linked EIA to ESD, including integration, intergenerational equity and a precautionary approach. The Court treated prior assessment as a mechanism by which environmental consequences are placed inside the decision rather than considered after commitment.

Outcome. The impugned decision was held void. The Court did not itself approve or reject the mine; the legal defect concerned the decision-making process and the adequacy of the environmental assessment.

Why it matters here. *Gray* is a NSW case, not a substitute for the EPBC Act. Its teaching value is conceptual and comparative: EIA cannot rationally inform decision-making if material cumulative consequences are excluded at the outset.

When to cite it. Use it to explain the relationship between EIA, ESD and cumulative/downstream consequences, while anchoring an EPBC answer in the EPBC statutory provisions.

4.14 Exemptions must be proved — the Wielangta forestry litigation

[*Brown v Forestry Tasmania \(No 4\)* \[2006\] FCA 1729](#) and [*Forestry Tasmania v Brown* \[2007\] FCAFC 186](#)

Facts. The litigation concerned forestry operations in the Wielangta forest and potential impacts on the Tasmanian wedge-tailed eagle, broad-toothed stag beetle and swift parrot. Forestry Tasmania relied on the s 38 Regional Forest Agreement (RFA) forestry exemption.

First-instance issue and result. Marshall J examined whether the forestry operations were undertaken in accordance with the RFA and, on the first-instance construction of the agreement, held the exemption unavailable. The case materials highlight recovery/threat-abatement planning and whether promised species protection had actually been implemented.

Critical appellate qualification. The first-instance conclusion on the s 38 exemption was **reversed on appeal** in *Forestry Tasmania v Brown* [2007] FCAFC

186. The Full Court's interpretation of the RFA/s 38 framework meant Forestry Tasmania could rely on the exemption. Students must not cite the first-instance exemption holding as if it remained the final legal position.

Why the pair matters. The cases teach two separate skills: (1) identify the precise statutory exemption and prove its legal conditions; and (2) always check the appellate history before using a case proposition.

Professional lesson. “We are in an exempt industry” is never enough. Ask: which section? what agreement/authorisation? what does it legally require? has any appellate authority changed the meaning?

4.15 Commonwealth-State overlap and Queensland coordinated projects

An action can require both Queensland and Commonwealth processes. The EPBC Act does not generally erase State law. The Commonwealth-Queensland **assessment bilateral agreement** can reduce duplication by allowing an accredited Queensland assessment — including an appropriate coordinated-project EIS process — to supply the assessment material used for the Commonwealth decision. That is not the same as saying Queensland “switches off” Commonwealth jurisdiction. The Commonwealth approval question under the EPBC Act remains unless a lawful approval-bilateral mechanism actually applies to the action.

Client advice sequence. (1) map Queensland approvals and whether coordinated-project declaration/EIS is available; (2) separately map EPBC referral risk; (3) determine whether the bilateral assessment agreement can accredit the State process; (4) confirm who will make the final Commonwealth approval decision; (5) build both regimes into one programme rather than treating one as a substitute for the other.

4.16 From controlled action to assessment — s 87

If the action is controlled, the next legal question is how the impacts will be assessed. Section 87 determines the assessment approach under the statutory scheme. The assessment stage builds the evidentiary record for the later decision. Depending on the statutory pathway, this can involve accredited State assessment, preliminary documentation, a public environment report, an environmental impact statement, or another lawful assessment route. The key conceptual distinction is:

SCREENING asks: “Does Commonwealth approval need to be obtained?”

ASSESSMENT asks: “What evidence is required to understand the protected-matter impacts?”

APPROVAL asks: “Should the action be approved, refused, or approved subject to conditions?”

4.17 Approval, representations and conditions — ss 131AA, 133, 134 and 136

At the Part 9 stage, the Act provides procedural protection for the proponent. Before the Minister decides whether to approve the action and what conditions to impose, s 131AA requires the proponent/designated proponent to be informed of the proposed decision and proposed conditions and invited to provide written comments within 10 business days (measured in Canberra).¹⁰

Section 133 is the approval decision. Section 134 governs conditions. The condition power is broad but not unlimited: there must be the statutory nexus to protecting a matter protected by a Part 3 controlling provision or repairing/mitigating damage to such a matter caused by the action. The section contemplates mechanisms including securities/bonds and financial contributions where the statutory criteria are satisfied. Section 136 then governs matters to which the Minister must have regard in the approval/conditions decision, including relevant protected-matter impacts, economic and social matters, ESD and the assessment material prescribed by the section.¹¹

This distinction is essential for conditions: a condition is not valid merely because it produces a generally desirable environmental outcome. Ask **what protected matter the condition protects, repairs or mitigates; how the condition connects to the action; and why the chosen mechanism is within the statutory purpose.**

4.18 Think like the environmental lawyer

Role	Question	Expected reasoning
Student	What section applies?	Find exact Part 3 trigger, referral provision, screening criteria and current statutory wording.
Lawyer	What facts and evidence activate the section?	Define action, proponent, impact pathway, protected matter, likelihood/significance, indirect impacts and any larger action.

10. *Environment Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act 1999* (Cth) s 131AA.

11. *Environment Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act 1999* (Cth) ss 133-136.

Role	Question	Expected reasoning
Adviser	What should happen next?	Sequence surveys, redesign, referral, State process, public engagement, assessment, representations on conditions and project commitments.
Board / C-suite	What decision must management make?	Do not commit capital/works until critical approval risk, timing, conditions, finance/security exposure and alternatives are understood.

WEEK 4 TUTORIAL — ACTUAL QUESTIONS

ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT ASSESSMENT TUTORIAL

Problem facts. In January this year, Resorts United Development Limited (RUD) released plans for a proposed ecotourism resort in South East Queensland, near but not within the Gondwana Rainforests of Australia (Main Range Group). The resort would accommodate up to 900 guests. Pristine Creek flows through the site and drains into a larger waterway that is a critical breeding area for *Numenius phaeopus*. The Queensland Government supports the \$90 million project and proposes a \$10 million development grant. RUD must construct a 9 km resort access road. The State has indicated that Transport and Main Roads will build a connector road through the Gondwana Rainforests, requiring substantial clearing of Durobby. Local growers along tributaries use bendosultan, a pesticide harmful to aquatic ecology and waterbirds. Council proposes to dam part of Pristine Creek to improve irrigation. The creek supports the Oxleyan Pygmy Perch, which requires shallow breeding waters; Council proposes translocation despite uncertainty about long-term success. A government consultant has also identified habitat of *Murina florium* (tube-nosed insect bat) that may be affected by the RUD development, with the species said to contribute to Gondwana Rainforest evolutionary processes through seed dispersal.

Question 1

Which aspects (if any) of the proposed activities/commitments by RUD, the Queensland State Government and the Council discussed above should be referred under the *Environment Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act 1999* (Cth)?

Question 2

What bearing, if any, would the declaration of the project as a 'coordinated project' for which an environmental impact statement is required pursuant to Part 4 of the *State Development and Public Works Organisation Act 1971* (Qld) have on assessment for the purposes of the EPBC Act? The project has not yet been declared, although some Queensland politicians supportive of the project have suggested that RUD should pursue such a declaration as it would enable the project to "avoid Commonwealth interference". Are the politicians correct?

Question 3

David Strong is a third-year environmental science student who works part-time as a policy officer with the Australian Conservation Foundation and attends a regional conservation forum. He is concerned about the Council's proposed dam disrupting Oxleyan Pygmy Perch breeding habitat. If Commonwealth approval is granted and David wishes to challenge the Minister's decision on the basis that the decision is not in accordance with the precautionary principle, does such an argument hold any merit? For this tutorial, do not consider standing.

Question 4

The EIS process under the EPBC Act has been completed. RUD hears that an approval is likely subject to stringent conditions, including: (a) a \$10 million bond to secure rehabilitation costs if construction encroaches into a protected buffer; and (b) a financial contribution to Council's Mangrove Foreshore Rehabilitation Scheme. What opportunity, if any, will RUD have to make representations about these conditions and are such conditions within the Minister's power?

WEEK 4 TUTORIAL — HIGH-DISTINCTION MODEL ANSWERS

DETAILED TUTORIAL MODEL ANSWERS

Question 1 — What should be referred?

Issue map. The problem deliberately contains multiple actors and multiple activities. The correct method is not to ask “is the resort referable?” as a single question. Separate: **(1)** RUD resort + access road; **(2)** State funding grant; **(3)** State/TMR connector road through the Gondwana Rainforests; and **(4)** Council’s Pristine Creek dam/irrigation proposal. Then ask whether each is an “action”, whether it may significantly affect a Part 3 protected matter, and whether a larger-action or indirect-impact analysis connects apparently separate activities.

RUD resort and access road. RUD is a corporate proponent and the physical resort/access-road works plainly fit the broad s 523 concept of action. The facts raise at least World Heritage values (because the project is near the Gondwana Rainforests and the bat evidence connects the project to evolutionary values), listed migratory species (the Whimbrel, *Numenius phaeopus*, is listed migratory) and potentially listed threatened species/ecological communities identified by proper protected-matters searching. The 9 km access road should not be artificially severed if it is functionally part of the resort development: s 74A makes the larger-action question explicit. If the combined resort/access action may be controlled, s 68(1) points strongly to referral.

The bat evidence. The problem gives an ecological-function pathway: habitat loss → reduced *Murina florum* population → reduced seed dispersal → possible degradation of evolutionary processes contributing to World Heritage values. Do not assume the fictional/teaching species is itself EPBC-listed unless the statutory list confirms it. The important legal question is whether its ecological function creates a significant-impact pathway to the *World Heritage values* protected by ss 12/15A. That requires expert evidence about habitat, dependence, magnitude and significance.

State \$10 million grant. Do not call the grant itself a referable “action” without checking s 524A. The EPBC scheme excludes specified government funding decisions from the concept of action. The grant may be commercially important,

but the physical development it facilitates remains separately subject to the Act. This is exactly why the actor/action distinction matters.

TMR connector road through the World Heritage property. Physical road construction and clearing are a distinct action capable of direct impacts on World Heritage values and possibly threatened/migratory species. A State may refer under s 69. The fact that a State agency is the proponent does not create immunity from the EPBC scheme. The road's relationship with the RUD resort should also be tested: if one action facilitates the other, the indirect-impact/larger-action analysis becomes important.

Council dam. The dam is a physical action. The Oxleyan Pygmy Perch (*Nannoperca oxleyana*) is EPBC-listed endangered, so ss 18/18A are directly relevant if significant impact is possible. The uncertainty surrounding relocation is not a reason to assume the species is safe; it raises an evidentiary/precautionary issue. The dam also facilitates increased irrigation. Under the Nathan Dam/s 527E framework, ask whether the dam facilitates secondary irrigation to a major extent and whether pesticide runoff consequences are within contemplation or reasonably foreseeable. The critical breeding area for the listed migratory Whimbrel raises ss 20/20A as well.

Conclusion. RUD should prepare one legally coherent referral for its resort/access-road action if the current evidence supports the "may be controlled" threshold. The State should separately address referral of the connector road; Council should address referral of the dam. The funding grant is not itself the physical action. Before any conclusion, the legal team should run current protected-matters searches, obtain species/World Heritage-value evidence, map the action boundaries and causal links, and prohibit premature works pending the statutory pathway.

Strong counterargument. RUD may argue that it does not construct the State connector road and cannot be responsible for every downstream activity. That is relevant, but not decisive. The lawyer must distinguish the identity of each action/proponent from the separate statutory concept of impact. Nathan Dam and s 527E are used to test whether consequences of another actor's conduct are sufficiently connected to the primary action.

Question 2 — Queensland coordinated project and the Commonwealth assessment

Issue. Does a Queensland declaration under Part 4 of the *State Development and Public Works Organisation Act 1971* (Qld), with an EIS, remove the need for EPBC assessment/approval?

Rule. No general “State approval defeats Commonwealth approval” rule exists. EPBC Act s 10 preserves concurrent State/Territory law. The Commonwealth and Queensland have an assessment bilateral agreement under Part 5 of the EPBC Act. Where its requirements are met, an accredited Queensland process can be used to assess the impacts for Commonwealth purposes, reducing duplication. The final Commonwealth approval decision under Part 9 is still a Commonwealth statutory decision unless a separate lawful approval-bilateral mechanism applies.

Application. A coordinated-project declaration can be strategically useful because the Coordinator-General’s EIS process may be accredited for Commonwealth assessment. Instead of two full assessment documents/processes, the State EIS can develop the evidence needed for both regimes. But the Commonwealth controlling provisions do not vanish. The Commonwealth decision-maker must still decide the federal approval question under the EPBC Act on the accredited assessment material.

Are the politicians correct? No. Saying the State process would “avoid Commonwealth interference” confuses *assessment integration* with *jurisdictional displacement*. It may streamline assessment; it does not automatically extinguish Commonwealth protected-matter jurisdiction.

Professional advice. RUD should pursue coordinated scheduling if commercially useful, but the project programme should show both State and Commonwealth decision gates. The legal team should verify that the precise action and EIS pathway fall within the current bilateral agreement and that the EIS terms of reference capture every EPBC controlling provision.

Question 3 — Precautionary principle challenge

Issue. Could an approval be legally vulnerable if the decision-maker failed to take account of scientific uncertainty concerning serious/irreversible damage to Oxleyan Pygmy Perch habitat?

Exact law. Section 391 now addresses both the Minister and the CEO. For the s 75 controlled-action decision and the s 133 approval decision discussed here, s 391(1) requires the Minister to take account of the precautionary principle for the decisions listed in s 391(3). Section 391(1A) separately requires the CEO to take account of the principle for the decisions listed in s 391(4). Section 391(2) states the statutory principle: lack of full scientific certainty should not be used to postpone a measure to prevent environmental degradation where there are threats of serious or irreversible environmental damage. Section 136 also embeds ESD considerations in the approval/conditions stage.

Application. The facts give both components that make precaution legally important: potentially serious/irreversible consequences for an endangered species with a very restricted distribution, and material scientific uncertainty about whether translocation will work. The European example does not eliminate uncertainty; the facts expressly say the long-term outcome remains unknown. A decision that treated that uncertainty as a reason to do nothing, without genuinely considering precautionary protective measures, would present a plausible judicial-review argument.

But precaution is not an automatic veto. David cannot simply say “there is uncertainty, therefore approval is unlawful”. The legal question is whether the statutory decision-maker *took account* of the principle and lawfully evaluated the threats and available measures. An approval supported by robust avoidance, habitat protection, conditions, adaptive management and evidence can still be consistent with the precautionary principle. Judicial review polices legality, not whether the Court would make a more environmentally protective merits decision.

Authority connection. *Leatch v National Parks and Wildlife Service* (1993) 81 LGERA 270 is a useful Australian teaching authority on precaution under scientific uncertainty. *Gray* reinforces the role of prior EIA and ESD. But for an EPBC problem, start with s 391 because it is the governing Commonwealth statutory command.

Conclusion. The argument can have real merit if the record shows the Minister failed to take account of the statutory precautionary principle or misunderstood its role. Its success depends on the reasons and evidentiary record, not merely on the existence of ecological uncertainty.

Question 4 — Proposed bond and rehabilitation contribution

Issue 1: procedural opportunity to respond. Section 131AA requires the Minister, before deciding approval and conditions, to inform the person proposing the action/designated proponent of the proposed decision and proposed conditions and invite written comments within 10 business days. RUD therefore has a statutory opportunity to make targeted representations. It should not use the response merely to say the conditions are expensive; it should address statutory power, nexus, proportionality/practical operation, drafting clarity, duplication and alternative mechanisms.

Issue 2: \$10 million rehabilitation bond. Section 134 authorises conditions with the required connection to protecting a matter protected by a controlling provision or repairing/mitigating damage to that matter. The statutory condition framework contemplates security/bond mechanisms. A rehabilitation bond linked to potential encroachment into a legally protected buffer is therefore capable of falling within power if the buffer protects the relevant Part 3 matter and the quantum/mechanism serves the statutory protective/repair purpose. RUD should test the evidence supporting the \$10 million figure, trigger for calling the security, release mechanism and whether the condition is drafted with sufficient certainty.

Issue 3: contribution to the Mangrove Foreshore Rehabilitation Scheme. A financial contribution can be within s 134's condition framework, but the existence of a general Council environmental programme does not itself establish validity. The Minister must connect the contribution to the protected matter(s) and the action. If the scheme protects/repairs/mitigates the same Ramsar, migratory, threatened-species, World Heritage or other controlling values affected by the action, the nexus can be strong. If it is merely a useful unrelated local project, RUD has a stronger argument that the condition exceeds the statutory purpose.

Issue 4: decision-stage considerations. Section 136 is relevant to the approval/conditions reasoning, and s 391 remains important where the approval decision engages precaution. The assessment report and public material form part of the decision record.

Conclusion/advice. RUD should make s 131AA representations. It should accept conditions that are demonstrably tied to the protected matters while negotiating drafting, amount, triggers and delivery mechanics. It should challenge or seek redrafting of a contribution condition if the Commonwealth cannot demonstrate the statutory nexus to the impacts of RUD's action.

CHAPTER 4 — PINPOINT EPBC REFERRAL & SCREENING CONSOLIDATION

CHAPTER 4 PRECISION CONSOLIDATION: EVERY REFERRAL STEP TAUGHT IN WEEK 4

4.20 Referral duty, content, variation and candour — ss 68, 72, 156A and 489

Provision	Exact role in the problem	Lawyer's question
s 68(1)	A person proposing to take an action must refer the proposal if the person thinks the action may be or is a controlled action.	Has the proponent identified a real possibility that a Part 3 controlling provision is engaged?
s 68(2)	Permits referral where the person is unsure whether the action is a controlled action.	Is uncertainty itself commercially significant enough that a referral should be made to obtain a decision?
s 68(3)	The referral must state whether the proponent believes the action is a controlled action.	Is the stated position defensible on the evidence and consistent with the rest of the referral?
s 72; s 72(3)	Controls form/content; the course materials emphasise that alternatives in location, timing or activities may be specified.	Have realistic alternatives been described so the decision-maker sees the true project choices rather than an artificially narrow proposal?
s 156A	Provides the statutory mechanism relevant to varying a referral.	If the design changes, can the change lawfully be dealt with as a variation or does it alter the project so fundamentally that fresh referral thinking is required?
s 489	Creates criminal exposure for recklessly or negligently providing false or misleading information in the statutory information context taught in the referral materials.	Has every material project dependency, impact pathway and factual statement been checked before submission?

These provisions work together. A technically polished referral is not enough if it describes the wrong project, omits a foreseeable connected component or understates an impact pathway. *Mees v Roads Corporation* is therefore not a free-standing “case about misleading words”; it teaches why project definition and statutory disclosure must be read together with ss 68, 72 and 74A.

4.21 Public comment, information and the s 75 decision — ss 74(3), 75(1A), 75(2), 75(5), 76

Section 74(3) underpins the public-comment step taught in the seminar. Public participation matters because **s 75(1A)** requires the Minister to consider relevant public comment when deciding whether approval is required. The decision is not a merits balancing exercise at this stage: under **s 75(2)(a)** the Minister must consider the adverse impacts of the action on protected matters, while **s 75(2)(b)** prevents beneficial impacts from being used in the screening decision in the manner prohibited by the Act. **Section 76** allows further information to be sought, and **s 75(5)** supplies the decision timeframe subject to statutory timing rules.⁸⁹

***Booth v Bosworth* (2001) 114 FCR 39 and *Jarasius v Forestry Commission of NSW* (1988) 77 LGRA 79**

Why these authorities are paired in the course. They separate two different threshold words. “Likely” does not require proof that the impact is more probable than not; the course frames it as a real and not remote chance or possibility. “Significant” asks whether the impact is important, notable or of consequence having regard to context/intensity. A strong answer must apply both concepts rather than compressing them into “there might be some impact”.

Application. For a threatened-species project, first prove the pathway by which the action could affect habitat/population. Then assess the probability of that pathway and separately assess the seriousness of the consequence. A low-probability but catastrophic/irreversible pathway may still demand careful treatment under the statutory and precautionary framework.

4.22 Project splitting, early works and decision outcomes — ss 74A, 74AA, 74B-74C and 77A

Section 74A allows the Minister to deal with a referral that is merely a component of a larger action. **Section 74AA** protects the screening process against physical commencement while the referral decision process is still underway in the

⁸⁹ [Environment Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act 1999 \(Cth\)](#) ss 74(3), 75(1A), 75(2), 75(5), 76.

circumstances specified by the section. **Sections 74B-74C** create the “clearly unacceptable” pathway. **Section 77A** allows a “not controlled action if undertaken in a particular manner” outcome, which operates in practice like a tightly specified pathway the proponent must follow.

CLIENT WARNING

Do not solve a program-delay problem by beginning clearing, access roads or other irreversible works while the legal status of the action is unresolved. The correct response is to align project definition, ecology, referral timing and construction gates. A board should have a documented “no physical works” gate where s 74AA risk exists.

4.23 Reconsideration and later information — ss 77(4), 78, 78A and 158A

The Week 4 live seminar specifically emphasises that the referral decision is not always the end of the screening story. **Section 77(4)** is relevant to reasons; **s 78** gives the Minister a statutory reconsideration power where the statutory preconditions are met; **s 78A** enables a person to request reconsideration in the circumstances set out by the Act; and **s 158A** limits reconsideration merely because a species or other matter is subsequently listed after the referral point in the way explained in class.⁹⁰

Why it matters. For proponents this is a certainty/risk-management issue; for regulators and community participants it is an integrity mechanism. Advice should therefore preserve a clear factual record showing what was known, what was represented and whether later information is genuinely new or merely better evidence of an impact pathway that existed all along.

4.24 Exemptions — prove the statutory doorway before relying on it

The Week 4 materials identify limited exemptions in Chapter 2 Part 4, including provisions such as **ss 29, 33, 38 and 43** in the course's exemption map. The professional rule is strict: identify the exact exemption, every statutory condition and any incorporated agreement/plan before advising that Part 3 approval is unnecessary. The forestry litigation illustrates the danger of treating an exemption label as automatic protection.

⁹⁰. *Environment Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act 1999* (Cth) ss 77(4), 78, 78A, 158A.

Brown v Forestry Tasmania (No 4) [2006] FCA 1729; Forestry Tasmania v Brown [2007] FCAFC 186

Connection to legislation. The argument depended upon the Regional Forest Agreement exemption. The case teaches that an exemption can fail where the legal conditions supporting it are not satisfied. It must also be read with its appellate history.

Client advice. Build an “exemption proof file”: the statutory provision, agreement/plan relied on, factual preconditions, current status, maps and compliance evidence. If any limb is doubtful, advise on the Part 3/referral pathway rather than assuming immunity.

4.25 Consequences, remedies and what is — and is not — a Week 4 remedy

At this stage of the course, the immediate legal consequences taught are primarily **prohibition/offence exposure for taking a controlled action without approval under s 67A**, exposure associated with premature works under **s 74AA**, referral-integrity exposure including **s 489**, and statutory reconsideration under **ss 78/78A**. Broader injunction, judicial-review, merits-review and enforcement architecture is dealt with later in the subject. The exam-safe method is therefore to identify the remedy or consequence the taught provision actually supplies instead of inventing common-law damages where the statute provides a public-law or regulatory response.

Strong conclusion formula. State (1) whether the action should be referred; (2) which Part 3 matters/provisions are plausibly engaged; (3) whether the impact evidence makes controlled-action status reasonably likely; (4) what the proponent must not do yet; (5) what additional evidence is required; (6) the most likely statutory pathway; and (7) the immediate legal/commercial next step.

CHAPTER 4 FAQ QUESTIONS

CHAPTER 4 FAQs — QUESTIONS

1. Is referral the same as Commonwealth approval?

2. Why must I define the “action” before identifying the environmental law?

3. What makes an action a “controlled action”?

4. Can jobs, tourism revenue or climate benefits prevent a controlled-action finding?

5. What is a particular-manner decision and why does it matter?

6. What is the difference between screening, assessment and approval?

7. Why are *Mees* and s 74A important for staged projects?

8. Why is Nathan Dam still important after s 527E?

9. Does a Queensland EIS replace the EPBC Act?

10. Does the precautionary principle require refusal whenever science is uncertain?

11. Can the Minister impose a bond or financial contribution as a condition?

12. Why must appellate history be checked before citing a case?

CHAPTER 4 FAQ ANSWERS

CHAPTER 4 FAQs — ANSWERS

1. No. Referral opens screening. If the action is controlled, assessment follows and the later Part 9 decision determines approval and conditions. Treating referral as approval confuses three different statutory stages.

2. Because the Act regulates an “action” and its impacts. You cannot correctly identify the referral duty, larger-action risk, impact chain or proponent until the legally relevant activity is defined.

3. Section 67 links controlled-action status to Part 3: the action is controlled where taking it without approval would be prohibited by a controlling provision. The analysis therefore requires the exact protected matter and significant-impact pathway.

4. Not at screening. Section 75 is directed to the protected-matter impact question. A socially valuable project can still be controlled or clearly unacceptable. Broader economic/social factors have their proper statutory place later.

5. Under s 77A, the action is not controlled because the decision-maker relies on the action being undertaken in a specified manner. That manner is not optional mitigation language; it is legally critical to the outcome.

6. Screening decides whether Commonwealth approval is required. Assessment builds the evidence about impacts. Approval decides whether the controlled action may proceed and on what conditions.

7. Mees demonstrates why a referral can be misleading through omission; s 74A gives the Minister a mechanism to require the larger action rather than accept an artificial component referral.

8. Nathan Dam teaches the legal problem of indirect consequences. Section 527E now supplies the enacted framework. Use the case to understand the issue and the section to state the current statutory test.

9. No. A Queensland EIS may be accredited through the assessment bilateral agreement and reduce duplication, but it does not automatically remove the Commonwealth approval function.

10. No. Precaution is a mandatory consideration where s 391 applies, but it does not mechanically command refusal. The decision-maker must genuinely address serious/irreversible threats and scientific uncertainty, and consider protective measures.

11. Potentially yes under s 134 if the condition has the necessary statutory nexus to protecting or repairing/mitigating damage to a Part 3 protected matter. A generally worthy environmental payment with no statutory connection is more vulnerable.

12. Because the proposition may have been reversed or qualified. The Wielangta litigation is the ideal reminder: the first-instance s 38 outcome in *Brown* was reversed by the Full Court.

CHAPTER 4 MULTIPLE CHOICE — QUESTIONS

CHAPTER 4 MULTIPLE CHOICE QUESTIONS

1. A developer believes an action probably will not have a significant impact but accepts there is a credible possibility. Which response best reflects s 68?

- A. Referral is impossible unless the developer believes the action is definitely controlled.
- B. If the developer thinks the action may be controlled, it must refer.
- C. Only a State can refer the proposal.
- D. Referral itself grants approval.

2. At the s 75 screening stage, which is the best statement?

- A. The Minister decides the final conditions of approval.
- B. The Minister decides whether the action is controlled and which Part 3 provisions control it.
- C. State approvals cease to apply.
- D. The proponent's economic benefits automatically outweigh environmental harm.

3. RUD separates its access road from the resort referral even though both are functionally integrated. Which provision should immediately be checked?

- A. s 74A.
- B. s 391 only.
- C. s 134 only.
- D. s 10 only.

4. The strongest lesson from *Mees* is:

- A. a referral is safe if no sentence is literally false.
- B. material omission can make referral information misleading in context.
- C. the Minister must independently reconstruct every missing fact.
- D. project staging is always unlawful.

5. Nathan Dam is most useful where:

- A. the only impact is immediate excavation.
- B. a project facilitates downstream/secondary activity that may harm a protected matter.
- C. there is no causal connection at all.
- D. the student wants to avoid applying s 527E.

6. A renewable-energy project has serious Ramsar impacts. Which statement is strongest?

- A. Renewable status exempts it.
- B. Climate benefits guarantee approval.
- C. It must still be tested under the EPBC Act and can be clearly unacceptable.
- D. Ramsar only applies to fossil-fuel projects.

7. A Queensland coordinated-project EIS is accredited for Commonwealth assessment. What follows?

- A. Commonwealth approval jurisdiction necessarily disappears.
- B. The State assessment can be used for Commonwealth purposes, reducing duplication, but the Commonwealth approval decision remains unless another lawful mechanism applies.
- C. EPBC Part 3 no longer applies.
- D. The proponent may ignore Commonwealth conditions.

8. Under s 391, scientific uncertainty means:

- A. approval must always be refused.
- B. uncertainty is irrelevant.
- C. lack of full certainty is not a reason to postpone protective measures where threats of serious/irreversible damage exist.
- D. only State decision-makers consider precaution.

9. RUD receives proposed Commonwealth conditions. What is its clearest statutory opportunity to respond?

- A. s 131AA written comments within 10 business days.
- B. no opportunity exists.
- C. only a post-approval appeal.
- D. s 68 referral comments.

10. A \$10m bond condition will be valid simply because rehabilitation is environmentally desirable.

- A. True.
- B. False — the condition must be within s 134 and have the necessary nexus to a protected matter/action.

CHAPTER 4 MULTIPLE CHOICE — ANSWERS & EXPLANATIONS

CHAPTER 4 MULTIPLE CHOICE ANSWERS

- 1. B.** Section 68(1) deliberately uses “may be or is” controlled. A is wrong because certainty is not required. C is wrong because a proponent can/must refer under s 68. D is wrong because referral starts screening; it is not approval.
- 2. B.** Section 75 is the controlled-action/controlling-provision decision. A belongs later in Part 9. C contradicts s 10. D confuses screening with later statutory consideration of broader matters.
- 3. A.** Section 74A directly addresses a component of a larger action. B/C/D may be relevant elsewhere but do not answer the project-splitting issue.
- 4. B.** *Mees* teaches contextual candour. A is too narrow. C wrongly transfers the proponent’s disclosure problem to the Minister. D overstates the law: genuine separate actions can exist.
- 5. B.** Nathan Dam is the classic indirect/downstream-impact teaching case. A does not engage its distinctive lesson. C lacks the necessary connection. D is wrong because current analysis must use s 527E.
- 6. C.** Statutory impact, not environmental branding, controls. A/B are categorical errors; D is legally nonsensical.
- 7. B.** An assessment bilateral agreement can streamline assessment. It does not automatically extinguish Part 3 or the Commonwealth approval function.

8. C. That is the statutory precautionary formulation. A turns precaution into an automatic prohibition, which it is not. B and D contradict s 391.

9. A. Section 131AA is the direct pre-decision opportunity for the proponent to comment on proposed approval conditions.

10. B. Desirability is not enough. The condition must be authorised by s 134 and connected to the protected matter/action in the way the section requires.

CHAPTER 4 SHORT ANSWER — QUESTIONS

CHAPTER 4 SHORT ANSWER QUESTIONS

1. Explain the relationship between ss 67, 67A and 68.

2. Explain the difference between screening, assessment and approval under Chapter 4 of the EPBC Act.

3. Explain why s 74A matters to project definition.

4. Explain how *Mees* changes the way a lawyer should review a referral.

5. Explain how Nathan Dam and s 527E should be used together.

6. Explain the relationship between s 10 and a Queensland coordinated-project EIS.

7. Explain the statutory role of the precautionary principle in an EPBC approval decision.

8. Explain why a s 134 condition needs a statutory nexus.

CHAPTER 4 SHORT ANSWER — MODEL ANSWERS

CHAPTER 4 SHORT ANSWER MODEL ANSWERS

1. Section 67 identifies when an action is a controlled action by reference to Part 3; s 67A prohibits taking a controlled action without the statutory basis required by the Act; s 68 creates the proponent-referral gateway so the decision-maker can determine controlled-action status. In an exam, connect them rather than reciting them independently.

2. Screening asks whether approval is required (Part 7, especially s 75). Assessment develops the environmental evidence once the action is controlled (Part 8, including s 87 assessment approach). Approval decides whether the controlled action may proceed and on what conditions (Part 9, ss 133-136).

3. Section 74A protects against an artificially narrow component referral. The lawyer must identify the commercially and environmentally coherent action, including connected works, rather than assuming that contract packaging dictates statutory project boundaries.

4. *Mees* shows that literal truth is not enough if omission creates a misleading impression. The lawyer should test connected infrastructure, induced consequences and the larger commercial project before certifying the referral narrative.

5. Nathan Dam explains why indirect third-party consequences can matter. Section 527E now provides the statutory causation test. The best answer uses the case to explain the legal problem and s 527E to state the current law.

6. Section 10 preserves concurrent State law. A coordinated-project EIS may be accredited under the Commonwealth-Queensland assessment bilateral agreement, allowing one assessment process to inform both regimes, but that does not automatically remove the Commonwealth approval decision.

7. For the s 133 approval decision, s 391(1) requires the Minister to take account of the precautionary principle; s 391(1A) separately applies the principle to specified CEO decisions. The principle is engaged by threats of serious/irreversible harm plus scientific uncertainty; it requires genuine consideration of protective measures, not automatic refusal.

8. Section 134 is a statutory condition power, not a general power to fund worthy environmental projects. The condition must connect to protecting a Part 3 matter or repairing/mitigating damage to such a matter caused by the action. That nexus is the legality question.

CHAPTER 4 IRAC / PROFESSIONAL PROBLEMS — QUESTIONS

CHAPTER 4 PROFESSIONAL PROBLEM QUESTIONS

IRAC 1 — Early clearing and seasonal survey

A listed threatened species may occur on land proposed for a 90-hectare residential project. The company has only a winter desktop assessment and wants to clear an access track while its federal referral is pending. Advise the board.

IRAC 2 — Split port referral

A proponent wants to refer only dredging while separately contracting later berths, roads and shipping infrastructure. All components are commercially dependent. Advise on project definition and referral risk.

IRAC 3 — Renewable hub and Ramsar wetland

A major renewable-energy hub delivers substantial emissions benefits but permanently disturbs habitat within and adjacent to a Ramsar wetland used by migratory birds. Management says the project's climate benefits should guarantee approval. Advise.

IRAC 4 — Conditions and board strategy

A controlled action is likely to be approved subject to a large rehabilitation bond, a contribution to an off-site conservation scheme and seasonal no-work windows. The board asks whether it can refuse the conditions after approval and litigate later. Advise on the pre-decision strategy.

CHAPTER 4 IRAC / PROFESSIONAL PROBLEMS — MODEL ANSWERS

CHAPTER 4 DETAILED IRAC MODEL ANSWERS

IRAC 1 — Early clearing and seasonal survey

Issue. Whether referral is required, whether evidence is adequate and whether the access clearing can begin while referral screening is underway.

Law. Identify the threatened-species controlling provision (ss 18/18A as applicable), then ss 67, 67A and 68. If the action/larger action has been referred, s 74AA is critical. The definition of action in s 523 and project-splitting mechanism in s 74A must be considered.

Application. A winter desktop review is not a reliable ecological absence finding if the species is seasonal, cryptic or habitat-dependent. The access track may be part of the larger action rather than a harmless preliminary project. Clearing can also irreversibly destroy the evidence/habitat being assessed. The legal team should stop physical works, commission properly timed field surveys, map habitat and test avoidance/redesign before making the significance assessment.

Counterargument. Management may say the track is minor. That is factual, not dispositive. The question is whether the track is part of the action/larger action and whether it can affect the protected matter.

Conclusion/advice. Do not commence irreversible works merely to protect the construction timetable. Align ecology, referral and construction programming first; document the legal go/no-go gate for the board and contractors.

IRAC 2 — Split port referral

Issue. Whether dredging can be referred as a standalone action without creating s 74A / misleading-referral risk.

Law. Section 74A allows the Minister to reject a component referral where it is part of a larger action the same person proposes. *Mees* emphasises contextual

completeness. Section 527E is relevant to consequences facilitated by the primary action.

Application. Commercial dependence is strong evidence that the components form one project. Separate contracts are not decisive. Map whether dredging is useful only because the berth/road/shipping changes follow, and whether cumulative marine, traffic and habitat consequences arise from the combined development. A referral that describes dredging in isolation risks delay, loss of credibility and a request for the larger action.

Advice. Define and refer the legally coherent project. Explain staging honestly, distinguish genuine future alternatives from committed components, and assess combined impacts.

IRAC 3 — Renewable hub and Ramsar wetland

Issue. Whether broad climate benefit defeats the Ramsar/migratory-species screening and approval risks.

Law. Apply the Ramsar and migratory controlling provisions, ss 67-75 and, if controlled, the later Part 8/9 framework. At s 75, adverse protected-matter impacts are the focus. The clearly-unacceptable pathway can apply despite the project's positive purpose.

Application. Quantify wetland ecological character, migratory habitat use, footprint, alternatives and mitigation. The Asian Renewable Energy Hub revised proposal is a real demonstration that renewable branding cannot displace the statutory protected-matter test.

Conclusion/advice. Redesign should prioritise avoidance of the protected wetland values. Broader benefits may be relevant at later decision stages where the Act permits them, but cannot be used as a shortcut around the controlling provisions.

IRAC 4 — Conditions and board strategy

Issue. How should a proponent respond to proposed conditions and what makes those conditions lawful?

Law. Section 131AA gives the proponent 10 business days to comment on the proposed approval/conditions. Section 134 governs condition power and nexus; s 136 governs approval/condition considerations.

Application. Waiting until after approval wastes the best statutory opportunity to fix ambiguity, excessive security mechanics or a weak nexus. The board should instruct legal/technical teams to prepare evidence-based representations: identify which conditions are accepted, propose drafting alternatives, challenge conditions with no Part 3 nexus, and show how equivalent protection can be achieved more efficiently where appropriate.

Conclusion/advice. Treat s 131AA as a negotiation-and-record-building stage. Preserve legal rights, but use the statutory comment process to improve the decision before resorting to litigation.

CHAPTER 4 RESEARCH & MID-SEMESTER PREPARATION

CHAPTER 4 ATTACK SHEET

60-SECOND PROBLEM METHOD

1. Identify every actor/proponent. 2. Define each “action” and larger-action possibility. 3. Identify jurisdiction and Commonwealth constitutional/statutory hook. 4. Identify exact MNES / Part 3 provision. 5. Draw direct + indirect impact pathways. 6. Ask whether the action may be controlled → s 68. 7. Check disclosure, s 74A and no early works/s 74AA. 8. At s 75 identify controlling provisions, adverse impacts, public comments and s 391 precaution. 9. If controlled, identify s 87 assessment route. 10. At approval map ss 131AA, 133, 134, 136 and conditions. 11. Separately map Queensland/local approvals and any bilateral-assessment pathway. 12. Give practical advice: evidence, timing, redesign, risk, next decision.

CASES — WHAT EACH ONE DOES

Mees: referral candour / omission / larger project. **Nathan Dam:** indirect and downstream impact; now read with s 527E. **Gray:** EIA as an ESD mechanism and cumulative consequences (NSW comparative authority). **Brown (No 4) + Forestry Tasmania v Brown:** exemptions and the essential discipline of checking appellate history. **Leatch:** precautionary reasoning under scientific uncertainty; for EPBC problems start with s 391.

Mid-semester Weeks 1-4 consolidation

By the end of Week 4, the student should be able to move from the broad evolution and values of environmental law, through Commonwealth/State constitutional responsibility and international environmental law, into the actual statutory mechanics of a major-project referral. The exam skill is integration: do not write four disconnected mini-essays. Use the facts to move through **jurisdiction** → **exact law** → **authority** → **evidence** → **application** → **counterargument** → **conclusion**.

Open-book strategy. Index your notes by issues, not merely weeks. Your first tabs should be: Commonwealth power / EPBC architecture; MNES + controlling provisions; “action” ss 523-524A; ss 67-68; ss 74-75; s 74A; s 74AA; s 77A; s 87; s 391; Nathan

Dam/s 527E; Commonwealth-State/bilateral assessment; approval conditions ss 131AA, 133-136. That lets you reach the legal test quickly under exam time pressure.

Authoritative resources

[*Environment Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act 1999* \(Cth\) — current authorised compilation](#)

[EPBC Act Public Portal — referrals, decisions and project documents](#)

[Commonwealth-Queensland EPBC assessment bilateral information](#)

[*State Development and Public Works Organisation Act 1971* \(Qld\)](#)

[Mees v Roads Corporation \[2003\] FCA 306](#)

[Minister for the Environment and Heritage v Queensland Conservation Council Inc \[2004\] FCAFC 190](#)

[Gray v Minister for Planning \[2006\] NSWLEC 720](#)

[Brown v Forestry Tasmania \(No 4\) \[2006\] FCA 1729](#)

[Forestry Tasmania v Brown \[2007\] FCAFC 186](#)

FINAL PROFESSIONAL CHECK

Before a client commits to works, you should be able to answer: **What is the action? Who is the proponent? What Part 3 matters can be affected? What evidence supports significance? What cannot lawfully happen yet? What assessment pathway follows? What State process runs alongside it? What conditions/security could affect project economics? What is the next legal decision gate?**

End of Week 4 integrated teaching. Week 5 material will extend the assessment/approval pathway when supplied.

WEEK 5 • CHAPTER 5 — IN DEVELOPMENT

ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT ASSESSMENT UNDER THE EPBC ACT — PART 2: ASSESSMENT, APPROVAL AND CONDITIONS

SOURCE-LOCKED PLACEHOLDER

Week 5 seminar material will complete the Commonwealth assessment and approval pathway.

No substantive law has been invented for this chapter. It will be built from Adrian's supplied live seminar/tutorial/source materials, reconciled with current authoritative law, and then completed using the locked narrative, AGLC4, tutorial, FAQ, MCQ, short-answer, IRAC, crossword and attack-sheet structure.

WEEK 7 • CHAPTER 6 — IN DEVELOPMENT

LICENSING OF ACTIVITIES

SOURCE-LOCKED PLACEHOLDER

Reserved for the State-focused environmental licensing teaching material supplied after the Week 7 seminar.

No substantive law has been invented for this chapter. It will be built from Adrian's supplied live seminar/tutorial/source materials, reconciled with current authoritative law, and then completed using the locked narrative, AGLC4, tutorial, FAQ, MCQ, short-answer, IRAC, crossword and attack-sheet structure.

WEEK 8 • CHAPTER 7 — IN DEVELOPMENT

CONTAMINATED LAND AND LAND CLEARING

SOURCE-LOCKED PLACEHOLDER

Reserved for the contaminated-land and land-clearing teaching material supplied after the Week 8 seminar.

No substantive law has been invented for this chapter. It will be built from Adrian's supplied live seminar/tutorial/source materials, reconciled with current authoritative law, and then completed using the locked narrative, AGLC4, tutorial, FAQ, MCQ, short-answer, IRAC, crossword and attack-sheet structure.

WEEK 9 • CHAPTER 8 — IN DEVELOPMENT

COMMON LAW AND THE ENVIRONMENT

SOURCE-LOCKED PLACEHOLDER

Reserved for the common-law environmental teaching material supplied after the Week 9 seminar.

No substantive law has been invented for this chapter. It will be built from Adrian's supplied live seminar/tutorial/source materials, reconciled with current authoritative law, and then completed using the locked narrative, AGLC4, tutorial, FAQ, MCQ, short-answer, IRAC, crossword and attack-sheet structure.

WEEK 10 • CHAPTER 9 — IN DEVELOPMENT

BUSINESS, CORPORATIONS AND THE ENVIRONMENT

SOURCE-LOCKED PLACEHOLDER

Reserved for the business/corporations environmental teaching material supplied after the Week 10 seminar.

No substantive law has been invented for this chapter. It will be built from Adrian's supplied live seminar/tutorial/source materials, reconciled with current authoritative law, and then completed using the locked narrative, AGLC4, tutorial, FAQ, MCQ, short-answer, IRAC, crossword and attack-sheet structure.

WEEK 11 • CHAPTER 10 — IN DEVELOPMENT

ENVIRONMENTAL DISPUTES AND LITIGATION

SOURCE-LOCKED PLACEHOLDER

Reserved for the environmental disputes and litigation teaching material supplied after the Week 11 seminar.

No substantive law has been invented for this chapter. It will be built from Adrian's supplied live seminar/tutorial/source materials, reconciled with current authoritative law, and then completed using the locked narrative, AGLC4, tutorial, FAQ, MCQ, short-answer, IRAC, crossword and attack-sheet structure.

WEEK 12 • CHAPTER 11 — IN DEVELOPMENT

COURSE REVIEW AND EXAMINATION PREPARATION

SOURCE-LOCKED PLACEHOLDER

Reserved for the Week 12 course review, integrated revision and final examination preparation material.

No substantive law has been invented for this chapter. It will be built from Adrian's supplied live seminar/tutorial/source materials, reconciled with current authoritative law, and then completed using the locked narrative, AGLC4, tutorial, FAQ, MCQ, short-answer, IRAC, crossword and attack-sheet structure.

ABOUT THE AUTHOR



Dr Adrian Adams has long held a profound and deeply personal passion for environmental conservation, the natural world and the protection of the places and ecosystems that sustain us. An avid surfer and lifelong lover of the ocean, marine life, wildlife and the outdoors, Adrian's environmental values extend far beyond academic interest - they form an important part of the way he sees the world and the future we leave behind.

Environmentally conscious, biophilic, conservation-minded and stewardship-focused, Adrian believes that progress should not require abandoning our responsibility to nature. His interests encompass the protection of oceans and coastlines, marine environments, biodiversity, wildlife, ecosystems, climate awareness and the responsible stewardship of land and natural resources.

Working extensively in property and development, Adrian brings a distinctive real-world perspective to environmental law. He understands the commercial, planning and practical realities of creating homes, communities and urban environments while also recognising the responsibility to minimise ecological footprints and preserve environmental values.

His philosophy is that development and conservation do not have to exist in opposition. Through responsible planning, thoughtful design, environmental law and informed commercial decision-making, Adrian advocates for a more symbiotic relationship between the built and natural environments.

His connection to the ocean remains central to that outlook. Surfing, coastal environments and marine life continually reinforce his appreciation of how valuable - and how vulnerable - the natural world can be.

ABOUT THE BOOK

Can progressive urban growth and meaningful ecological preservation successfully coexist?

In an era of expanding cities, increasing development pressures and significant environmental and climate challenges, the intersection of property development, planning, design and environmental law has never been more important.

Environmental Law: A Study and Teaching Guide moves beyond dry legal theory to transform complex Australian environmental law into a practical, accessible and real-world learning framework.

Drawing together Commonwealth, State and local legislation, leading cases, regulatory authorities, environmental principles, worked examples, tutorials, issue spotting and detailed model answers, the book teaches readers not simply what the law says, but why it matters, how it operates and how to apply it.

A central theme runs throughout the book: responsible property development and environmental stewardship need not automatically be competing objectives. Thoughtful planning, sound legal reasoning, sustainable design and environmental consciousness can help create outcomes that recognise both human needs and ecological responsibility.

Whether you are a law student, environmental science student, planner, property professional, developer or future decision-maker, this guide is designed to help you understand environmental law with confidence and apply it in the real world.

KEY FEATURES

AUSTRALIAN ENVIRONMENTAL LAW

Commonwealth, State and local legal frameworks.

EXACT LAW & AUTHORITIES

Legislation, cases and practical application.

TUTORIAL & IRAC GUIDANCE

Issue spotting, legal reasoning and model answers.

DEVELOPMENT & CONSERVATION

Planning, approvals, compliance and environmental protection.

PRACTICAL REVISION

FAQs, quizzes, worked problems and detailed answers.